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INTRODUCTION
Eva Brems and Alexandra Timmer
Stereotyping has emerged as a human rights law topic. Stereotypes assign certain 
roles and characteristics to a group. Examples include the notions that women 
are nurturing and weak, men combative and powerful, and gays promiscuous 
and unsuited to parenting. Such stereotypes can deeply impact the enjoyment 
of human rights. They reinforce inequality and discrimination. Several human 
rights treaties therefore mention that states are under an obligation to combat 
stereotyping. Examples include Article 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); Article 8(b) of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); and Articles 12 
and 14 of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention). 
Increasingly, human rights courts and treaty bodies – including the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR), the CEDAW Committee, and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) – voice concerns about stereotyping and insist 
that states should not enforce harmful stereotypes.
Nevertheless, stereotypes have so far received little sustained consideration 
from human rights law scholars. The literature has largely been confined either 
to domestic borders (ie focusing on American equal protection law),1 or to 
single human rights treaties (typically CEDAW),2 or to a single ground (namely 
gender). The stereotyping concept is markedly further developed in the context of 
gender discrimination compared to other grounds of discrimination, raising the 
question how well the concept travels to other grounds. This volume is innovative 
by taking a broad view on the human rights dimensions of stereotyping. The book 
investigates different stereotyping grounds – namely race, gender, and disability – 
1 eg Cary Franklin, ‘The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law’ 
(2010) 85 New York University Law Review 83; Neil S Siegel and Reva B Siegel, ‘Struck By 
Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination’ (2010) 
59 Duke Law Journal 771.
2 eg Rebecca J Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2010); Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Article 5 CEDAW’ in Marsha A 
Freeman, Christine Chinkin and Beate Rudolf (eds), The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women: A Commentary (OUP 2012).
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as well as different human rights bodies and courts, including the UN system, the 
ECtHR and the IACtHR.
1. STEREOTYPING AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE: 
CROSSCUTTING THEMES
As a human rights issue, stereotyping raises several important crosscutting 
themes. We will discuss three of them below. The first theme is how to conceive 
of stereotypes, the second is how to distinguish harmful from acceptable 
stereotyping, and the third is the role of courts and treaty bodies in addressing 
stereotypes. These are all contested topics, which the authors in this volume 
address in different ways.
The first theme, how to conceive of stereotypes, is conceptual. There is 
extensive social psychology literature on this topic,3 but it remains an open 
question what conceptualisation is most useful in human rights law contexts. In 
their book entitled Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives, Rebecca 
Cook and Simone Cusack have proposed the following definition of a stereotype: 
‘a generalized view or preconception of attributes or characteristics possessed by, 
or the roles that should be performed by, members of a particular group’.4 This 
definition, or something akin to it, is also used by several of the authors in the 
present volume focusing on gender and race stereotyping.5 Cook and Cusack’s 
definition underlines that stereotypes can both be descriptive and normative in 
content. Often, the descriptive and the normative lie very close together, as in 
the ‘women are homemakers’ and ‘women should be homemakers’ stereotype. 
Moreover, the definition is neutral in the sense that it can encompass both 
positive and negative preconceptions.6 It would be a mistake to think, however, 
that only negative stereotypes – of the variety ‘women are weak’ or ‘Roma are 
thieves’ – have negative consequences. Positive stereotypes can be malignant 
too.7 Salient examples are the many benevolent yet patronising stereotypes about 
3 Good introductions include Charles Stangor (ed), Stereotypes and Prejudice: Essential 
Readings (Psychology Press 2000); Todd D Nelson (ed), Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping 
and Discrimination (Psychology Press 2009); John F Dovidio et al (eds), The SAGE Handbook 
of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination (SAGE 2010).
4 Cook and Cusack (n 2) 9.
5 Cusack (ch 2); Cook and Weiss (ch 8); Möschel draws on a similar definition: ‘beliefs about 
another group in such terms as personality traits, attributions, or behavioural descriptions’ 
(ch 6); Peroni and Timmer simply conceive of stereotypes as ‘beliefs about groups of people’ 
(ch 3).
6 Not every author in this volume takes the same view, however. Perlin stresses that stereotypes 
typify in negative ways, and that, when applied to persons with disabilities, there is no evidence 
of positive stereotyping (see ch 5).
7 See eg Peter Glick and Susan T Fiske, ‘An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism 
as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality’ (2001) 56 American Psychologist 109; 
John T Jost and Aaron C Kay, ‘Exposure to Benevolent Sexism and Complementary Gender 
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women: when women are held to be nurturing, warm and caring, this serves to 
justify a system of patriarchy where men perform the leading roles and women 
the supportive ones.
Not all stereotyping can or should be eliminated, however. There are two 
main reasons for this, one legal and the other psychological. The legal reason 
is that law is inevitably based on classifications and generalisations. Equality 
scholars have long emphasised this.8 Classifications are usually based on 
stereotypes, as when the law prohibits people below a certain age to drive (the 
stereotype at issue is that children are reckless). Thus law cannot be purged from 
all stereotyping. The second reason is that, as an empirical psychological matter, 
all people stereotype. Stereotypes serve several psychological functions: they can 
both ‘supplement an information-impoverished environment’ and ‘reduce the 
complexity of an information-rich environment’.9 In other words, stereotypes 
provide predictability.10 Another psychological function of stereotypes concerns 
our feelings about ourselves. Stereotyping is a ‘self-image-maintenance’ strategy.11
This brings us to the second crosscutting theme. As not all stereotyping can 
or need be eliminated, legal scholars and judges face the perennial difficulty of 
distinguishing between harmful and acceptable stereotyping. In her chapter, 
Verónica Undurraga calls this ‘separating the wheat from the chaff’.12 Legal 
scholars seem to agree that identifying harmful stereotypes requires a form of 
contextual analysis.13 But there is no consensus as to what kind of contextual 
aspects courts should take into account. This comes as no surprise: not only is 
there no consensus in the scholarship, but the approach of national courts to the 
question of what makes stereotypes harmful also varies greatly. For example, the 
US Supreme Court regularly invalidates measures that are based on protective 
stereotyping (in other words: stereotyping that serves the purpose of ameliorating 
Stereotypes: Consequences for Specific and Diffuse Forms of System Justification’ (2005) 88 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 498.
8 eg Joseph Tussman and Jacobus ten Broek, ‘The Equal Protection of the Laws’ (1949) 37 
California Law Review 341, 343–344. See also more generally John H Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press 1980) 156 (‘[s]tereotypes … are 
the inevitable stuff of legislation’); Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 
(Belknap Press 2006).
9 Charles Stangor and Mark Schaller, ‘Stereotypes as Individual and Collective Representations’ 
in Charles Stangor (ed), Stereotypes and Prejudice: Essential Readings (Psychology Press 2000) 
74.
10 Cook and Cusack (n 2) 14–15.
11 Steven Fein and Steven J Spencer, ‘Prejudice as Self-Image Maintenance: Affirming the Self 
Through Derogating Others’ in Charles Stangor (ed), Stereotypes and Prejudice: Essential 
Readings (Psychology Press 2000) 186.
12 See Undurraga (ch 4).
13 Alexandra Timmer, ‘Judging Stereotypes: What the European Court of Human Rights Can 
Borrow from American and Canadian Equal Protection Law’ (2015) 63 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 239, 279–281.
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the position of a disadvantaged group), whereas the Supreme Court of Canada is 
much more likely to approve such stereotyping.14
What does the challenge to distinguish harmful stereotypes entail, more 
specifically, in the framework of human rights law? Stereotypes become 
problematic when they operate to deny individuals their human rights.15 Thus, 
in human rights law, identifying harmful stereotyping requires identifying 
whether the application of a stereotype constitutes a human rights violation in 
itself, and/or whether the application of a stereotype is a contributing factor in 
a human rights violation. An example of the first scenario is when a state does 
not accord fathers parental leave, because mothers are supped to take care of 
children. This scenario was at issue in the ECtHR case of Konstantin Markin v 
Russia.16 An example of the second scenario, where stereotyping was a factor that 
contributed to a human rights violation, can be found in the ECtHR case of V.C. v 
Slovakia, concerning the forced sterilisation of a Roma woman.17 The physician of 
V.C. had noted in her medical file ‘patient is of Roma origin’.18 Stereotypes about 
the high birth-rate of Roma women, coupled to the stereotype that Roma want 
to live of social benefits,19 might have influenced the doctor in performing the 
forced sterilisation – which in turn is a violation of the prohibition of degrading 
treatment and the right to private and family life (Articles 3 and 8 ECHR).
This raises the third and last crosscutting theme, namely what courts 
(including both regional human rights courts and national courts) and treaty 
bodies can and should do to address harmful stereotypes. The first step, authors 
in this volume agree, is that courts should name stereotypes properly in their legal 
reasoning.20 Naming stereotyping entails identifying what beliefs about groups of 
people are at play in a case, and it also entails exposing what harms these beliefs 
do. Naming stereotypes makes them visible. Naming stereotypes is a prerequisite 
for changing them. The second step is that courts and treaty bodies should 
clarify – as much as possible – the state’s obligations as regards stereotyping. In 
the first place state obligations are negative in character: states ought to refrain 
from legislating or acting on the basis of harmful stereotypes. But that is not all. 
States have also a more proactive role to play. States’ positive obligation to address 
stereotypes regards the question what role states can play in preventing officials 
from relying on harmful stereotypes and in ensuring that individuals do not 
stereotype each other in harmful ways.
14 Ibid 275–278.
15 Cook and Cusack (n 2) 20.
16 Konstantin Markin v Russia (2013) 56 EHRR 8.
17 V.C. v Slovakia ECHR 2011-V 381. See similarly N.B. v Slovakia App no 29518/10 (ECtHR, 
12 June 2012); I.G. and Others v Slovakia App no 15966/04 (ECtHR, 13 November 2012).
18 V.C. (n 17) para 150.
19 Ibid para 146.
20 Cook and Cusack (n 2) 39–70.
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUME
The institutional framework that has been created for the international monitoring 
of states’ respect for human rights is pluriform and fragmented. The first three 
chapters of the volume single out for separate analysis the three layers or fora that 
can be considered to be leading in terms of setting standards for human rights 
law overall. These are the United Nations Treaty Bodies (Chapter 2), the European 
Court of Human Rights (Chapter 3) and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Chapter 4).
In human rights treaty provisions, references to stereotyping are scarce. 
They can be found neither in the European Convention on Human Rights and 
its additional protocols, nor in the American Convention on Human Rights and 
its protocols. Yet, among the United Nations human rights treaties that address 
specific target groups, two explicitly include a reference to stereotypes. In that 
respect it is interesting to note that the CEDAW, which was adopted in 1979, is 
the first treaty of this type, and the CRPD, which was adopted in 2006, is the 
most recent one. Moreover, the provision on stereotyping in the CRPD is more 
elaborate than that in CEDAW. Even though the concept of stereotyping has not 
prominently risen to the forefront in the intervening decades, this shows that 
combatting harmful stereotypes has for a long time been considered a relevant 
aspect of the United Nations agenda for the protection of the human rights of 
individuals belonging to specific categories, and that it remains a feature on this 
agenda today.
In Chapter 2, Simone Cusack analyses the engagement of the UN Treaty 
Bodies and Special Mechanisms with the concept of stereotyping. She finds 
that, as a result of the work of the CEDAW Committee, references to gender 
stereotyping are most common. In her analysis of the CEDAW Committee’s 
work, Cusack finds increasing nuance in the language that is used to engage with 
gender stereotyping, as well as increasing depth in the analysis of the impact of 
stereotyping. In terms of commonality of referencing, disability stereotyping 
comes second. Nevertheless, Cusack finds neither the CEDAW Committee 
nor the CRPD Committee systematically and consistently integrate an anti-
stereotyping approach in their work, and that a lot of work remains to be done to 
further develop such an approach. References to other types of stereotyping (eg 
racial stereotyping) occasionally occur in the UN mechanisms, yet Cusack finds 
that these have been mostly weak and ad hoc. Missed opportunities abound to 
strengthen the analysis of human rights violations by pointing out the harmful 
work of stereotyping. The chapter adopts a constructive approach, putting the 
finger on the main weaknesses of current approaches, and suggesting strategies to 
overcome these. Cusack emphasises in particular the need to accurately identify 
stereotypes. This implies distinguishing them from related concepts, such as 
myths or prejudice, as well as distinguishing between the actual stereotypes and 
the assumptions that underpin them. In Cusack’s opinion, correctly naming the 
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stereotype at work is crucial to avoid ‘concealment of the specific belief that needs 
to be modified or transformed and the practice that needs to be eliminated’. In 
addition, she points at the importance of elaborating state obligations related to 
stereotyping.
Chapter 3, by Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer, combines a focus on 
a single forum (the European Court of Human Rights) with a thematic focus 
on domestic violence cases. Thus, the authors’ starting point is not the intrinsic 
harm of stereotyping as such, but rather its pernicious role as a facilitator of other 
human rights violations. Concretely, they discuss gender stereotyping as ‘one of 
the factors that structurally contribute to domestic violence and ineffective state 
responses’. The authors find the confirmation of this structural link in international 
human rights law, in particular in the work of the CEDAW Committee and in the 
Istanbul Convention. This implies that gender-based violence cannot be tackled 
without addressing the gender stereotypes in which it is rooted. In that context, it 
is vital that those combatting gender-based violence avoid reiterating narratives 
of vulnerability that may reconfirm harmful gender stereotypes. In line with 
Cusack’s argument (cf Chapter 2), the authors put a lot of emphasis on naming 
stereotypes. In a careful analysis of the European Court’s domestic violence case 
law, they identify at least five distinct gender stereotypes, and explain how they 
work. Like Cusack, they also adopt a constructive approach that shows the way 
forward. In addition to naming stereotypes, they argue that the Court should 
contest them. They argue that the Court should stipulate positive state obligations 
to address the stereotypes that are at the root of domestic violence. In addition, 
they argue that evidence that state agents gender stereotyped the victim and/or 
the perpetrator of domestic violence, should lead to a finding of discrimination.
If we wanted to stereotype regional human rights courts, the ECtHR would be 
typecast as very prudent, always looking over its shoulder for the political reaction 
its judgments might cause, preferring incremental over radical approaches, and 
electing to be silent about potentially controversial issues that it need not strictly 
address. In contrast, the IACtHR might be presented as the daughter of many 
revolutions, preferring big steps over small ones, and not shying away from strong 
language or highly innovative interpretations.
The kernel of truth in this deliberately overstated comparison explains the 
change in approach between Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 4, Verónica Undurraga 
analyses the Inter-American Court’s approach to gender stereotyping. While the 
European Court needs some encouragement to engage in stereotyping analysis 
(cf  Chapter 3), its American counterpart might instead need to exercise some 
caution, the author explains. Undurraga presents a detailed analysis of two 
flagship cases, the Cotton Field case about gender-based violence, and the Atala 
Riffo case about loss of child custody on account of sexual orientation. In both 
cases, the Court explicitly and in some detail discusses gender stereotypes as 
part of the structural causes of the human rights violations that were at stake. 
The author explains how they reveal the Inter-American Court’s substantive and 
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transformative vision of (gender) equality. This extends to the Court’s decisions 
on reparation measures, a field in which the European Court does not even tread. 
The author applauds the Court’s educational and expressive role, yet she also 
issues a number of warnings. Firstly, Undurraga points at the numerous legal 
hurdles that lie ahead if the Court wants to continue on this road. Challenging 
the Court to further develop its doctrine on stereotyping, she points out the need 
to target not stereotypes as such but rather to distinguish a subset of ‘harmful’ 
stereotypes, which requires the development of criteria on the basis of which this 
distinction can be operated. In addition, the author sees a need for the Court 
to more clearly define the aim of its interventions in this field and to adapt its 
language and reparatory measures accordingly. One reason why such strong legal 
anchoring of the Court’s anti-stereotyping doctrine might be needed is presented 
in the chapter’s last section, which predicts a conservative backlash against the 
Court on account of what is perceived as its radical gender ideology.
To the extent that international human rights law has engaged with 
stereotyping, this has mostly been in the form of gender stereotyping. And as 
these chapters show, many interesting lessons can be drawn from this experience 
that affect stereotyping on other grounds. This book focuses on other types 
of stereotyping, and it does so in detail in Chapter 5 about (mental) disability 
stereotyping and Chapter 6 on racial stereotyping.
In Chapter 5, Michael Perlin proposes the term ‘sanism’ as an analogy to 
racism and sexism for discussions about (legal) attitudes to people with mental 
disabilities. Sanism is based on stereotypes and stigma and, according to the 
author, pervades every area of mental disability law. Perlin does not recognise 
a need to distinguish harmful from other stereotypes vis-à-vis persons with 
disabilities, as in his opinion ‘there is no evidence of any “positive” stereotyping 
with regard to this population’. Using examples that are mainly from domestic 
US law, Perlin identifies many of the stereotypes that are at work in this context, 
analyses how they function, and the harm they inflict on individuals’ dignity. 
Perlin uncovers sanist stereotypes in the legal process, as well as in legislative 
debate. He underscores the importance of law and court rulings in this field with 
reference to the scholarship on ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’. Law has a therapeutic 
potential, yet this potential is too often wasted. The author argues that ‘sanism has 
never been taken as seriously as racism, sexism or homophobia’. Yet he sees some 
glimmers of hope. One of these is based in a number of US and international court 
decisions that have acknowledged the negative impact of sanist stereotyping. 
The other is the CRPD: ‘if taken seriously, the CRPD can potentially be the best 
weapon – ever – in the fight against sanist stereotypes that stigmatize persons 
with disabilities’.
In Chapter 6 as well, the evidence of an anti-stereotyping approach is limited. 
In his analysis of racial stereotyping as a human rights issue, Mathias Möschel 
identifies a mostly untapped potential for integrating this approach in international 
human rights norms and cases on racial discrimination. His exploration includes 
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both the identification of racial stereotyping as a human rights violation in its own 
right, and its contribution to other human rights violations, in particular those 
involving violence – namely genocide, and racially motivated violence by state as 
well as private actors. In the case law of the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia, as well as in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights about violence against Roma, Möschel finds a few 
examples that show some recognition that racist stereotypes leading to violence 
constitute a human rights problem. Yet these examples remain exceptional, and 
they fail to show an in-depth understanding of the impact of such stereotypes. 
Outside the context of violence, Möschel finds isolated examples of good practice: 
the European Court’s case law on racist bias by domestic courts, and the UN 
Human Rights Committee’s decision on racial profiling as discrimination. Yet 
his overall finding is that ‘the recognition of racial stereotypes by binding human 
rights law is haphazard at best, quite limited, and rarely explicit’. That is why he 
turns to non-binding law, exploring the role of stereotypes in the work of the 
UN CERD Committee and of the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI). He finds that in the work of the CERD Committee, racial 
stereotyping is acknowledged to some extent, in particular in its observations 
on state reports under Article 7 CERD, concerning the obligation of ‘combating 
prejudices which lead to racial discrimination’, and in its case law interpreting 
Article 4 CERD, on the obligation to tackle racist hate speech. Yet the CERD 
Committee does not use the term ‘stereotypes’ as such. This is different for 
the ECRI, which has explicitly addressed racial stereotyping in some of its 
recommendations and country reports. In the opinion of Möschel, ‘possibly the 
ECRI is the most advanced institution in openly acknowledging and addressing 
the issue of racial stereotypes under human rights law’. The author thinks that 
more attention is needed for the role of racial stereotypes in human rights fora. 
He suggests that the CERD Committee adopt a general recommendation about 
Article 7 CERD that is similar to General Recommendation No 25 of the CEDAW 
Committee on Article 5 CEDAW. Moreover, seeing parallels with gender 
stereotypes also at a more fundamental level, Möschel suggests using the concept 
of indirect discrimination to show the negative impact of racist stereotypes.
The volume concludes with two fascinating case studies.
In Chapter 7, Rikki Holtmaat presents the case of the SGP, an orthodox 
Calvinist political party in the Netherlands that up to 2013 refused to present 
female candidates for elections on its list. This situation gave rise to no less than 
fourteen legal procedures, in which the SGP was ultimately defeated. Nevertheless, 
Holtmaat argues that this case illustrates that equality law may not be the most 
suitable tool to combat gender stereotypes. Among the fourteen legal procedures 
on the topic, only one addressed the gender stereotypes at the basis of the party’s 
ideology. Holtmaat finds that ‘legally construing the SGP’s exclusion of women 
from political participation as an issue of unequal treatment of women, to a large 
extent stood in the way of effectively redressing the gender stereotypes at stake 
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in these procedures’. The author argues that the anti-discrimination framework 
led to a distortive representation of the stakes for women. In her opinion, the 
heart of the matter was not a disadvantage as compared to men, but rather the 
situation in which women did not have a say in defining what their community 
considers an appropriate role for them, and the fact that the Dutch State, through 
its subsidies for this party, facilitated the dissemination of gender stereotypes. 
Holtmaat objects strongly to the framing of the case in terms of conflicting 
fundamental rights. This came down to a defence of a discriminatory rule by 
an appeal on traditional patriarchal values, which cannot be accepted in light 
of the State’s commitment under Article 5 CEDAW to eradicate patriarchal 
gender stereotypes. She concludes that gender justice requires different, more 
sophisticated legal metaphors than those of ‘balancing’ and ‘conflicting rights’.
Finally, Chapter 8, by Rebecca Cook and Cornelia Weiss, looks at gender 
stereotyping in the military. The military is a highly relevant setting for the study 
of gender stereotyping, as it is directly related with the exercise of power and as it 
has traditionally been associated with core traits of ‘masculinity’: ‘where women 
take on warrior and leadership roles that have traditionally belonged to men, 
hostile stereotyping emerges to keep women out of, invisible in, or relegated to 
support roles in, the military rather than embraced by it’. The authors present a 
rich pallette of domestic and regional cases that have analysed potential gendered 
violations of the fundamental rights of women and men in the military. Their 
cases illustrate that gender stereotyping may harm men as well as women, and 
that harmful stereotypes about women may be at the heart a case that is ostensibly 
about discrimination against men (eg the ECtHR case of Konstantin Markin v 
Russia about parental leave). The authors distinguish three types of cases. In the 
first type, exclusion cases, unsubstantiated generalisations are at work; yet courts 
have intervened without explicitly naming the stereotypes. In the other types 
of cases, concerning unequal treatment and sexual assault, courts have named 
the stereotypes (which were under-inclusive generalisations in the first category 
and false stereotypes in the second), and have discussed the harm they inflict at 
individual and group level. The authors hypothesise that the difference can be 
explained by the degree of awareness-raising that had already been done about 
gender prejudices in the military.
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TOWARDS CHANGE
How the UN’s Response 
to Stereotyping is Evolving
Simone Cusack*
1. INTRODUCTION
The number of human rights issues commanding and deserving attention 
throughout the world is undeniably shocking.1 A broad range of factors affect 
whether or not any of those issues receive attention, as well as any action that 
is taken to address them. If and how the United Nations (UN) responds to 
particular human rights issues is one factor that is often critical in generating and 
sustaining interest in an issue.2 It can also be important in the identification of 
solutions that will bring about real change in respect of that issue – ones that are 
capable of ensuring the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
This chapter examines the UN’s evolving response to one particular human 
rights issue, namely stereotyping.3 It explains that interest in gender stereotyping 
* The author would like to thank Prof Eva Brems and Dr Alexandra Timmer for their leadership 
in organising the ‘Stereotyping as a Human Rights Issue’ conference, held in December 
2013. Special thanks are also due to Professor Rebecca J Cook for her constant leadership, 
contributions, collaborations and insightful comments on the issue of stereotyping and 
earlier drafts of this chapter, as well as the Women’s Human Rights and Gender Section of 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the anonymous reviewers and the 
conference participants for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Any errors are the 
responsibility of the author alone. This chapter is written in the author’s personal capacity. 
With few exceptions, the information, laws and jurisprudence referred to in this chapter were 
current as at March 2015.
1 See eg Human Rights Watch, World Report: Events of 2013 (Human Rights Watch 2014).
2 See eg Free & Equal, the United Nations campaign for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
equality <https://www.unfe.org/en> accessed 23 March 2015.
3 The term ‘stereotyping’ is used in this chapter to refer to the ‘process of ascribing to an 
individual specific attributes, characteristics, or roles by reason only of her or his membership 
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has increased significantly within the UN over the past five or so years and that 
interest in disability stereotyping has also grown during this time, albeit to a far 
lesser extent. It argues that the heightened interest in, and examination of, gender 
and disability stereotyping has contributed to improved UN responses to those 
types of stereotyping, which has, in turn, aided the identification of solutions that 
seek to bring about change for people experiencing those types of stereotyping. 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 
Committee or Committee), it is claimed, has been a leader in this regard.
While there has been a noticeable evolution in responses to gender and (to 
a lesser extent) disability stereotyping over the past half-decade, the chapter 
contends that UN human rights mechanisms have given comparatively little 
attention to other types of stereotyping and that their responses to this issue have 
been ad hoc and weak as a result. A number of reasons are offered for the differing 
responses: the absence of express treaty obligations dealing with those other types 
of stereotyping; the limited awareness amongst many UN mechanisms of relevant 
treaty obligations;4 and the failure of many UN mechanisms to identify, and 
seize opportunities to hold States Parties accountable for, relevant stereotyping 
violations.
Notwithstanding the changing UN responses to gender and disability 
stereotyping over the past half-decade, greater efforts are needed to strengthen UN 
responses to other types of stereotyping. In this, it is suggested, there are crucial 
lessons to be learned from the UN’s evolving responses to gender stereotyping. 
At the same time, it is claimed that there is still considerable room to improve 
UN responses to gender and disability stereotyping, including by expanding the 
range of UN mechanisms that engage with those types of stereotyping and further 
strengthening the analysis of their impact on human rights. This chapter suggests 
that the CEDAW Committee’s work on gender stereotyping will provide a solid 
foundation upon which to continue strengthening UN responses to stereotyping. 
However, it also suggests that reliance on the Committee’s work will not alone 
be sufficient to address all types of stereotyping; it is incumbent on all UN 
human rights mechanisms, supported by the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR or Office) and human rights advocates, to address 
stereotyping as part of their respective mandates.
The chapter begins in section 2 by critically analysing some of the key 
developments in UN responses to stereotyping over the past half-decade. Building 
on research the author completed for the OHCHR,5 it examines: the growing 
in a particular group’. See Rebecca J Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: 
Transnational Legal Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010) 12.
4 See section 2.1.3 below.
5 Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping as a Human Rights Violation: Research Report, 
Commissioned by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2013) 20–41, 
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/2013-Gender-Stereotyping-as-HR-
Violation.docx> accessed 28 March 2015.
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visibility of gender and disability stereotyping within the UN; the increasing 
sophistication of UN analyses of those types of stereotyping; and, the recent 
leadership the OHCHR has shown on the issue. Section 3 then highlights some 
of the main weaknesses in current responses to stereotyping, namely the regular 
failure of many UN mechanisms to identify stereotypes accurately, the lack of 
guidance provided to date on relevant human rights obligations, and the limited 
awareness of good practice examples of challenging stereotyping. Section 3 also 
identifies strategies for strengthening UN responses to this issue, with a view to 
continuing to build momentum towards the identification and implementation of 
solutions that will bring about real change. It suggests that further work is needed 
to build the capacity of UN mechanisms to understand, identify and challenge 
stereotypes. It also suggests that UN mechanisms should take additional steps 
to elaborate state obligations related to stereotyping. And lastly it calls on UN 
mechanisms to identify and highlight practices that are bringing about positive 
change in relation to stereotyping. The chapter concludes with a brief reflection 
on how UN mechanisms can translate the current momentum around the issue 
of gender stereotyping into real and meaningful change moving forward.
2. KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN UN RESPONSES 
TO STEREOTYPING
State obligations to address stereotyping long have been a feature of international 
human rights law. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW),6 adopted in 1979, was the first international human 
rights treaty to introduce express obligations on stereotyping. In general terms, 
it requires States Parties to modify or transform harmful gender stereotypes and 
eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping.7 Further obligations were introduced 
in 2006, with the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), which requires States Parties to take measures to combat 
stereotypes of people with disabilities.8 Two further treaties, adopted in 1989 
and 1965 respectively, are also noteworthy. The Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) appears to reject the stereotype that all children are immature and 
therefore incapable of making informed decisions or expressing informed views, 
by requiring their evolving capacities to be taken into account and their views to be 
6 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 
18  December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW). See 
generally Marsha A Freeman, Christine Chinkin and Beate Rudolf (eds), The UN Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: A Commentary (OUP 2012).
7 CEDAW, preambular para 14, Arts 2(f), 5, 10(c). See also R.K.B. v Turkey, Communication 
No 28/2010, UN Doc CEDAW/C/51/D/28/2010 (2012) para 8.8.
8 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered 
into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD) Arts 4(1)(b), 8(1)(b).
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given due weight.9 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) requires States Parties to combat prejudice 
(a related and sometimes overlapping problem), resulting in discrimination.10 
Additionally, many treaty bodies, including the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC)11 and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,12 have 
recognised implied obligations to address stereotyping.
Considering these international obligations, it is important to take stock of 
how UN mechanisms are addressing stereotyping and whether those responses 
are helping to identify robust solutions to this important human rights issue. 
A  review of the jurisprudence of those mechanisms shows that there have 
been several important developments concerning stereotyping, particularly 
over the past five or so years. Gender stereotyping, and disability stereotyping 
more recently and to a lesser extent, have been at the centre of most of those 
developments, with only limited attention given by UN mechanisms to other 
types of stereotyping. Since space does not permit all of the developments to be 
highlighted here, section 2 canvasses three that stand out. They are: the increased 
visibility of stereotyping within the UN; the growing sophistication in how UN 
mechanisms analyse stereotyping and its resultant harms; and the growing 
leadership role played by the OHCHR in addressing this issue.
2 .1. THER E IS GR EATER VISIBILITY OF STER EOTYPING 
WITHIN THE UN
2.1.1. Gender Stereotyping
Gender stereotyping, more than any other type of stereotyping, has been visible 
within the UN human rights system for a number of years. The visibility of this 
type of stereotyping is likely due to the early adoption of state obligations related 
to stereotyping in CEDAW, and the CEDAW Committee’s ongoing scrutiny of 
this issue. After all, it was back in 1987 that the CEDAW Committee adopted 
its General Recommendation No 3 urging States Parties ‘to adopt education and 
public information programmes, which will help eliminate prejudices and current 
9 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 
2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3 (CRC) Arts 5, 12(1), 14(2).
10 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 
21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (ICERD) Art 7.
11 See eg Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 28: Article 3 (The Equal Rights of Men 
and Women), UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev 9 (Vol I) (2000) para 5; Human Rights Committee, 
Concluding Observations: Cameroon, UN Doc CCPR/C/CMR/CO/4 (2010) para 8.
12 See eg Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 16: 
The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4 (2005) paras 11, 14, 19, 22; Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20 (2009) paras 20, 35.
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practices that hinder the full operation of the principle of the social equality of 
women’.13
The Committee’s early jurisprudence focused mainly on the impact of 
stereotyping in the education and employment sectors as well as in marriage 
and family relations. It was common, for example, for the CEDAW Committee 
to express concern about stereotyping that confines women to, or excludes them 
from, certain roles in political and public life, or that results in the devaluing 
of work traditionally performed by women.14 The Committee also emphasised 
early on the importance of education initiatives, and working with the media, as 
a way of challenging stereotyping. For instance, it would often urge States Parties 
to implement programmes and campaigns to change stereotypical attitudes, and 
to work with the media to project a positive image of women and change views 
about the roles and responsibilities of women and men within the family and 
in society.15 However, the Committee’s early recommendations rarely extended 
beyond such initiatives and provided only limited guidance on how States Parties 
might fulfil their CEDAW obligations on stereotyping.           
The CEDAW Committee has expanded its focus more recently, examining 
the impact of stereotyping in diverse areas of life and urging States Parties 
to implement a wider range of measures to challenge stereotyping. These 
measures have included adopting a comprehensive strategy on stereotyping,16 
implementing temporary special measures to accelerate the transformation of 
harmful stereotypes,17 and ensuring systems for the identification of asylum 
seekers and refugees are not based on gender stereotypes.18 At the same time 
as the Committee has broadened its focus, it has stressed the significance of 
13 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 3: Education and Public Information 
Programmes, UN Doc A/42/38 at 78  (1987). For an overview of the CEDAW Committee’s 
work on Article 5 of CEDAW, the treaty’s main provision on stereotyping, see Rikki Holtmaat, 
‘Article 5’ in Marsha A Freeman, Christine Chinkin and Beate Rudolf (eds), The UN Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: A Commentary (OUP 2012) 
141.
14 See eg CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 21: Equality in Marriage and 
Family Relations, UN Doc. A/49/38 at 1 (1994) paras 11, 12; CEDAW Committee, General 
Recommendation No 23: Political and Public Life, UN Doc. A/52/38/Rev1 at 61 (1997) paras 12, 
20(c), 20(d), 27, 28, 44.
15 See eg Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Twenty-
Eighth Session; Twenty-Ninth Session, UN GAOR, 58th sess, Supp No 38, UN Doc A/58/38 
(2003) (Part I) paras 69, 115, 210, 309; (Part II) paras 109, 167.
16 See eg CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Russia, UN Doc CEDAW/C/USR/CO/7 
(2010) para 21; CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Albania, UN Doc CEDAW/C/
ALB/CO/3 (2010) para 25; CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: United Arab 
Emirates, UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARE/CO/1 (2010) para 25.
17 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 25, on Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, on Temporary 
Special Measures, UN Doc A/59/38 (2004) para 38.
18 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 32 on the Gender-Related Dimensions of 
Refugee Status, Asylum, Nationality and Statelessness of Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/32 
(2014) para 44.
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state obligations on stereotyping for the realisation of the rights guaranteed by 
CEDAW. Notably, in its General Recommendation No 25, it characterised the 
obligation to ‘address prevailing gender relations and the persistence of gender-
based stereotypes’19 as one of three categories of obligations central to the 
achievement of substantive equality. The Committee reinforced the importance 
of this obligation in R.K.B. v Turkey, an employment discrimination case, when 
it explained that ‘full implementation of the Convention requires States parties 
to modify and transform gender stereotypes and eliminate wrongful gender 
stereotyping’.20
Although stereotyping has long been on the CEDAW Committee’s radar, the 
entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women21 (Optional Protocol) gave even greater 
visibility to stereotyping within the UN and provided the Committee further 
opportunities to strengthen its response to the issue. The reason the Optional 
Protocol was such a critical turning point is that, for the first time, the Committee 
could examine the impact of stereotyping on the rights of individual women. For 
instance, in L.C. v Peru, a reproductive rights case, the Committee considered how 
the stereotype that women should be mothers – and its underpinning assumption 
that women should prioritise childbearing and childrearing over their own lives 
and health and over all other roles they might perform or choose – influenced 
the decision of doctors to delay spinal surgery, and their refusal to perform a 
therapeutic abortion, on a minor who was raped and subsequently attempted 
suicide.22
After overcoming tentative beginnings, when it missed crucial opportunities 
to address stereotyping,23 the Committee now routinely uses its views in 
individual communications to examine and shed important light on the harms 
of, and hold States Parties accountable for, stereotyping. Its 2010 decision in Karen 
Tayag Vertido v the Philippines,24 a sexual violence case, was a watershed in this 
regard. Arguably the leading UN case on stereotyping at the time of writing, the 
19 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 25 (n 17) para 7. See also R.K.B. (n 7) 
para 8.8.
20 R.K.B., ibid.
21 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (adopted 10 December 1999, entered into force 22 December 2000) 2131 UNTS 83 
(OPCEDAW). For an overview of the CEDAW Committee’s jurisprudence under the Optional 
Protocol, see Simone Cusack and Lisa Pusey, ‘CEDAW and the Rights to Non-Discrimination 
and Equality’ (2013) 14 MJIL 54.
22 L.C. v Peru, Communication No 22/2009, UN Doc CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009 (2011) para 8.15. 
For an analysis of this case, see Charles N Ngwena, ‘A Commentary on LC v Peru: The CEDAW 
Committee’s First Decision on Abortion’ (2013) 57(2) JAfrL 310.
23 See Cook and Cusack (n 3) 156–160, 167–172; Simone Cusack, ‘The CEDAW as a Legal 
Framework for Transnational Discourses on Gender Stereotyping’ in Anne Hellum and 
Henriette Sinding Aasen (eds), Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional 
and National Law (CUP 2013) 124, 139.
24 Karen Tayag Vertido v the Philippines, Communication No 18/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/
C/46/D/18/2008 (2010). For an analysis of this case, see Simone Cusack and Alexandra SH 
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CEDAW Committee held the State Party accountable for a trial judge’s decision 
to acquit an accused of rape based on gender stereotypes, rather than on law or 
fact.25 In doing so, it affirmed that judicial stereotyping violates the rights to non-
discrimination and a fair trial, and explained that judges must not create inflexible 
standards of how women should behave when confronted with a situation of rape, 
based on gender stereotypes.26 It also called on the State Party to ensure that legal 
procedures in rape cases are ‘impartial and fair, and not affected by prejudices or 
stereotypical gender notions’.27
Although the Committee’s views in individual communications have given 
greater visibility to the impact of stereotyping in a range of areas, it has been its 
views on stereotyping in communications about gender-based violence that have 
been most prominent to date. Through these views, which build on its General 
Recommendation No 19 on violence against women,28 the Committee has affirmed 
repeatedly that stereotyping is a root cause of gender violence, and stressed the 
need to challenge stereotyping as a way of preventing such violence.29 It has also 
affirmed the importance of States Parties taking steps to ensure: investigations 
into allegations of violence are conducted impartially and free of stereotypes;30 
and stereotyping does not compromise access to justice for victims/survivors.31 
Additionally, in Ángela González Carreño v Spain, a domestic violence case, the 
Committee emphasised the need to ensure that stereotyping does not result in the 
rights of abusers being prioritised over those of victims/survivors in child custody 
and visitation decisions.32 In upholding the claim, the Committee explained that 
the decision to grant F.R.C. unsupervised visits with his daughter was based 
on stereotypes that privileged his (male) interests and minimised his abusive 
Timmer, ‘Gender Stereotyping in Rape Cases: The CEDAW Committee’s Decision in Vertido v 
The Philippines’ (2011) 11 HRLR 329.
25 Vertido, ibid paras 8.5–8.6, 8.9.
26 Ibid para 8.4.
27 Ibid para 8.9(b).
28 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women, UN Doc 
A/47/38 at 1 (1993) paras 11–12, 21, 23, 24(e), 24(f), 24(t)(ii). For an overview of the CEDAW 
Committee’s work on gender-based violence against women, see Christine Chinkin, ‘Violence 
Against Women’ in Marsha A Freeman, Christine Chinkin and Beate Rudolf (eds), The UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: A Commentary 
(OUP 2012) 443.
29 Isatou Jallow v Bulgaria, Communication No 32/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011 (2012) 
para 8.6; V.K. v Bulgaria, Communication No 20/2008, UN Doc CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 
(2011) para 9.11; Fatma Yildirim (deceased) v Austria, Communication No 6/2005, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (2007) para 12.2; Şahide Goekce (deceased) v Austria, Communication 
No 5/2005, UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (2007) para 12; A.T. v Hungary, Communication 
No 2/2003, UN Doc CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (2005) para 9.4.
30 Isatou Jallow v Bulgaria, ibid para 8.6.
31 Ángela González Carreño v Spain, Communication No 47/2012, UN Doc CEDAW/
C/58/D/47/2012 (2014) para 9.4; V.K. (n 29) para 9.11; Vertido (n 24) paras 8.4, 8.9(b); R.P.B. v 
the Philippines, Communication No 34/2011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/57/D/34/2011 (2014) 
para 8.8.
32 González Carreño, ibid paras 9.4, 9.7.
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behaviour.33 It also affirmed that child custody and visitation decisions should be 
based on the best interests of the child, not on stereotypes, with domestic violence 
being a relevant consideration.34
While the CEDAW Committee’s evolving response to stereotyping is 
to be celebrated, the strength of the response has been curbed by its failure at 
times to identify instances of stereotyping35 and identify and name stereotypes 
accurately.36 Even when stereotyping and stereotypes have been identified, there 
has sometimes been a disconnect between that identification and the subsequent 
recommendations made by the Committee. In other words, despite its initial 
work in diagnosing the problem, the Committee has on occasion failed to include 
in its jurisprudence recommendations to address stereotyping or, if it has made 
recommendations, they have been general in nature and given only limited 
guidance to States Parties. For example, despite concluding in A.T. v Hungary 
that stereotyping had played a central role in the domestic violence experienced 
by A.T.,37 the Committee did not make any specific recommendations in 
respect of how the State Party might go about the difficult task of modifying or 
transforming the operative stereotypes or eliminating the practice of wrongful 
gender stereotyping.
Despite the limitations of some of its responses, the CEDAW Committee 
has laid a solid foundation for the expanding discourse on gender stereotyping 
within the UN and, importantly, it continues to strengthen its response to this 
issue. Moreover, the attention it has given to gender stereotyping has helped to 
propel the issue onto the international human rights stage, encouraged other 
mechanisms to give the issue serious attention and shown them how they might 
begin to engage with this and other types of stereotyping. The growing number 
of UN human rights mechanisms that address gender stereotyping, referencing 
the work of the CEDAW Committee as they do, is clear evidence of the impact its 
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid para 9.4.
35 See eg Cristina Muñoz-Vargas y Sainz de Vicuña v Spain, Communication No 7/2005, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/39/D/7/2005 (2007). One Committee member, in a dissenting opinion, condemned 
a Spanish law that entrenched male primacy in the order of succession because it perpetuated 
discrimination and institutionalised stereotypes: at paras 13.1–13.13. However, the other 
members either did not identify the gender stereotypes codified in the law or opted not to 
address them in this case. Had they done so, they might, as the dissenting Committee member 
did, have determined to declare the communication admissible.
36 See eg L.C. (n 22). The CEDAW Committee found in this case that the State Party had violated 
Article 5 of CEDAW when its doctors treated a pregnant minor on the basis of the stereotype 
‘that protection of the foetus should prevail over the health of the mother’, para 8.15. It is 
suggested respectfully that the stereotype at play in this case is that ‘women should be mothers’ 
and the assumption underpinning that stereotype is that women should prioritise childbearing 
and childrearing over their own lives and health and over all other roles they might perform or 
choose. That is to say, the Committee identified the assumption underpinning the stereotype 
and not the stereotype itself.
37 A.T. (n 29) para 9.4.
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work is having in raising the visibility of, and improving responses to, this issue 
within the UN.
Consider, for example, the 2013 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights, which analysed the relationship between 
unpaid care work, inequality and women’s human rights. The report provided 
key insights into how gender stereotypes (eg men as breadwinners, women as 
carers/nurturers) influence the distribution of unpaid care work between women 
and men and, in many instances, discriminate and condemn women to poverty.38 
Referencing CEDAW and the jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee, the 
Special Rapporteur stressed the importance of transforming stereotypes that 
lead to the gendered and unequal division of unpaid care responsibilities.39 This, 
she elaborated, requires States Parties to ‘recognize and value the importance of 
unpaid care, but without reinforcing care work as women’s sole responsibility or 
supporting particular models of the family to the exclusion of others’.40 In addition 
to not enforcing or perpetuating gender stereotypes,41 the Special Rapporteur 
underscored the importance of States Parties challenging those stereotypes,42 
including by promoting ‘the concept of shared family responsibility for unpaid 
care work in the home’.43
2.1.2. Disability Stereotyping
Disability stereotyping44 has emerged during the past half-decade as a growing 
area of interest within the UN, likely due to the entry into force in 2008 of the 
CRPD and the work of advocates around this type of stereotyping.45 The CRPD 
is only the second international human rights treaty to introduce express 
obligations related to stereotyping (although such obligations are contained in 
a number of regional treaties).46 It is also the first treaty to impose an express 
38 UNHRC, ‘Report by Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights Magdalena 
Sepúlveda Carmona’ (2013) UN Doc A/68/293, paras 8, 13, 21, 29. See also Australian Human 
Rights Commission, Investing in Care: Recognising and Valuing those who Care; Volume 1: 
Research Report (Australian Human Rights Commission 2013); Australian Human Rights 
Commission, Accumulating Poverty? Women’s Experiences of Inequality over the Lifecycle; 
An Issues Paper Examining the Gender Gap in Retirement Savings (Australian Human Rights 
Commission 2009).
39 Sepúlveda Carmona, ibid paras 13, 21, 61, 70.
40 Ibid para 70.
41 Ibid para 74.
42 Ibid paras 86, 94.
43 Ibid para 94.
44 For a more detailed analysis of disability stereotyping, see chapter 5 in this volume.
45 See eg Stephanie Ortoleva, ‘Women with Disabilities: The Forgotten Peace Builders’ (2010) 
33 LoyLA Il CLR 83, 90–92, 114, 139; Stephanie Ortoleva and Hope Lewis, ‘Forgotten Sisters: 
A Report on Violence against Women with Disabilities: An Overview of its Nature, Scope, 
Causes and Consequences’ School of Law Faculty Publications, Paper 184 (2012) <http://hdl.
handle.net/2047/d20002563> accessed 28 March 2015.
46 See eg see Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (entered into force 25 November 2005) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/66.6 Arts 2(2), 
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obligation to address compounded stereotypes, requiring States Parties to ‘adopt 
immediate, effective and appropriate measures to combat stereotypes, prejudices 
and harmful practices relating to persons with disabilities, including those based 
on sex and age, in all areas of life’.47 This obligation is particularly significant as it 
acknowledges that experiences of discrimination and other rights violations may 
differ when stereotyping is based on multiple attributes.
Through a small but growing number of Concluding Observations, the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee) is 
beginning to emphasise the importance of adopting education and training 
measures to combat stereotypes and prejudices, and to promote the dignity, 
capabilities and contributions of people with disabilities.48 It has, for instance, 
urged States Parties to introduce awareness-raising initiatives to: challenge the 
stereotypical view of people with disabilities as vulnerable and, therefore, in 
need of protection49 or as the object of charity.50 The CRPD Committee has also 
encouraged States Parties to develop and implement policies and programmes to 
combat stereotypes of people with disabilities.51 The inclusion of recommendations 
related to policy initiatives is important because it demonstrates an awareness 
of the broad-ranging and holistic measures needed to challenge stereotyping 
and, in this, reflects lessons learned from the CEDAW Committee’s evolving 
jurisprudence on stereotyping.
While the CRPD Committee is still developing its body of jurisprudence (and 
will presumably offer more substantive contributions on disability stereotyping 
moving forward), it has nevertheless overlooked key opportunities to address this 
issue in its work to date. For instance, the CRPD Committee failed to consider 
disability stereotyping in its General Comment No 152 on equal recognition before 
the law, despite acknowledgment that disability stereotypes have undermined 
equal recognition for people with intellectual disabilities.53 Like with the CEDAW 
4(2)(d), 12(1)(b); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication 
of Violence against Women (entered into force 5 March 1995) OAS/Ser.L/V/1.4 rev Arts 6(b), 
8(b).
47 CRPD, Art 8(1)(b).
48 See eg CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Tunisia, UN Doc CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 
(2011) para 15(a); CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Peru, UN Doc CRPD/C/
PER/CO/1 (2012) para 19; CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: El Salvador, UN 
Doc CRPD/C/SLV/CO/1 (2013) paras 21–22; CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Denmark, UN Doc CRPD/C/DNK/CO/1 (2014) paras 22–23.
49 See eg CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Austria, UN Doc CRPD/C/AUT/CO/1 
(2013) para 22; CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Azerbaijan, UN Doc CRPD/C/
AZE/CO/1 (2014) para 21.
50 CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Mexico, UN Doc CRPD/C/MEX/CO/1 (2014) 
paras 17–18.
51 See eg CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Peru, UN Doc CRPD/C/PER/CO/1 (2012) 
para 19.
52 CRPD Committee, General Comment No 1: Article 12: Equal Recognition before the Law, UN 
Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 (2014).
53 See eg Case of Alajos Kiss v Hungary, Application No 38832/06, Judgment, 20 May 2010 
(ECtHR) (considering the impact of stereotyping on the voting rights of people with 
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Committee, the introduction of an individual communication procedure54 
will afford the CRPD Committee important opportunities to strengthen its 
consideration of stereotyping, examine the impact of stereotyping on individuals 
with disabilities, and interpret and apply the CRPD’s stereotyping provisions. 
So far, however, only one communication has raised stereotyping as an issue for 
consideration and that communication was declared inadmissible on unrelated 
grounds.55
A number of UN mechanisms outside the CRPD Committee have considered 
disability stereotyping, with many focusing their attention on compounded 
stereotyping of women and girls with disabilities. Perhaps unsurprisingly given 
the similarities between the CEDAW and CRPD provisions on stereotyping, 
many of those mechanisms have looked, and continue to look, to the CEDAW 
Committee for guidance in interpreting and applying the provisions in the latter 
treaty. To take one example, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women, its causes and consequences, looked both to the CRPD and CEDAW as 
well as the CEDAW Committee’s jurisprudence, when analysing the linkages 
between stereotyping and violence against women and girls with disabilities.56 
In her expert view, compounded gender and disability stereotyping influences 
the unique forms, causes and consequences of violence against women and girls 
with disabilities. She explained that ‘[w]omen with disabilities are at high risk of 
violence based on social stereotypes and biases that attempt to dehumanize or 
infantilize, exclude or isolate them, and target them for sexual and other forms 
of violence’.57 According to the Special Rapporteur, compounded stereotyping 
can also lead to adverse findings about the legal capacity and credibility of 
women and girls with mental disabilities in gender-based violence cases, such as 
intellectual disabilities). See also Stephanie Ortoleva, ‘Inaccessible Justice: Human Rights, 
Persons with Disabilities and the Legal System’ (2011) 17(2) ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 281.
54 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 
12  December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) GA Res 61/106, Annex II, UN GAOR, 
61st sess, Supp No 49, at 80, UN Doc A/61/49 (2006).
55 Kenneth McAlpine v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Communication 
No 6/2011, UN Doc CRPD/C/8/D/6/2011 (2012). The communication concerned a man who 
claimed that the UK had failed to combat stereotypes of diabetics, which lead many employers, 
judges and other legal professionals to assume they take extended time off work due to their 
illness.
56 UNHRC, ‘Report by Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and 
Consequences Rashida Manjoo’ (2012) UN Doc A/67/227, paras 41, 76–84. On state 
obligations related to stereotyping and gender-based violence against women, see: Ramona 
Biholar, Transforming Discriminatory Sex Roles and Gender Stereotyping: The Implementation 
of Article 5(a) CEDAW for the Realisation of Women’s Right to be Free From Gender-based 
Violence in Jamaica (Intersentia 2013); Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Preventing Violence against Women: 
The Due Diligence Standard with Respect to the Obligation to Banish Gender Stereotypes on 
the Grounds of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention’ in Carin Benninger-Budel (ed), Due 
Diligence and its Application to Protect Women from Violence (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 63.
57 Manjoo, ibid para 32.
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when it operates to exclude or discount their testimony or their complaints are 
disregarded or disbelieved based on gender and disability stereotypes.58
Like the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, the CEDAW 
Committee has also examined compounded stereotyping of women and girls 
with disabilities. R.P.B. v the Philippines, which concerned the rape of a 17-year-
old girl who is both deaf and mute, provides a case in point.59 In its views, the 
Committee concluded that the Philippines violated CEDAW when, inter alia, 
the trial court acquitted the accused of rape on the basis of stereotypes. Because 
of stereotyping, it explained, the trial judge expected R.P.B. to respond to the 
attack in a certain way, formed a negative view of her credibility when she did 
not do so, and disregarded key facts of the case, such as the lack of consent and 
how R.P.B.’s age and disability influenced her response.60 While the Committee 
highlighted key passages of the trial judgment that evidenced gender stereotyping 
(see section 2.2.2 below), it was less explicit about the role that disability and age 
stereotyping played and the specific impact of the compounded gender, disability 
and age stereotypes at play in the case. Still, it recommended that the State Party 
ensure all sexual violence proceedings are conducted impartially, fairly and free 
from stereotypes based on the gender, age or disability of the victim/ survivor.61 
It also urged the State Party to provide regular training to judges and other 
legal professionals, so that stereotypes do not affect court proceedings and 
decision-making.62
Other mechanisms that have examined disability stereotyping (to a greater or 
lesser extent) include: the (then) UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education, 
who briefly considered the impact of disability stereotyping in his examination of 
the importance of inclusive education for people with disabilities;63 the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to safe drinking water and sanitation, who explored the 
relationship between stereotypes, prejudice and stigma and their impact on access 
to water and sanitation for people with disabilities, among others;64 and the (then) 
UN Special Rapporteur on the right to highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health, who very briefly considered how stereotypes influence perceptions 
58 Ibid paras 41, 59. See also Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, ‘More Than an Empty Gesture: 
Enabling Women with Mental Disabilities to Testify on a Promise to Tell the Truth’ (2013) 
25(1) CJWL 31; Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, ‘Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of 
Women with Mental Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues’ (2007) 52 McGill LJ 515; 
Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant, ‘Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with 
Mental Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief ’ (2007) 52 McGill LJ 243.
59 R.P.B. (n 31).
60 Ibid paras 8.9–8.10.
61 Ibid para 9(b)(iii).
62 Ibid para 9(b)(iv).
63 UNHRC, ‘Report by Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education Vernor Muñoz’ (2007) UN 
Doc A/HRC/4/29, paras 11, 36, 39, 82.
64 UNHRC, ‘Report by Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and 
Sanitation Catarina de Albuquerque’ (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/21/42, paras 26, 67.
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about whether or not people with intellectual disabilities are capable of living 
independently and making decisions for themselves.65
The increased interest in disability stereotyping, likely occasioned by the 
adoption of the CRPD, has been key in giving greater visibility to this type of 
stereotyping and in expanding UN discourses beyond the exclusive realm of 
gender stereotyping. Scrutiny of this particular type of stereotyping remains 
relatively new, however, and, in many ways, is still in its embryonic stages. Analysis 
of disability stereotyping is certainly nowhere near as systematic or robust as 
it is for gender stereotyping. Further work is accordingly needed to ensure the 
full spectrum of UN mechanisms is cognisant of disability stereotyping, and 
understands the broad-ranging impact it can have on the lives of people with 
disabilities. Further work is also needed to ensure that, wherever possible, UN 
mechanisms seize opportunities to scrutinise disability stereotyping, and 
articulate the nature and scope of state obligations to address such stereotyping, 
including its compounded forms. The leadership of the CRPD Committee will be 
critical in this regard, just as the CEDAW Committee’s leadership has been key 
in giving greater visibility within the UN to the issue of gender stereotyping. The 
Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, a position created 
recently, also provides a crucial opening to turn attention, and a critical eye, 
to the issue of disability stereotyping. Significantly in this respect, the Special 
Rapporteur’s mandate requires her ‘[t]o raise awareness of the rights of persons 
with disabilities, to combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices that 
hinder their opportunity to participate in society on an equal basis with others, 
to promote awareness of their positive contributions and to inform persons with 
disabilities about their rights’.66
2.1.3. Other Types of Stereotyping
UN mechanisms have responded to other types of stereotyping. Take stereotyping 
based on race or ethnicity as an example.67 The 2015 report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on minority issues, which included a thematic discussion of hate 
speech and incitement to hatred against minorities in the media, contains one of 
the more thorough examinations of the other types of stereotyping. In her report, 
the Special Rapporteur identified stereotyping as a form of hate speech and named 
common stereotypes of minority groups (eg violent, untrustworthy, disloyal, 
dirty).68 She focused her examination on the role media plays in perpetuating 
65 UNHRC, ‘Report by Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the 
Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health Paul Hunt’ (2005) UN Doc 
E/ CN.4/2005/51, para 15.
66 Resolution 26/20 Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc 
A/ HRC/RES/26/20 (2014).
67 For a detailed analysis of UN responses to racial stereotyping, see chapter 6 in this volume.
68 UNHRC, ‘Report by Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues Rita Izsák’ (2015) UN Doc 
A/ HRC/28/64, paras 52, 62.
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stereotypes of minority groups and considered the resultant impact on human 
rights. In her expert view, stereotyping by the media can: nurture inaccurate and 
false assumptions and opinions that can result in discrimination and prejudices: 
stigmatise and dehumanise whole communities; cause virulent attacks; and 
incite violence against minority members.69 The Special Rapporteur used her 
report to underscore the importance of a pluralistic media and representation 
of minority groups in the mainstream media.70 She accordingly urged media 
outlets to maintain high standards of ethical journalism, report factually and 
impartially, avoid stereotyping, and implement programmes to train, recruit 
and support media workers from minority groups, including for challenging 
wrongful stereotyping of minority groups.71 The Special Rapporteur also stressed 
the importance of education for promoting understanding, respect and tolerance 
as a way of eliminating stereotypes and prejudices about minority groups.72
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is one of several 
other UN mechanisms that have grappled with stereotyping based on race or 
ethnicity. In its General Recommendation No 30 on discrimination against 
non-citizens, for example, it urged States Parties to counter stereotyping of 
non-citizen population groups and ensure that non-citizens are not subject to 
stereotyping in the fight against terrorism.73 It has also encouraged States Parties 
to adopt measures to challenge stereotyping of Roma people.74 And in its General 
Recommendation No 35 on hate speech, the Committee noted the importance of 
the freedom of expression for deconstructing racial stereotypes and urged States 
Parties to adopt policies to empower all groups to exercise this freedom.75 It also 
stressed the need to ensure media representations of minority groups are based 
on ‘principles of respect, fairness and the avoidance of stereotyping’.76
Notwithstanding these and a number of further interventions on other types 
of stereotyping, the issue of stereotyping has gained only limited traction outside 
of gender stereotyping and, to a lesser extent, disability stereotyping. For this 
reason, there has been comparatively little visibility of other types of stereotyping 
within the UN and the responses of UN mechanisms to these types of stereotyping 
have been mostly weak and ad hoc. This is evident from the infrequent attention 
given to, and basic analysis of, other types of stereotyping during the past five or so 
69 Ibid paras 62–63.
70 Ibid paras 64–70.
71 Ibid para 110.
72 Ibid para 115.
73 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), General Recommendation 
No 30: Discrimination against Non-Citizens, UN Doc CERD/C/GC/35 (2005) paras 10, 12.
74 CERD, Concluding Observations: Belarus, UN Doc CERD/C/BLR/C0/18–19 (2013) para 16; 
CERD, Concluding Observations: Finland, UN Doc CERD/C/FIN/CO/20–22 (2012) para 17; 
CERD, Concluding Observations: Serbia, UN Doc CERD/C/SRB/CO/1 (2011) para 16; CERD, 
Concluding Observations: Romania, UN Doc CERD/C/ROU/CO/16–19 (2010) para 16.
75 CERD, General Recommendation No 35: Combating Racist Hate Speech, UN Doc CERD/G/
GC/35 (2013) para 29.
76 Ibid para 40.
Intersentia 25
Building Momentum Towards Change
years. The absence of express human rights obligations concerning stereotyping 
in treaties other than CEDAW and the CRPD is undoubtedly a reason for the more 
limited focus on these other types of stereotyping, although it bears repeating 
that ICERD contains an express obligation to combat prejudice, a related and 
sometimes overlapping problem.77 It also bears repeating that almost all human 
rights treaty bodies have recognised implied obligations to address stereotyping, 
including as part of the rights to non-discrimination and equality.78 Yet it would 
appear that there is only limited awareness of those obligations, as evidenced in 
the infrequent and passing references made to them by many UN mechanisms.
What’s more, human rights treaty bodies that have themselves recognised the 
implied obligations are missing opportunities to hold States Parties accountable 
for relevant violations. An example is the decision of the HRC in L.N.P. v Argentine 
Republic,79 which concerned discrimination against, and the gang rape of, a 
15-year-old girl from the Qom ethnic group in Argentina. The HRC concluded in 
that case that the trial court’s decision to acquit the perpetrators of rape constituted 
a violation of the right to non-discrimination in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights80 (ICCPR).81 It explained that the trial court had invoked 
discriminatory and offensive criteria to cast doubt on the girl’s morality (ie the 
fact that she was not a virgin and suggestions that she was a sex worker), which led 
it to conclude that the girl had failed to prove lack of consent. Although the HRC 
ultimately found violations of the ICCPR, nowhere in its views did it identify the 
role that stereotyping – for instance, gender and/or ethnic stereotyping – played 
in the decision to acquit, or articulate which stereotypes the court relied on.82 This 
is in spite of recognising in its General Comment No 28 that the ICCPR requires 
States Parties to ensure that stereotyping does not affect women’s legal rights 
and protections, including against rape.83 Had the HRC examined the role of 
stereotyping, it would have been able to challenge the practice and the operative 
stereotypes, urge the State Party to take appropriate action, and help to ensure 
that other survivors of rape are not vulnerable to the same stereotyping by the 
Argentinian judicial system.
It is clear that more needs to be done to raise awareness amongst UN 
mechanisms of the existence, nature and scope of the full range of human rights 
obligations related to stereotyping. As more mechanisms are made aware of the 
full extent of international obligations related to stereotyping and as they turn 
their attention to examining the various types of stereotyping, the visibility (and 
77 ICERD Art 7.
78 See notes 6–12 above and accompanying text.
79 L.N.P. v Argentine Republic, Communication No 1610/2007, UN Doc CCPR/C/102/D/1610/2007 
(2011).
80 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ICCPR (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).
81 L.N.P. (n 79) paras 13.3, 13.8.
82 Ibid para 13.3.
83 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 28 (n 11) para 20.
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scrutiny) of this issue within the UN will grow even further and UN responses 
to this issue will likely also grow in number and strength. Importantly, this will 
serve to reinforce stereotyping’s place as an issue deserving of attention from all 
UN human rights mechanisms.
2 .2 . ANALYSIS OF GENDER STER EOTYPING IS MOR E 
SOPHISTICATED
At the same time as the visibility of gender (and, to a lesser extent, disability) 
stereotyping has increased, the analysis of gender stereotyping has also grown in 
sophistication, particularly amongst UN mechanisms that have been engaging 
with it for a long time. Rather than simply identifying gender stereotyping as a 
root cause of women’s rights violations and perhaps urging states to introduce 
education initiatives or work with the media to challenge stereotyping, as might 
once have been the case, these mechanisms are now beginning to engage with the 
issue in a more critical and in-depth way. Given its considerable work on gender 
stereotyping, it is unsurprising that the quality of the CEDAW Committee’s 
analysis of stereotyping has grown most markedly. Two areas where this is 
particularly evident are the more nuanced language the Committee is using when 
it engages with gender stereotyping and its more comprehensive examination of 
stereotyping, including its resultant harms to women.
2.2.1. The Language Used to Engage with Gender Stereotyping is More Nuanced
The language the CEDAW Committee is using to describe state obligations 
to address gender stereotyping has become more nuanced over time. An 
examination of the Committee’s early jurisprudence on gender stereotyping 
shows that it would often urge States Parties to ‘abolish’ or ‘eliminate’ gender 
stereotypes and the practice of gender stereotyping.84 Yet the Committee’s views 
in R.K.B. v Turkey signalled a change in approach. In that case, the Committee 
explained that CEDAW ‘requires States parties … to modify and transform gender 
stereotypes and eliminate wrongful gender stereotyping’.85 In doing so, it appears 
to have drawn a distinction between state obligations concerning stereotypes (ie 
the belief) on the one hand and those obligations concerning stereotyping (ie the 
practice of applying the belief to individuals) on the other.
According to the Committee, CEDAW requires States Parties to take steps to 
change stereotypical beliefs (ie modify or transform), but it does not require them 
to go further by eradicating such beliefs. In adopting this view, the Committee 
appears to have recognised that there may be an inherent incompatibility with 
84 See eg CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 3 (n 13).
85 R.K.B. (n 7) para 8.8.
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the freedom of expression (and even other human rights) in requiring states to 
abolish or eliminate a belief. Yet, at the same time, it seems to have recognised 
the importance of changing stereotypical beliefs that are harmful, for instance 
those that cause holders of stereotypical beliefs to assume that the subject group 
is inferior to other groups and which incite violence against individual group 
members. Under this new approach, the Committee has also taken the view that 
CEDAW requires States Parties to do more than simply modify or transform the 
practice of stereotyping; they must actually put an end to the practice of applying 
stereotypical beliefs to individuals, when doing so violates human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.
It is not yet clear whether other UN mechanisms will make the same 
distinction as the one drawn by CEDAW Committee. Interestingly, the CRPD 
Committee has not done so in its early jurisprudence on stereotyping, preferring, 
instead, to use the terms ‘combat’ and ‘eliminate’ interchangeably to describe state 
obligations to address disability stereotypes and disability stereotyping.86 There 
are, however, some very early signs that the language the CEDAW Committee is 
using to differentiate between state obligations in respect of gender stereotypes 
and gender stereotyping is beginning to be replicated more broadly with the UN 
system, including within the Human Rights Council.87
As with state obligations, the language the CEDAW Committee uses to 
describe the resultant harms of stereotyping has become more nuanced. Through 
its Optional Protocol jurisprudence, it has clarified that CEDAW is concerned 
with ‘harmful’88 stereotypes and ‘wrongful’89 stereotyping. Put simply, in 
its expert view, CEDAW addresses stereotypes and stereotyping that affect 
recognised human rights, rather than all stereotypes and all types of stereotyping. 
Although other UN mechanisms have not been so explicit in their discussion of 
this issue, their focus has undoubtedly remained on those stereotypes and types 
of stereotyping that in one way or another impair or nullify the recognition, 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights, as the examples used in this chapter 
show. Assuming other UN mechanisms accept the approach adopted by the 
CEDAW Committee, two questions will need to be answered moving forward. 
Firstly, when is a stereotype considered to be ‘harmful’? And, secondly, when is 
stereotyping ‘wrongful’?90
86 See eg CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Tunisia, UN Doc CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 
(2011) para 15(a); CRPD Committee, Concluding Observations: Peru, UN Doc CRPD/C/PER/
CO/1 (2012) para 19.
87 See eg Navi Pillay, ‘Opening Remarks’, The Impact of Gender Stereotypes on the Recognition 
and Enjoyment of Women’s Human Rights, Annual Full Day Discussion on Women’s Human 
Rights, Human Rights Council, 26th sess, Geneva, 17 June 2014.
88 V.V.P. v Bulgaria, Communication No 31/3011, UN Doc CEDAW/C/53/D/31/2011 (2012) 
para 9.6 (emphasis added).
89 R.K.B. (n 7) para 8.8.
90 For an early consideration of these terms, see Cusack (n 5) 18–19.
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2.2.2. Analysis of the Impact of Stereotyping is More In-Depth
The CEDAW Committee’s examination of the impact of stereotyping is another 
area where the sophistication of its analysis has grown considerably. Contrasting 
the Committee’s views in A.T. v Hungary91 with its more recent views in R.P.B. v 
the Philippines,92 both gender-based violence cases, provides a stark illustration 
of how it is engaging with the issue of stereotyping in greater detail. In 2005, 
the Committee held Hungary accountable for its failure, over a period of more 
than four years, to protect A.T. effectively against her abusive former partner.93 In 
2014, it held the Philippines accountable for a trial court’s decision to acquit a man 
of raping his 17-year-old neighbour, who is both mute and hearing impaired.94 
Although the Committee found stereotyping-related violations of CEDAW in 
both these cases, its analysis of the issue varied considerably.
In upholding A.T.’s claim, the Committee affirmed that gender stereotyping 
is a root cause of gender-based violence within Hungary and condemned its 
failure to address this harmful practice.95 The Committee also recalled that it 
had identified harmful stereotypes when it considered the State Party’s periodic 
report in 2002 and explained that these were the same stereotypes that had 
contributed to the violence experienced by A.T.96 Whilst the identification of the 
link between stereotyping and domestic violence was a welcome development, 
the CEDAW Committee missed a valuable opportunity in this case to name 
the specific gender stereotypes that contributed to the violence against A.T. It 
also missed an opportunity to explain how those stereotypes enabled domestic 
violence against her and how they had been perpetuated within the State Party. 
What’s more, the Committee did not avail itself of the opportunity to articulate 
the nature and scope of state obligations to address stereotyping that facilitates 
domestic violence, or make recommendations as to how the State Party should 
address such stereotyping.97
Fast-forwarding almost ten years to R.P.B. v the Philippines, the CEDAW 
Committee criticised the trial court for basing the decision to acquit on gender 
and disability stereotypes, rather than on law and fact.98 In doing so, it identified 
several stereotypes relied upon by the trial court and singled out key passages of 
the court’s decision where they had been applied. For instance, the suggestions that 
a Filipina rape victim would ‘summon every ounce of her strength and courage 
to thwart any attempt to besmirch her honour and blemish her purity’,99 and the 
91 A.T. (n 29).
92 R.P.B. (n 31).
93 A.T. (n 29) paras 9.2–9.6.
94 R.P.B. (n 31) paras 8.3–9.
95 A.T. (n 29) para 9.4.
96 Ibid.
97 Cook and Cusack (n 3) 156–160.
98 R.P.B. (n 31) para 8.9–8.10.
99 Ibid para 8.9.
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court’s finding that R.P.B.’s ‘demeanour was inconsistent with that of an ordinary 
Filipina’ and the ‘reasonable standard of human conduct’ because she had not 
physically resisted the attack or sought to escape.100 The CEDAW Committee 
then examined the impact of the court’s reliance on stereotypes on its decision 
to acquit. In doing so, the Committee explained that the court formed a negative 
view of R.P.B.’s credibility because she had not responded to the rape in line with 
the operative stereotypes.101 It further explained that the court’s reliance on those 
stereotypes caused it to disregard key facts, including her age and disability, which 
supported the allegations made by R.P.B., including why she did not physically 
resist or call for help during the assault.102 Lastly, the Committee spelt out the 
obligations of States Parties concerning judicial stereotyping and made several 
related recommendations, including that the Philippines take steps to ensure that 
all sexual violence proceedings are conducted fairly and impartially, and free 
from stereotypes.103
The growing sophistication of analyses of stereotyping is a crucial 
development in UN responses to this issue. Even so, most of the progress in this 
area has been limited to the CEDAW Committee. While the evolution of the 
Committee’s analysis is significant and is helping to inform broader UN responses 
to stereotyping, it is essential that other UN mechanisms follow the Committee’s 
lead and expand the quality of their analyses of this issue.
2 .3. THE OHCHR IS PLAYING A LEADERSHIP ROLE 
ON STER EOTYPING
UN responses to stereotyping have been strengthened by the recent leadership 
shown by the OHCHR and the former High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
In March 2014, the (then) High Commissioner said the OHCHR would devote 
‘considerable attention to providing more robust guidance’104 on the issue. In line 
with this commitment, the OHCHR has incorporated stereotyping into its 2014–
2017 management plan, established a webpage on stereotyping,105 and helped 
facilitate a panel on this issue at the Human Rights Council annual women’s rights 
discussion in 2014. In a further demonstration of the Office’s commitment to this 
issue, the former High Commissioner, when delivering her opening address at 
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid paras 8.9–8.10.
102 Ibid para 8.9.
103 Ibid paras 8.8, 9(b)(iii), 9(b)(iv).
104 Navi Pillay, ‘Equality and Justice in the Courtroom’ Huffington Post (3 March 2014).
105 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Gender Stereotypes/Stereotyping <www.
ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/WRGS/Pages/GenderStereotypes.aspx> accessed 28 March 
2015.
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the Council’s panel discussion, acknowledged that stereotyping ‘is an important 
human rights concern’.106
Additionally, the OHCHR commissioned two research projects on 
stereotyping. The first examined how international human rights treaties and 
UN mechanisms have addressed stereotyping,107 and identified strategies the 
Office could adopt to assist efforts to challenge this practice.108 The second 
project explored the negative impact of judicial stereotyping on gender-based 
violence cases, identified strategies for addressing it and highlighted good 
practice examples of their use.109 Expanding its focus on stereotyping to include 
other aspects of the criminal justice system, the OHCHR is now working with 
the Republic of Moldova to help it de-codify stereotypes from its Prosecutorial 
Guidelines for Investigation and Prosecution of Acts of Sexual Violence.110 It is also 
analysing gender-based violence judgments of ordinary and specialist violence 
courts in Guatemala and El Salvador for evidence of stereotyping and taking 
steps to help build judicial capacity to challenge this practice.111 More broadly, 
the OHCHR’s field offices in Cambodia and Moldova have included the issue of 
stereotyping in their in-country human rights training.112
Although still in its early stages, the OHCHR’s leadership has been 
instrumental already in elevating stereotyping on the UN agenda. The Human 
Rights Council panel on stereotyping, which was a recommendation of the Office’s 
first project, is a clear example of this. Another example is the work the Office is 
undertaking to include stereotyping in a checklist for the preparation of reports 
for the Universal Periodic Review process.113 But more than just helping to raise 
the profile of stereotyping, the Office – particularly through mapping relevant 
human rights obligations and identifying strategies for challenging this practice 
– is providing needed guidance in this area, something for which there is a strong 
106 Pillay (n 104), 2.
107 Cusack (n 5).
108 Simone Cusack, Strategies for Addressing Gender Stereotyping: Policy Paper, Commissioned by 
the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2013).
109 Simone Cusack, Eliminating Judicial Stereotyping: Equal Access to Justice for Women in Gender-
based Violence Cases, Commissioned by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (2014) <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/judicial_stereotyping2014. 
docx> accessed 28 March 2015.
110 In 2013, the CEDAW Committee expressed concern about the low rate of reporting, and 
ineffective investigation and prosecution, of sexual violence cases in the Republic of Moldova. 
It subsequently recommended that the State Party ensure that investigations into allegations 
of sexual violence are carried out in accordance with international standards. In particular, 
the Committee urged the State Party to amend its Prosecutorial Guidelines for Investigation 
and Prosecution of Acts of Sexual Violence. See CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: 
Republic of Moldova, UN Doc CEDAW/C/MDA/CO/4–5 (2013) paras 19–20. The Republic of 
Moldova is now reviewing the guidelines and the OHCHR has sought to aid the reform process 
by providing expert guidance on international human rights law, including in relation to the 
issue of stereotyping.
111 Statement by Veronica Birga (personal email correspondence 19 January 2015).
112 Statement by Adwoa Kufuor (personal email correspondence 20 January 2015).
113 Statement by Veronica Birga (personal email correspondence 19 January 2015).
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appetite, particularly amongst member states.114 Importantly, the OHCHR is also 
helping to build capacity amongst, and providing critical support to, UN human 
rights mechanisms to address stereotyping through their respective mandates. 
For instance, it has prepared a short briefing note on stereotyping, which was 
distributed to new special procedure mandate holders and soon will be made 
available to other mandate holders and treaty body experts.115 It is hoped this 
will serve as a starting point for UN mechanisms keen to learn more about 
stereotyping and how they could address this issue usefully through their work.
3. STRATEGIES FOR STRENGTHENING 
UN RESPONSES TO STEREOTYPING
Although many UN mechanisms, and particularly the CEDAW Committee, 
have improved how they respond to stereotyping over the past half-decade, 
there are nevertheless still considerable opportunities for strengthening those 
responses. Section 3 reflects briefly on some of the ongoing weaknesses in how 
UN mechanisms are responding to stereotyping, specifically: the failure of many 
mechanisms to identify stereotypes accurately; the limited guidance on state 
obligations, particularly obligations in treaties other than CEDAW; and the lack 
of information about good practice examples of challenging stereotyping. At 
the same time, section 3 identifies several strategies that, if implemented, could 
help to overcome these shortcomings and, ultimately, strengthen UN responses 
to stereotyping. In this connection, it: calls for greater efforts to build the 
capacity of UN mechanisms to understand and identify stereotypes accurately; 
urges UN mechanisms to elaborate state obligations related to stereotyping; 
and recommends that UN mechanisms identify and highlight practices that are 
bringing about positive change in relation to stereotyping.
3.1. BUILD CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND AND IDENTIFY 
STER EOTYPES ACCUR ATELY
3.1.1. Failure to Identify Stereotypes Accurately
A weakness of current approaches to stereotyping is that when UN human rights 
mechanisms address stereotyping, they often do not identify operative stereotypes 
accurately.116 Sometimes they mislabel related, but distinct, concepts such as myths 
114 See eg Statements of the governments of Estonia, Nepal and Ireland, The Impact of Gender 
Stereotypes on the Recognition and Enjoyment of Women’s Human Rights, Annual Full Day 
Discussion on Women’s Human Rights, Human Rights Council, 26th sess, Geneva, 17 June 2014.
115 Statement by Veronica Birga (personal email correspondence 19 January 2015).
116 Cusack (n 5) 65–67.
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(eg most perpetrators of rape are strangers) and prejudices (eg women are inferior 
to men), as stereotypes. Other times they identify the assumption underpinning 
the stereotypical belief, rather than the stereotype itself. For example, identifying 
the assumption that ‘women bear the responsibility for sexual attacks or invite 
them by being out late or in isolated places or by dressing in a particular manner’,117 
rather than the stereotypes that ‘women should be modest’ (which may cause its 
holder to assume that immodest women invite sexual assaults).
The problem with mislabelling stereotypes or failing to identify them 
accurately is that it creates confusion about the actual problem threatening 
human rights – the stereotype and/or its application to an individual in the form 
of stereotyping. This leads to the concealment of the specific belief that needs to 
be modified or transformed and the practice that needs to be eliminated because 
it violates human rights. It also potentially diverts attention and resources away 
from efforts to challenge wrongful stereotyping. That, of course, is not to say that 
prejudices, myths and the assumptions underpinning stereotypes do not also 
warrant attention; they do.118 However, the full implementation of international 
human rights obligations related to stereotyping requires UN mechanisms to be 
very clear about the specific stereotypes that are undermining the recognition, 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights. This means that they must be able to 
identify the attributes, characteristics and/or roles that have been ascribed to 
individuals as a result of stereotyping.
3.1.2. Build Capacity of UN Mechanisms
Further work is therefore needed to build the capacity of UN mechanisms 
to understand, identify and challenge stereotypes and ensure they do not 
perpetuate them through their work. Whilst there is a substantial body of work 
on stereotyping in marriage and family relations, there is a particular need to 
build capacity to name the stereotypes that operate in other areas of life (eg the 
military, health). What, for example, are some of the common stereotypes that 
operate in those areas? How have those stereotypes been perpetuated?119 What 
has been the impact on human rights (eg impeding the promotion of women 
in the military)?120 And what strategies have proven successful in challenging 
stereotyping in those areas and are there any good practice examples of the 
strategies being used in practice?
117 UNHRC, ‘Report by Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers Gabriela 
Knaul’ (2011), UN Doc A/66/289, para 48.
118 See eg John F Dovidio, Peter Glick and Laurie Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years 
after Allport (Blackwell Pub 2005); Gorgon W Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-
Wesley Pub Co 1954).
119 See eg Raewyn Connell and Rebecca Pearce, Gender Norms and Stereotypes: A Survey of 
Concepts, Research and Issues about Change, UN Women, Expert Group Meeting, Envisioning 
Women’s Rights in the Post-2015 Context, EGM/B20/BP.2 (2014) 10–30.
120 See ch 8 in this volume.
Intersentia 33
Building Momentum Towards Change
Whilst the UN mechanisms need to make a concerted effort to educate 
themselves and others about stereotypes, including, for instance, through General 
Recommendations and their reports to the Human Rights Council, there is also 
an important role for the OHCHR (and others) to play in this area. As explained 
above, the Office is currently working to build capacity around the issue of 
stereotyping, including through its briefing note on stereotyping for treaty body 
experts and special procedures and its paper on eliminating judicial stereotyping. 
It should also explore opportunities to support UN special procedures and 
treaty bodies wishing to address stereotyping through their reports and 
jurisprudence.121 This might involve facilitating training and the publication or 
distribution of resources providing crucial guidance on stereotyping and how 
to recognise, articulate and challenge stereotypical beliefs. The OHCHR should 
also explore opportunities to promote the important work that UN mechanisms 
have already completed, and that they continue to complete, on stereotyping, 
including through its stereotyping webpage. In addition to the work undertaken 
on this issue by treaty bodies such as CEDAW, it might be useful to highlight the 
reports of those UN Special Rapporteurs that have addressed this issue through 
their mandates.122
As well as the OHCHR, human rights advocates and others can play a key role 
in building the capacity of UN mechanisms to address stereotyping, including 
through the accurate identification of the nature and scope of the problem. The 
International Commission of Jurists is, for example, developing a resource on 
eradicating stereotypes from laws and practices related to sexual violence against 
women, which usefully identifies common stereotypes in this area.123 Although 
this initiative does not target UN mechanisms specifically, it illustrates the 
important role that human rights advocates can play in building capacity around 
the issue of stereotyping and ensuring that the problem is identified accurately 
and understood better.
3.2 . ELABOR ATE STATE OBLIGATIONS R ELATED 
TO STER EOTYPING
3.2.1. Limited Guidance on State Obligations Related to Stereotyping
UN mechanisms have provided some useful guidance on the nature and scope 
of human rights obligations related to stereotyping. Nevertheless, the increased 
121 Cusack (n 108) paras 3.1–4.5.
122 See eg Knaul (n 117); UNHRC, ‘Report by Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights 
Farida Shaheed’ (2012), UN Doc A/67/287; Sepúlveda Carmona (n 38).
123 See eg International Commission of Jurists, Sexual Violence against Women: Eradicating 
Gender Stereotypes in Laws and Practice. Distilling the Issues & Pointing to Comparative Good 
Practices (draft, 2014) (on file with author).
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scrutiny of this issue has exposed significant gaps in the guidance provided to 
date. The limited awareness of relevant obligations contained in treaties other than 
CEDAW is particularly noteworthy in this regard. Many states are consequently 
unsure about the steps they should take to implement their obligations fully, 
which is undermining efforts to modify or transform harmful stereotypes and 
eliminate wrongful stereotyping. For instance, what measures are required under 
the CRC to challenge age-based stereotyping? Similarly, what steps must states 
take to modify or transform harmful stereotypes based on sexual orientation?
3.2.2. Elaborate State Obligations Related to Stereotyping
The gaps that have been exposed evidence a need for more comprehensive 
information on the nature and scope of the full range of human rights obligations 
related to stereotyping.124 In light of its considerable work on stereotyping thus far, 
further, detailed guidance on state obligations would initially best come from the 
CEDAW Committee. A General Recommendation, informed by a ‘general day of 
discussion’,125 would be most suited to this goal, owing to the significant scope it 
affords the Committee to articulate the extent of CEDAW’s obligations to address 
stereotyping. At a minimum, the General Recommendation should: identify how 
stereotypes and stereotyping violate CEDAW; explain the nature and scope of 
state obligations in Articles 2(f), 5 and 10(c) of CEDAW, including when they are 
read with Articles 6 to 16; elaborate the linkages between those obligations and 
the fulfilment of CEDAW’s overarching goals of eliminating discrimination and 
achieving equality; and clarify the effect of reservations to Articles 2(f) and 5. It 
might also address related concepts such as prejudice126 and stigma127 and their 
relationship to CEDAW. The CEDAW Committee’s earlier recommendations 
on stereotyping, particularly under the Optional Protocol, should also feature 
prominently in the General Recommendation. Furthermore, it is important that 
the Committee continues to articulate the nature and scope of state obligations to 
address stereotyping through its work on other substantive issues. It is pleasing, 
for this reason, that the Committee’s General Recommendation No 33 on women’s 
access to justice for women includes a number recommendations on stereotyping, 
including adopting mechanisms to ensure rules of evidence, investigations and 
124 Shaheed (n 122) paras 43–44.
125 The CEDAW Committee has already held general days of discussions on topics such as 
women’s right to education, rural women, access to justice, women in conflict and post-
conflict situations, and harmful practices. State obligations to address stereotyping have been 
considered briefly during these days of discussion. See CEDAW Committee <www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/CEDAWIndex.aspx> accessed 28 March 2015.
126 For a general analysis of the impact of prejudice, see Dovidio, Glick and Rudman (n 118); 
Allport (n 118).
127 For an analysis of the impact of stigma on women in the context of abortion, see Rebecca 
J Cook, ‘Stigmatized Meanings of Criminal Abortion Law’ in Rebecca J Cook, Joanna N 
Erdman and Bernard M Dickens, Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2014) 347.
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other legal and quasi-judicial procedures are impartial and not influenced by 
stereotypes.128 It is also pleasing that its recent General Recommendations on 
harmful practices and the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, 
nationality and statelessness of women deal with this issue.129
Whilst further guidance from the CEDAW Committee would be a critical 
step forward in addressing gaps in information about the nature and scope of state 
obligations, it will not by itself provide adequate guidance on the stereotyping 
obligations contained in treaties other than CEDAW or in relation to those 
types of stereotyping based on grounds other than sex/gender. It is therefore 
incumbent on all UN mechanisms to consider how they, too, can elaborate state 
obligations to address stereotyping. Already, some UN mechanisms have begun 
to elucidate the nature and scope of state obligations in this area. For example, 
the 2010 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief 
highlighted how schools can help to eliminate harmful stereotypes and other 
prejudices that affect members of religious minorities.130 In a further example, 
the 2012 report of the Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking 
water and sanitation identified several measures states should take to challenge 
stereotyping that stigmatises certain groups and undermines their access to safe 
water and sanitation.131
Examples such as these are, however, all too rare. As such, they underscore 
the need for a greater commitment from UN mechanisms to articulate the full 
range and extent of state obligations related to stereotyping. Not only would this 
help to address critical gaps in information about state obligations, but it also has 
the potential to stimulate and enrich transnational discourses about all types of 
stereotyping.
3.3. HIGHLIGHT GOOD PR ACTICE EX AMPLES 
OF CHALLENGING STER EOTYPING
3.3.1. Limited Awareness of Effective Responses to Stereotyping
As awareness of stereotyping has begun to grow, so has interest in good practices 
in challenging stereotyping. Evidence of this interest was clear during the 
128 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 33 on women’s access to justice, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GC/33 paras 3, 7–8, 18, 21, 26–35, 51(h), 65(h), 66.
129 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 32 (n 18) paras 31, 44; CEDAW Committee 
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, Joint General Recommendation/General 
Comment No 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and 
No 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on Harmful Practices, UN Doc CEDAW/C/
GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18 (2014) paras 6, 17, 29, 39, 67, 69(c).
130 UNHRC, ‘Report by Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Heiner Bielefeldt’ 
(2010) UN Doc A/HRC/16/53, paras 27–40, 58.
131 De Albuquerque (n 64) paras 18, 20, 22, 29, 31, 35, 44, 64–69, 82(c)(iii).
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Human Rights Council’s 2014 annual discussion on women’s human rights, 
when a number of governments enquired about practices that are helping to 
dispel stereotypes and prevent their application to individuals. For instance, the 
Government of Ireland asked how it could best support young girls to grow up 
without internalising harmful stereotypes, and the Government of Nepal asked 
how regional mechanisms could help to challenge stereotyping at the national 
level.132 It is not just states that have an appetite for information about good 
practices in challenging stereotyping, but also UN mechanisms and other human 
rights advocates. For example, in discussing stereotyping in her 2012 report, the 
Special Rapporteur on the field of cultural rights lamented the lack of ‘sufficient 
information on best practices … at the national level’.133 She went on later in her 
report to issue a call to governments, national human rights institutions and non-
governmental organisations, to gather examples of such practices.134
The interest in good practices is understandable given the size and complexity 
of the challenges involved in modifying or transforming harmful stereotypes and 
eliminating wrongful stereotyping. How, for instance, should a state set about 
transforming a belief or set of beliefs that have become so ingrained as to be 
considered a ‘normal’ aspect of daily life (eg women should be caregivers; men 
should be breadwinners)? Which strategies have already proven useful in bringing 
about, or initiating, that transformation? What worked well, and what were the 
risks and challenges in implementing them, and how were they overcome?
3.3.2. Identify and Highlight Measures that are Bringing about Positive Change
It is important that more UN mechanisms respond to, and capitalise on, the 
interest in good practices, by identifying and highlighting measures that are 
bringing about positive change in relation to stereotyping. The OHCHR’s recent 
paper on judicial stereotyping illustrates one way that UN mechanisms could 
seek to make a contribution in this area.135 A key aim of the Office’s paper was 
to identify strategies to challenge judicial stereotyping as well as good practice 
examples of their use in cases involving gender-based violence. Some of the 
strategies highlighted include laws and policies that prohibit and sanction 
judicial stereotyping, rules of evidence and procedure that limit opportunities for 
judicial stereotyping, legal decisions that challenge stereotyping by lower courts 
and resources and training that build judicial capacity to address stereotyping. 
One example highlighted in the paper was rule 96 of the rules of procedure and 
evidence of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, which seeks to prevent judicial 
132 The Impact of Gender Stereotypes on the Recognition and Enjoyment of Women’s Human Rights, 
Annual Full Day Discussion on Women’s Human Rights, Human Rights Council, 26th sess, 
Geneva, 17 June 2014.
133 Shaheed (n 122) para 54.
134 Ibid para 83.
135 Cusack (n 109).
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stereotyping by providing that a sexual assault victim’s testimony does not need 
to be corroborated and prohibiting prior sexual conduct from being admitted in 
evidence or as a defence.136 Another example comes from the Gender Equality Unit 
of the Mexican National Supreme Court of Justice, which has provided crucial 
guidance on how judges can avoid and challenge stereotyping in its protocol on 
incorporating a gender perspective into judicial decision-making.137 The Unit’s 
monitoring of the implementation of the protocol will be critical in evaluating 
its success in ensuring judges refrain from stereotyping in their decisions and 
challenge it where it does occur.
4. CONCLUSION
The international human rights landscape is vastly different today than it was just 
five or six years ago insofar as the issue of stereotyping is concerned. The biggest 
change, though, has been the growing attention given to gender and, increasingly 
but to a far lesser extent, disability stereotyping. More and more regularly, UN 
human rights mechanisms are identifying instances of gender and disability 
stereotyping and examining in greater depth how those types of stereotyping 
are undermining the human rights of women and people with disabilities. This 
attention has, in turn, been crucial in deepening understanding of gender and 
disability stereotyping and improving the quality of UN responses to those types. 
Importantly, it has also been key in helping to identify, and build momentum 
towards, solutions capable of bringing about real change in modifying or 
transforming harmful gender and disability stereotypes, and eliminating 
wrongful gender and disability stereotyping. Of course, it is ultimately up to 
states, and not UN human rights mechanisms, to tailor and implement these 
solutions through their laws, policies, programmes and practices. Nevertheless, 
the expanding discourse on gender and disability stereotyping, and the 
heightened scrutiny of this issue amongst UN human rights mechanisms more 
broadly will undoubtedly apply pressure on, and help to motivate, states to take 
the steps needed to safeguard human rights against harmful gender or disability 
stereotypes and wrongful gender or disability stereotyping.
A challenge moving forward will be further expanding and deepening UN 
discourses on stereotyping to address better those types of stereotyping based 
on grounds other than gender and disability. Whilst existing UN jurisprudence 
on stereotyping will provide a useful starting point for this further evolution, it 
is ultimately the responsibility of all UN mechanisms to seize opportunities to 
address stereotyping as part of their respective mandates and, where mandates 
136 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (rev 2013) r 96.
137 Gender Equality Unit, National Supreme Court of Justice, Mexico, Judicial Decision-Making 
with a Gender Perspective: A Protocol. Making Equal Rights Real (2014).
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permit, hold states accountable for their failure to modify or transform all harmful 
stereotypes and eliminate all wrongful stereotyping. As responses to stereotyping 
grow further in strength, it will be important for UN mechanisms to consider 
opportunities for collaboration and coordination, including on critical questions 
like the content, scope and limitations of state obligations. What is clear for now 
is that the issue of stereotyping is on the UN’s human rights agenda and that UN 
mechanisms need to take advantage of the momentum generated over the past 
half-decade to further strengthen and expand their responses to stereotyping.
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Stereotyping has definitely appeared on the radar of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court or the Strasbourg Court). In several recent 
rulings, notably the Grand Chamber judgments of Konstantin Markin v Russia1 
and Aksu v Turkey,2 the Court has taken issue with gender-based and race-based 
stereotypes. Konstantin Markin concerned Russia’s refusal to grant parental leave 
to a military serviceman. This is an important ruling, because the Court held that 
the state could not rely on gender stereotypes to justify differences in treatment 
between men and women under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).3 Aksu concerned government-sponsored publications, which 
included derogatory stereotypes about Roma. The importance of this judgment, as 
seen from an anti-stereotyping perspective, is that the Court explicitly recognises 
that stereotyping can negatively impact the right to private life (Article 8 ECHR).
In this chapter, rather than comprehensively analysing and critiquing the ways 
in which the Strasbourg Court addresses (and fails to address) stereotypes,4 we 
zoom in on the Court’s case law regarding domestic violence against women. In a 
volume dedicated to exploring the ways in which stereotyping is a human rights 
issue, violence against women (VAW) – and specifically domestic violence against 
women – is a particularly salient and thorny issue. International human rights 
law – as will be discussed further below – recognises that there are close links 
1 Konstantin Markin v Russia (2012) 56 EHRR 8.
2 Aksu v Turkey (2013) 56 EHRR 4.
3 Konstantin Markin v Russia (2012) 56 EHRR 8 para 143.
4 This has been attempted elsewhere. See Alexandra Timmer, ‘Toward an Anti-Stereotyping 
Approach for the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 11 HRLR 707; and Alexandra 
Timmer, ‘Judging Stereotypes: What the European Court of Human Rights Can Borrow from 
American and Canadian Equal Protection Law’ (2015) 63 AJCL 239.
40 Intersentia
Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer
between pervasive gender stereotyping and VAW. The issue remains surprisingly 
under-examined in the ECtHR literature, however.
This chapter argues that the Court should address gender stereotyping in 
domestic violence cases and in that respect follow international human rights 
law. That is not to say that we think the Strasbourg Court can eliminate gender 
stereotypes. We think of the Court as one actor in a larger effort directed 
against the harmful gender stereotypes underpinning domestic violence. This 
effort is organised on many fronts, both legal and non-legal (such as via media, 
education and politics). Yet the only way the Court can play its role, this chapter 
further argues, is by carefully crafting legal reasoning that names and contests 
stereotypes. In naming gender stereotypes, the Court will be addressing one of 
the factors that structurally contributes to domestic violence and ineffective state 
responses. Naming gender stereotypes will thus enable the Court to frame the 
cases as gender-based rather than treating them as instances of individual and 
accidental violence. In contesting gender stereotyping, in turn, the Court will 
be demanding states to combat gender stereotyping and prohibiting them from 
relying on gender stereotypes to justify their unresponsiveness to violence.
Below, the chapter proceeds as follows. In the first part, we discuss the 
concept of stereotypes in general and that of gender stereotypes more specifically. 
In this part, we additionally outline the developments in international human 
rights law recognising the role that gender stereotypes play in violence against 
women and calling on states to combat them. In the second part, we name the 
gender stereotypes underlying various domestic violence cases in the Strasbourg 
case law and suggest ways in which the Court can contest them.
1. THE CONCEPTUAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
1.1. ON STER EOTYPES
In this chapter, we conceive of stereotypes as ‘beliefs about groups of people’. 
This is a fairly minimal and neutral definition,5 which leaves room for the 
fact that stereotypes come in various forms. Stereotypes can be prescriptive: 
prescribing a certain kind of behaviour or standard of appearance to (sub)groups 
of people (eg  women should be slim/men should be muscular; women should 
be submissive/ men should lead). They can also be descriptive: these stereotypes 
describe a statistical truth about a group as a whole, but do not necessarily 
accurately reflect the situation of the individual. In other words, descriptive 
5 Other definitions, notably the one of Cook and Cusack, are more elaborate. Cf the definition 
of a stereotype of Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack: ‘a generalized view or preconception of 
attributes or characteristics possessed by, or the roles that should be performed by, members 
of a particular group’. Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational 
Legal Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010) 9.
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stereotypes are largely accurate but overbroad assumptions (eg women live 
longer). Then there are also false stereotypes: false stereotypes are either based on 
prejudice or they simply have an unsound empirical/statistical basis (eg women 
are weak). And finally there are role-typing stereotypes: these are assumptions 
about the proper roles or modes of behaviour of people who belong to a certain 
group (famously eg  women are homemakers/men are breadwinners).6 One 
stereotype can fall under multiple of these headers (eg ‘women are homemakers’ 
has both a descriptive and a prescriptive dimension; and is also a role-type). As 
Rikki Holtmaat has pointed out, ‘the line between descriptive and prescriptive 
stereotypes is very thin since many descriptions of what women are, also function 
as prescriptions of how they should behave’.7 What is more, not only do stereotypes 
appear in these various forms, our neutral definition also leaves room for the fact 
that they can be both positive (eg ‘women are caring’) and negative (eg ‘women 
are weak’).
In the first place, stereotypes are held at the individual level. All of us harbour 
stereotypes, and these can be triggered automatically when we come into contact 
with members of the stereotyped group. This plays out at an unconscious level, 
without awareness or intention.8 Important for present purposes is that stereotypes 
also have a collective dimension: ‘many (perhaps most) of our stereotypes are in 
fact widely held and culturally sanctioned’.9 In this sense stereotypes are social 
norms; the extent to which people hold and express stereotypes depends on what 
they deem fit within their social environment.10 The fact that stereotypes become 
social norms is what makes them so dangerous, as we will show below when we 
discuss states’ lack of response to domestic violence cases.
Stereotypes attribute (perceived) group characteristics to the individual, 
without regard to the individual’s actual situation. In this way, stereotyping can 
result in different kinds of harms. It has been argued that people feel the injurious 
effects in the realms of (social) recognition, (material) distribution, and individual 
psychological well-being.11 We note that all forms of stereotypes discussed 
above can have harmful effects, including so-called positive stereotypes. Salient 
examples are the many benevolent yet patronising stereotypes about women: 
when women are held to be nurturing, warm and caring, this serves to justify 
6 This typology draws on Timmer (2015) (n 4) 255–259.
7 Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Article 5’ in Marsha A Freeman, Christine Chinkin and Beate Rudolf 
(eds), The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
A Commentary (OUP 2011) 141–67.
8 See eg Patricia G Devine and Lindsay B Sharp, ‘Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping and 
Prejudice’ in Todd D Nelson (ed), Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination 
(Psychology Press 2009) 62; and Anthony G Greenwald and Mahzarin R Banaji, ‘Implicit 
Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes’ (1995) 102 Psychol Rev 4.
9 David J Schneider, The Psychology of Stereotyping (Guilford Press 2004) 322.
10 Charles Stangor, ‘The Study of Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination within Social 
Psychology: A Quick History of Theory and Research’ in Todd D Nelson (ed), Handbook of 
Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination (Psychology Press 2009) 1, 4.
11 Timmer (2011) (n 4) 715–716.
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a system of patriarchy where men perform the leading roles and women the 
supportive ones.
So far, we have discussed the concept of stereotype in general. We turn now to 
gender stereotypes more specifically. Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack describe 
gender stereotypes as ‘beliefs about the personal attributes of women and men’.12 
Offering a definition of gender stereotypes is difficult, as the concept of gender 
is itself fluid and contested. Cook and Cusack have, however, developed a useful 
four-pronged typology of gender stereotypes.13 First are sex stereotypes; these 
concern ‘the physical and biological differences between men and women’.14 Next 
are sexual stereotypes, meaning those stereotypes which focus ‘on the sexual 
interaction between men and women’.15 Third are sex role stereotypes, these 
ascribe certain roles and behaviour to men and women. And lastly Cook and 
Cusack distinguish compounded stereotypes; meaning gender stereotypes that 
interact with other stereotypes to produce specific beliefs about sub-groups of 
men and women. Below, we will see some of these four forms of gender stereotypes 
reflected in the Strasbourg Court’s case law on domestic violence. But first we 
will explore the legal framework that has been developed in international human 
rights law regarding violence against women.
1.2 . GENDER STER EOTYPES AS A ROOT CAUSE 
OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN 
INTER NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Following decades of scattered attention if not silence,16 violence against women 
entered international human rights law as a human rights issue in the 1990s.17 
One significant development of these past few decades has been the recognition 
of the links between violence against women and the broader problem of gender 
inequality. The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has considerably contributed to 
this development. Though CEDAW does not explicitly address violence against 
women, its monitoring Committee (CEDAW Committee or the Committee) 
12 Cook and Cusack (n 5) 20.
13 Ibid 25–31.
14 Ibid 25.
15 Ibid.
16 Dianne Otto, ‘Lost in Translation: Re-scripting the Sexed Subjects of International Human 
Rights Law’ in Anne Orford (ed), International Law and Its Others (CUP 2006) 333 (noting 
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights left issues such as gendered violence silent).
17 Rhonda Copelon, ‘International Human Rights Dimensions of Intimate Violence: Another 
Strand in the Dialectic of Feminist Lawmaking’ (2003) 11 Journal of Gender, Social Policy 
and the Law 866 and Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human 
Rights Law (CUP 2013) 7. For fuller accounts of the trajectory of violence against women in 
international human rights law see ibid 865–876 and 7–12, respectively.
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has long regarded such violence as a form of discrimination against women.18 
According to the Committee, violence is ‘gender-based’ when it ‘is directed against 
a woman because she is a woman’ or when it ‘affects women disproportionately’.19
One of the fundamental implications of characterising the problem as one of 
discrimination against women is that violence against women is no longer seen 
as the result of an isolated individual act but rather as part of a more systemic 
problem.20 This understanding invites the interrogation of the unequal power 
relations between men and women that many feminists view at the root of violence 
against women.21 More specifically, it invites human rights law to expose and 
address the structural causes of violence against women,22 including traditional 
stereotypes of men and women.23
Indeed, the CEDAW Committee’s understanding of VAW as part of the wider 
problem of inequality has gone hand in hand with the Committee’s recognition 
that gender-stereotyped roles are a root cause of such violence. The Committee 
has noted that ‘traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate 
to men or as having stereotyped roles’ perpetuate violence against women.24 
It has said that these attitudes may justify such violence and that, in turn, the 
consequences of such violence may maintain women in subordinate roles.25 In 
fact, the Committee has found a violation of Article 5(a) – the CEDAW provision 
mandating states to combat gender stereotypes – in various cases concerning 
violence against women, including domestic violence26 and rape.27 For example, 
in A.T. v Hungary, concerning domestic violence, the CEDAW Committee 
noted that the facts of the case revealed ‘aspects of the relationships between the 
sexes and attitudes towards women’ found in the country as a whole, namely 
the ‘persistence of entrenched traditional stereotypes regarding the role and 
responsibilities of women and men in the family’.28
18 General Recommendation No 19, Violence against Women (1992) paras 1, 6 and 7. See also 
Yildirim v Austria (6/2005), CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (2007) para 12.2 and V.K. v Bulgaria 
(20/2008), CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 (2011) para 9.11.
19 General Recommendation No 19, Violence against Women (1992) para 6.
20 See eg Edwards (n 17) 186.
21 See generally Elizabeth M Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (Yale 
University Press 2000). ‘Feminist legal arguments about gender violence have developed from 
feminist insights about the way heterosexual intimate violence is part of a larger system of 
coercive control and subordination; this system is based on structural gender inequality and 
has political roots’: ibid 5.
22 Edwards (n 17) 186 (regarding this as one of the advantages of framing the problem as one of 
sex discrimination and inequality).
23 Ibid 189.
24 General Recommendation No 19, Violence against Women (1992) para 11.
25 Ibid.
26 A.T. v Hungary (2/2003), CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (2005).
27 Karen Tayag Vertido v The Philippines (18/2008), CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (2010).
28 A.T. v Hungary (2/2003), CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (2005), para 9.4. The CEDAW Committee 
has linked gender stereotypes to various forms of structural subordination of women, 
including violence against women. See Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Preventing Violence against Women: 
The Due Diligence Standard with Respect to the Obligation to Banish Gender Stereotypes on 
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Human rights instruments specifically addressing violence against women 
locate such violence similarly within the larger framework of gender inequality. 
For instance, the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) views 
gender inequality as the cause and consequence of violence against women.29 
Particularly telling is the fact that one of the purposes of the Istanbul Convention 
is to ‘contribute to the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women 
and promote substantive equality between women and men’.30 Like the CEDAW 
Committee, the Istanbul Convention conceptualises violence against women 
as a form of discrimination against women,31 although it does so ambiguously 
when it comes to domestic violence.32 On one side, it sets domestic violence 
apart from other forms of violence against women.33 This is evidenced in the 
title of the Convention and in various provisions, including Article 3 defining 
violence against women but not domestic violence as gender-based.34 On the 
other side, the Istanbul Convention recognises that ‘domestic violence affects 
women disproportionately’35 and defines ‘gender-based violence against women’ 
precisely as including violence that affects women disproportionately.36 Thus, the 
Istanbul Convention suggests that domestic violence is not exclusively gender-
based; it also affects other groups such as the elderly, children and men.37
the Grounds of Article 5(a) of the CEDAW Convention’ in Carin Benninger-Budel (ed), Due 
Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 78.
29 See Council of Europe, ‘Preventing Violence against Women: Article 12 of the Istanbul 
Convention, A Collection of Papers on the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence,’ prepared by Marianne Hester 
and Sarah-Jane Lilley (September 2014) 6. The United Nations Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence against Women (UN Declaration) also views violence against women as both a 
consequence and a cause of the subordinate status of women in society. Its Preamble does not 
just recognise that ‘violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power 
relations between men and women.’ It also states that ‘violence against women is one of the 
crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared 
with men.’ See also the Preamble of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará) 
recognising that violence against women is ‘a manifestation of the historically unequal power 
relations between women and men.’
30 Article 1(b) of Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention).
31 Article 3(a) of Istanbul Convention.
32 Römkens notes and critiques this ambiguity. Renée G Römkens, ‘Reflections on Domestic 
Violence as Gender-Based Violence in European Legal Developments’ in M Mohamad and 
S Wieringa (eds), Family Ambiguity and Domestic Violence in Asia. Concepts, Law, and Process 
(Sussex Academic Press 2013) 92–209.
33 Ibid 203.
34 Article 3(a) and (b) of Istanbul Convention. Römkens (n 32) 201–202.
35 Preamble and Article 2 of Istanbul Convention.
36 Article 3(d) of Istanbul Convention: ‘“gender-based violence against women” shall mean 
violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately’ (emphasis added).
37 Römkens (n 32) 202 (noting that the Explanatory Report makes it clear that the Istanbul 
Convention intends to include children, men and the elderly). She argues however that it is 
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Be that as it may, what is most relevant for present purposes is that the 
Istanbul Convention similarly links gender-based violence against women to 
gender stereotypes. Gender-based violence against women is viewed as ‘both the 
cause and the result of unequal power relations based on perceived differences 
between women and men’.38 More precisely, the expression of gender-based 
violence is understood ‘as aimed at protecting women from violence resulting 
from gender stereotypes’.39
Following the understanding of the problem as one of gender inequality 
linked to gender stereotypes, a certain set of solutions has emerged in 
international human rights law. These solutions do not simply require states to 
address the consequences of gender-based violence but also its root causes.40 In 
tackling violence against women, the CEDAW Committee for example has been 
concerned with a notion of gender equality that attends to broader and structural 
inequality and that aims at social transformation by, inter alia, combating the 
spread of stereotypes.41 This approach is reflected in the recommendations 
that the Committee has adopted in some of the above-mentioned VAW case 
law involving violations of Article 5(a) of CEDAW.42 More foundationally, it is 
embodied in the CEDAW drafters’ awareness that ‘a change in the traditional 
role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to 
achieve full equality between men and women’.43
The Istanbul Convention, in turn, calls for gender-based violence against 
women to be addressed within the context of ‘the prevailing inequality between 
women and men, existing stereotypes, gender roles and discrimination against 
women in order to adequately respond to the complexity of the phenomenon’.44 
Echoing provisions of CEDAW,45 the Istanbul Convention requires State Parties 
‘internally contradictory’ and inconsistent with the standards set by international human 
rights law, notably CEDAW, ‘to position domestic violence against men within its realm.’ ibid.
38 Istanbul Convention, Explanatory Report, 12 April 2011, para 44.
39 Ibid.
40 See Julie Goldscheid, ‘Domestic and Sexual Violence as Sex Discrimination: Comparing 
American and International Approaches’ (2006) 28 Thomas Jefferson L Rev 386–387.
41 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Battered Women and Feminist Law Making: Author Meets Readers 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Christine Harrington, Sally Engle Merry, Renée Römkens and 
Marianne Wesson’ (2001–2002) 10 JLP 362. See also Edwards (n 17) 193 (arguing that the 
responses of international human rights law treaty bodies have included ‘recommendations 
for social and cultural change’).
42 See eg Karen Tayag Vertido v The Philippines (18/2008), CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008 (2010) para 
8.9(b).
43 Preamble of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW).
44 Istanbul Convention, Explanatory Report, 12 April, 2011, para 43.
45 Article 5 of CEDAW. See also Article 4(j) of the UN Declaration, which similarly asks states to 
adopt all appropriate measures to eliminate prejudices and practices ‘based on the idea of the 
inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes and on stereotyped roles for men and women.’ 
A similar obligation is contained in Article 8(b) of the Convention of Belém do Pará, which 
importantly adds that customs, prejudices and practices based on such stereotyped roles 
‘legitimize or exacerbate violence against women’.
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to promote changes in attitudes towards women as well as towards their role and 
status in society.46 In the words of the drafters:
All measures to prevent violence against women should … be framed in the context 
of the promotion and the practical realisation of equality between women and 
men through eliminating discrimination against women, changing patriarchal 
attitudes and fighting back gender stereotypes.47
It is therefore clear from the developments in international human rights law 
that the eradication of gender-based violence against women cannot be achieved 
without tackling the gender stereotypes at the root of gender inequality. To a large 
extent, international human rights law has incorporated the feminist insight that 
violence against women both expresses and reproduces unequal gender relations 
based on stereotyped roles. Feminists have long been concerned with the use 
of gender stereotypes to justify and perpetuate women’s subordinate status in 
society,48 of which violence is one more manifestation.49 Rikki Holtmaat argues 
that the root causes of gender-based violence lie in norms and practices that view 
women as unequal or inferior to men and that often reflect gender stereotypes.50 
These stereotypes send strong messages about men’s and women’s roles in society 
and about their ‘proper behaviour’.51 Feminists have viewed domestic violence, 
for instance, as ‘a means to control the behaviour of [the batterer’s] victim so that 
she conforms to his expectations and societal expectations of the “true woman”’.52 
Christine Littleton vividly explains the operation of these stereotypes: ‘If only 
she had been a better wife, a more submissive helpmate, a more compliant sexual 
partner, then her nose would not have been broken, her eye would still be uncut, 
the bruises would never have marked her thighs’.53
46 Article 12 of Istanbul Convention. See Hester and Lilley (n 29) 7.
47 Ad Hoc Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence (CAHVIO), Interim Report, 27 May 2009, CAHVIO (2009) 4 FIN, para 17. As Hester 
and Lilley note: ‘The ultimate aim is to change the behaviour of men and women, boys and 
girls, that is currently all too often influenced by prejudice, gender stereotypes or gender-
biased customs and traditions, and that helps to perpetrate or condone violence against 
women’. Hester and Lilley (n 29) 7.
48 See eg Neil S Siegel and Reva B Siegel, ‘Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination’ (2010) 59 Duke LJ 771–798.
49 Many feminists view violence against women as ‘a facet of women’s subordination in society.’ 
Schneider (n 21) 59. See also Melanie Randall, ‘Domestic Violence and the Construction of 
“Ideal Victims”: Assaulted Women’s “Image Problems” in Law’ (2004) 23 St L U Pub L Rev 
111–112: ‘Gendered violence is a phenomenon that emerges from and reinforces women’s 
subordinate status in society.’
50 Holtmaat (n 28) 63.
51 Ibid.
52 Zanita E Fenton, ‘Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in 
Gender Violence’ (1998–1999) 8 Col J Gender L 18.
53 Christine A Littleton, ‘Women’s Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on 
Male Battering of Women’ (1989) 23 University of Chicago Legal Forum 29, quoted by Fenton 
in ibid 27–28.
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Notwithstanding its advances, the formulation of violence against women as 
rooted in gender inequality remains fraught with difficulties and complexities.54 
Some of these difficulties are conceptual. Equality and non-discrimination are 
contested concepts.55 Equality, for example, may be understood as narrowly 
aiming to treat likes alike – in this case, to treat men and women identically 
(formal equality).56 Or it may be conceptualised as more substantively concerned 
with tackling gender disadvantage, oppression and subordination.57 Pinning 
down the exact links between violence against women, inequality between men 
and women, gender subordination, discrimination against women and gender 
stereotypes largely depends on the interpretation of these concepts. A substantive 
conception of equality is better able to encompass the idea that violence is also 
an inequality issue. So far, however, international human rights law continues 
to struggle with the meanings of non-discrimination and equality, despite some 
shifts towards substantive equality.58 In fact, it appears that settling the meaning 
of these concepts ‘remains one of the greatest challenges for international human 
rights law’.59
International human rights law’s framing of VAW as a form discrimination 
against women has arguably been accompanied by another set of concerns. These 
concerns flow from the emphasis placed on women as victims of violence,60 
which in turn has been part of the broader strategy to have gender-specific rights 
acknowledged as human rights.61 The VAW model’s focus on women’s victimhood 
has been double-edged. On the one hand, the gender-specific frame of VAW 
has emphasised the harms of violence historically experienced by women and 
its roots in sex discrimination and female subordination.62 On the other hand, 
the emphasis on the gender identity of the victim has fostered disempowering 
portrayals of women.
Thus, whereas anti-stereotyping concerns are at the heart of feminist 
critiques of VAW, ironically the resulting laws have to some extent resulted in 
more stereotyping.63 That is to say, the focus on women as victims of violence has 
54 Edwards (n 17) 190–197.
55 Ibid 142.
56 This is the sameness/difference paradigm. As Alice Edwards explains: ‘Inequality under this 
paradigm is when women are not treated the same as men; special treatment is allowed only as 
far as it will lead to their eventual identical position as men’. ibid 175.
57 Ibid 144–148 (referring in these terms to the understandings of equality advanced by Kathleen 
Mahoney, Iris Marion Young and Catharine MacKinnon, respectively).
58 Ibid.
59 Edwards (n 17) 196.
60 For fuller accounts of the concerns raised by the gender-specific frame of violence within 
international law see Dianne Otto, ‘The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in 
International Law Over the Last Decade’ (2009) 10 Melb JIL 11–26. We focus only on those 
concerns relevant for the purposes of this chapter.
61 Otto (n 16) 345.
62 Julie Goldscheid, ‘Gender Neutrality, the “Violence Against Women” Frame and Transforma-
tive Reform’ (2013–2014) 82 U Miss-K City L Rev 628.
63 Ibid 640–641.
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tragically perpetuated older stereotypes of women as powerless and inherently 
vulnerable in need of protection.64 As a result, the strategy has in many instances 
spurred on protective and even imperialist responses aimed at rescuing (‘other’) 
women.65 These responses have been critiqued for obscuring women’s agency 
and resistance in the face of violence.66 More fundamentally, they have been 
questioned for treating the woman as a ‘victim subject’ rather than as a full 
subject of international human rights law.67 In treating women as the victims of 
violence, the gender-specific frame of VAW has been further critiqued for erasing 
analogous gendered injuries of violence suffered by other categories, including 
men.68 It has also been challenged for obfuscating the role of other factors such as 
race and age, a longstanding concern of intersectionality theorists.69
Given these and the other concerns discussed above, one critical question 
raised by feminists is the following: How to address the root causes of gendered 
violence without reinstating protective narratives of vulnerable women that 
undermine the feminist goals of women’s emancipation and erase the experience 
of violence suffered by other categories of people?70
In the remaining parts we will focus on one specific form of violence, namely 
domestic violence. We will show how, in addressing gender stereotypes, the 
Court can direct attention to the root causes of domestic violence. In focusing 
on gender stereotypes rather than on the victim’s gender identity, the Court may 
additionally circumvent re-inscribing the problem as one that concerns women 
alone and reinforcing images of women as archetypical victims.
2. NAMING AND CONTESTING GENDER 
STEREOTYPES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASE LAW
2.1. NAMING GENDER STER EOTYPES AND EXPOSING 
THEIR HAR MS
Efforts aimed at eliminating wrongful gender stereotypes have to begin with 
naming these stereotypes and the ways in which they harm women.71 As 
Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack argue: ‘Unless wrongful gender stereotyping 
is diagnosed as a social harm, it will not be possible to determine its treatment 
64 Ratna Kapur, ‘The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the Native Subject in 
International/Postcolonial Feminist Legal Politics’ (2002) 15 HHRLJ 1–38.
65 Ibid and Otto (n 16) 345.
66 Otto (n 60).
67 Kapur (n 64).
68 Otto (n 16) 345.
69 Goldscheid (n 62) 636–640.
70 Otto suggests this question in (n 60) 24–25.
71 See eg Cook and Cusack (n 5) 39–70; Timmer (2011) (n 4).
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and bring about its elimination’.72 The task of naming harmful stereotyping can 
sometimes be challenging, as it usually involves making visible what is socially 
deeply ingrained as ‘natural’ or ‘normal’.73 In the context of violence against 
women, it has been said that ‘[a] big difficulty for the attention and prevention of 
violence against women is that it appears as culturally naturalized, as an intrinsic 
characteristic of social relations and accepted gender model’.74
In this part, we name the gender stereotypes operative in two stages of the 
domestic violence cases: (1) the gender stereotypes underlying or causing the 
violent incidents; and (2) the gender stereotypes guiding or impacting the state 
responses to domestic violence. In addition, we explain how these stereotypes 
hurt the applicants or their female relatives affected by violence.
In many of the cases discussed below, gender stereotypes are often implicit. 
In other words, to a large extent, they operate subtly rather than overtly. The 
absence of explicit stereotypical remarks on record makes it challenging to 
uncover implicit stereotyping. Most of the cases we examine reveal stereotypical 
views of female victims of domestic violence. These are general assumptions 
about ‘ideal’ behaviours and ‘proper’ roles that female victims (ought to) display 
and perform in the face of violence. As will become evident in the discussion that 
follows, the stereotypes surrounding victimhood are in turn infused by gender 
stereotypes. The majority of them are sex-role stereotypes. These stereotypes 
feature in the state responses examined below, either at the domestic level or at 
the supranational level (ie in states’ submissions to the Strasbourg Court).
2.1.1. Women are (or Ought to be) Weak, Passive and Helpless
One gender stereotype implicit in state responses to domestic violence cases is 
the negative sex role stereotype that women are – or ought to be – weak, passive 
and helpless in the face of violence. This stereotype is for instance at play in 
Kalucza v Hungary – a case concerning allegations of assault, harassment and 
rape by a former common-law husband.75 The domestic courts’ rejections of the 
applicant’s requests for restraining orders were largely motivated by the fact that 
the applicant had also been violent towards her former husband. The District 
Court, for instance, rejected the applicant’s first request, after establishing that 
‘the bad relationship which has developed between the parties can be imputed 
72 Cook and Cusack (n 5) 40.
73 Ibid 41.
74 Ibid 41–42.
75 Kalucza v Hungary App no 57693/10 (ECtHR, 24 April 2012). See also ECtHR, Bevacqua and 
S. v Bulgaria App no 71127/01 (ECtHR, 12 June 2008) paras 61–62. In this case, the state’s 
submissions before the Strasbourg Court underestimated the violence exerted on the applicant 
by her husband by framing the case as one of ‘querulous allegations exchanged between 
spouses in the course of divorce proceedings.’ ibid para. 61. In this way, the blame was thus 
partly placed on the applicant and the violence she experienced made invisible.
50 Intersentia
Lourdes Peroni and Alexandra Timmer
to both parties’.76 Yet more illustrative is the reasoning of the Regional Court 
upholding the dismissal of her second request: ‘the ordering of a coercive measure 
only in respect of one party – in the present case against Gy.B. – is not justified 
due to the involvement of the aggrieved party’.77
In being violent towards her former husband, the applicant in Kalucza 
deviates from stereotypical views of domestic violence victims. If a woman fights 
back, she is ‘too strong’.78 The ‘ideal’ or ‘real’ victim of domestic violence is the 
opposite.79 Stereotypically, she is one who does not use violence against her 
violent partner. The use of violence therefore undermines her status as a victim.80 
Referring to women who use violence, Leigh Goodmark explains: ‘These women 
must also overcome the stereotype that they defy: the weak, passive, and helpless 
battered woman’.81 This stereotypical view of domestic violence victims is in turn 
infused by the gender stereotype of ‘feminine passivity and tolerance’.82 Women 
resisting domestic violence with violence thus find their credibility challenged 
both as a woman and as a woman alleging violence.83
This was certainly the case in Kalucza. Once the domestic judges learned 
that the applicant had used violence herself, her victim status and her ensuing 
ability to secure a restraining order were undermined. In fact, this was the main 
reason to dismiss her request for restraining orders against her husband. The 
mix of victimisation and sex role stereotypes at the root of the state inaction 
therefore harmed the applicant very concretely: she was deprived from protection 
against further violence. According to Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack, one 
of the ways in which gender stereotypes harm women is by imposing a burden 
on them.84 A gender stereotype, they note, may burden women by making them 
vulnerable to (more) violence.85 They may also harm them by ‘reducing the 
likelihood that sexual assault perpetrators would be held legally accountable, and 
so deterred’.86 An illustration of the latter form of harm is the discontinuation of 
the investigations by the District Prosecutor’s Office in Kalucza. The Prosecutor’s 
reasoning evokes the stereotypes animating the courts’ dismissal of the requests 
for restraining orders against the former husband. Indeed, the Prosecutor 
76 Ibid para. 17.
77 Ibid para. 25.
78 Fenton (n 52) 28.
79 See generally Leigh Goodmark, ‘When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When 
She Fights Back’ (2008) 20 YJL and Fem 75–129.
80 Ibid 94.
81 Ibid 95 (reference omitted).
82 Ibid 94.
83 Ibid footnote 6.
84 Cook and Cusack (n 5) 62.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
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discontinued the investigation against the applicant’s former husband for alleged 
sexual harassment after finding that animosity was reciprocal.87
The Strasbourg Court is mindful that one of the main reasons for refusing to 
protect the applicant was the fact that the woman was violent herself. It states that 
the domestic authorities ‘had a positive obligation to protect the applicant from 
the violent behaviour of her former common-law husband exerted in her home, 
notwithstanding the fact that she had also been violent towards him’.88 The Court 
does not only note that the domestic authorities did not give much reason to deny 
the restraining orders other than saying that ‘the bad relationship was imputable 
to both parties’.89 The Court also adds:
[I]f it could not be ordered in cases of mutual assaults, then the aim of providing 
effective protection to victims would be seriously undermined. The possibility 
that the victim acted in legitimate self-defence cannot be ruled out at that stage … 
The domestic court’s reasoning that a restraining order could not be issued in view 
of the aggrieved party’s involvement is therefore not acceptable.90
The Court firmly establishes that the positive obligation to protect the applicant 
subsisted and that the reciprocal character of the assaults could not in any 
way undermine, let alone eliminate, this obligation. Moreover, in highlighting 
the possibility of self-defence, the Court implicitly underscores the applicant’s 
resistance and agency. It thus avoids re-enacting the stereotypes of victims’ 
passiveness underpinning the domestic courts’ responses. Yet the Court does not 
go as far as naming the stereotype influencing the state’s inaction: that female 
victims of domestic violence (should) endure violence passively and helplessly. The 
stereotype in question is rather prescriptive because it expects women to remain 
passive when confronted with violence. At the same time, it is false because it 
assumes that women are weak and helpless without sound empirical basis.
2.1.2. Women Ought to be Submissive
Another stereotype usually associated with domestic violence also implicit in 
state responses is the stereotype that ‘the victim precipitates her own assault’.91 
This stereotype, in turn, suggests the normative gender stereotype that women 
should not provoke men. In other words, they ought to be submissive or obedient 
to men, including their male partners. The stereotypes in question underpin 
87 Kalucza v Hungary App no 57693/10 (ECtHR, 24 April 2012), para 19: ‘The Prosecutor’s Office 
established that there was animosity between the parties and that the applicant’s allegations 
alone were not sufficient to prove the commission of any crime’.
88 Ibid para 61 (emphasis added).
89 Ibid para 65.
90 Ibid para 66.
91 Fenton (n 52) 27.
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state responses highlighting women’s ‘provocation’ of violence, a notion that 
feminists have challenged for its male bias.92 Laws on provocation, some feminists 
have shown, have largely been shaped by ‘male rhymes, reasons and excuses’.93 
Examples of the implicit normative stereotype that women ought to be submissive 
include E.M. v Romania, concerning allegations of physical aggression and threat 
by the husband,94 and B. v the Republic of Moldova, also involving violence by a 
husband.95
In E.M. v Romania, the implicit stereotype plays a role, along with other 
factors, in determining the sanction applied in a proceeding for assault and injuries 
caused by the applicant’s husband to her mother. The domestic court considered 
that an administrative sanction was enough, given the ‘real circumstances’ within 
which the facts occurred, including that they had been triggered and prolonged 
by the applicant’s mother.96 It is not clear how exactly the victim triggered and 
extended the violent behaviour.
Regardless of the nature of the provocation, this type of reasoning is 
problematic for various reasons. It locates the source of the problem in the 
victim – she triggered the violent ‘reaction’ – while directing attention away 
from the violent behaviour of the perpetrator. This does not only justify such 
behaviour toward the woman; it actually puts the blame on her. Moreover, this 
sort of reasoning stereotypically assumes that, in the face of provocation, the man 
cannot hold himself but only react violently in a state of rage.97 In E.M. these 
implicit stereotypical assumptions about both female and male behaviours harms 
the woman in quite concrete terms: the person responsible for the violence gets a 
more lenient sanction.
In B. v the Republic of Moldova, in turn, the courts adopted six administrative 
decisions, following the applicant’s allegations of beatings by her husband. Four 
of these decisions fined the husband and one of them noted that the applicant had 
92 See Clare Connelly, ‘Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley: Commentary’ in Rosemary Hunter, 
Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminists Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Hart 
Publishing 2010) 292–96. The law on provocation in the United Kingdom, for example, has 
been challenged for its ‘masculine bias in favour of those who react to provoking events with 
anger – classically in the case of men who discover that their wives have committed adultery 
and/or are planning to leave them – as opposed to abused women who react through terror and 
despair, often in response to years of abuse rather than a single provoking event.’ ibid 292.
93 Susan Edwards, ‘Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley: Judgment’ in Rosemary Hunter, 
Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Hart 
Publishing 2010) 301.
94 E.M. v Romania App no 43994/05 (ECtHR, 30 October 2012).
95 B. v the Republic of Moldova App no 61382/09 (ECtHR, 16 July 2013).
96 E.M. v Romania App no 43994/05 (ECtHR, 30 October 2012), para 40: ‘Prenant en compte les 
« circonstances réelles » dans lesquelles les faits s’étaient produits, à savoir qu’ils auraient été 
déclenchés et prolongés par M.V., l’absence d’antécédents pénaux d’I.B. et son attitude sincère, 
le parquet estima qu’une amende administrative était une sanction suffisante.’ The other two 
factors are thus the lack of criminal record and the sincere attitude of I.B.
97 Edwards (n 93) 301.
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‘provoked him’, although it is not clear how.98 The fines ranged from the equivalent 
of 8.65 to 18 euros.99 The idea that the applicant provoked her husband resurfaces 
in the Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the applicant’s request for eviction of 
her husband from their common apartment to escape further violence.100 The 
applicant’s request relied on her husband’s violent behaviour.101 The Supreme 
Court rejected the claim for eviction with the argument that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove the husband’s systematic violent behaviour.102 This was 
despite the above-mentioned cases that resulted in sanctions against him. In fact, 
the Supreme Court noted that in one of those decisions ‘it had been mentioned 
that the applicant herself had provoked V.B.’s violence’.103
Admittedly, it is difficult to establish the links between the stereotype implicit 
in the idea that the applicant provoked her husband’s violence and the small fines 
ordered by the courts or the Supreme Court’s reluctance to issue an eviction 
order. The example serves nonetheless to show the existence of a victim-blaming 
mentality based on the idea that the women ‘asked for’ for the abuse.104 As we have 
noted above, the problem with victim-blaming mentality is that it contributes 
to violence becoming less visible.105 In B. the Supreme Court certainly fails to 
‘see’ the husband’s violent behaviour by simply noting that the applicant herself 
provoked him.
The Strasbourg Court critiques that the subsequent courts’ decisions kept 
referring back to the Supreme Court’s ruling without any consideration of the 
further acts of violence against the applicant.106 One of the Strasbourg Court’s 
conclusions is that the domestic authorities effectively forced the applicant 
‘to continue risking being subjected to violence or to leave home’.107 However, 
there is no word on whether the problematic decisions were grounded in gender 
stereotypes implicit in misconceptions about domestic violence victims, let alone 
on whether such misconceptions played a role in the decisions.
98 B. v the Republic of Moldova App no 61382/09 (ECtHR, 16 July 2013), para 9. The other two 
decisions terminated the proceedings following a friendly settlement and the expiry of the 
limitation period, respectively.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid para 14.
101 Ibid para 11.
102 Ibid para 14.
103 Ibid.
104 Fenton (n 52) 27.
105 Martha R Mahoney, ‘Legal Images of Battered Women’ (1991) 90 Mich L Rev 27.
106 B. v the Republic of Moldova App no 61382/09 (ECtHR, 16 July 2013) paras 56 and 74.
107 Ibid para 75.
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2.1.3. Women (Ought to) Endure Men’s Aggressiveness or Violence 
(and Other Gender Stereotypes)
One more example of how gender stereotypes may impact state responses to 
domestic violence is Eremia v the Republic of Moldova.108 The case concerned 
allegations of repeated assaults on the first applicant by her husband, ‘A.’, in 
front of their daughters (second and third applicants).109 Though a protection 
order was made, the husband managed to breach it recurrently and to further 
assault the applicant on several occasions.110 The protection order was ultimately 
partly revoked on appeal.111 A criminal investigation was opened following the 
applicant’s request.112 The prosecutor, however, suspended it for one year given 
that the husband had committed a ‘“less serious offence,” did not abuse drugs 
or alcohol, had three minors to support, was well respected at work and in the 
community and “did not represent a danger to society.”’113
Two sets of gender stereotypes can be identified in the domestic authorities’ 
responses. The first set involves the sex role stereotypes that suffering is an 
inevitable part of (married) women’s life and that aggressiveness is in turn a 
normal attribute of (married) men. These stereotypes can be discerned in the 
social workers’ alleged advice to the applicant. The social workers apparently 
advised her to reconcile with her husband arguing that she was ‘neither the first 
nor the last woman to be beaten up by her husband’.114 Female suffering, and its 
flip side, male aggression, are thus assumed to be part of the ‘normal’ state of 
affairs of marital life. The former stereotype is in fact a prescriptive one because 
it implies that women ought to accept violence and suffering in marriage. The 
latter is a false gender stereotype given its unsound empirical/statistical basis: all 
(married) men are not aggressive or violent. The stereotypical attitudes held by the 
social workers impacted negatively on the applicant’s protection: it took around 
four months for them to enforce the protection order issued by the courts.115
The second group of gender stereotypes can be found in the police’s response 
to the applicant’s complaints of violence against her husband. These stereotypes 
are evidenced by the remarks allegedly made by the police to pressure the applicant 
into withdrawing her complaints. The reason given by the police was apparently 
that ‘if A. had a criminal record and lost his job, this would have a negative impact 
on their daughters’ educational and career prospects’.116 These remarks contain 
108 Eremia v the Republic of Moldova (2014) 58 EHRR 2.
109 Ibid paras 7–10.
110 Ibid paras 11–21.
111 Ibid para 22.
112 Ibid para 23–24.
113 Ibid para 27.
114 Ibid para 25.
115 The order was issued on 9 December 2010 but not enforced by the social workers until 
15 March 2011. ibid paras 11 and 21.
116 Ibid para 17.
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the sex role stereotype that men are breadwinners and, implicitly, the correlated 
stereotype that women are homemakers.
Indeed, the police fail to acknowledge that the mother may also have had a 
job to support their children’s education and career. It appears that she actually 
had one. In claiming damages before the Strasbourg Court for the suffering 
caused to her, the applicant mentioned that she had been ‘humiliated by her work 
colleagues … for wanting to divorce A. and for “being a bad wife deserving to 
be beaten”’.117 The police’s assumptions, however, suggest that the husband is 
the most important, if not the only, financial supporter in the house. The related 
assumption is that the wife’s job is not as financially important or that she does 
not have one. The two stereotypical assumptions thus serve to reinforce a system 
of patriarchy where men play primary roles in the public sphere and women 
secondary ones in the private sphere. The prosecutor makes similar assumptions 
when it includes among the factors leading to the suspension of the investigation 
the fact that the husband ‘had three minors to support’ and that he was behaving 
as he ought in public: he ‘was well respected at work and in the community and 
did not represent a danger to society’.118 The implicit gender stereotypes thus play 
a role first in discouraging the applicant from submitting a complaint and later on 
in suspending the criminal investigation against her husband for a year.
The Strasbourg Court finds a violation of Article 14 ECHR, read in conjunction 
with Article 3 ECHR, in respect of the applicant. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court includes the pressure by the police and the delayed enforcement of 
the protection order by the social workers as factors reflecting a discriminatory 
attitude towards her as a woman.119 The Court shows particular concern with 
the way in which the social workers ‘allegedly further insulted the applicant by 
suggesting reconciliation since she was anyway “not the first nor the last woman 
to be beaten up by her husband”’.120 The Court however falls short of uncovering 
the gender stereotypes animating the pressure by the police and the suspension of 
the investigation by the prosecutor as well as the reluctance of the social workers 
to enforce the order to protect the applicant.
2.1.4. Women are Financially Dependent
Gender stereotypes may also appear in state’s arguments before the Strasbourg 
Court. One illustration is Valiulienė v Lithuania, concerning allegations of 
repeated acts of domestic violence.121 In disputing the idea that the applicant 
117 Ibid para 95 (emphasis added).
118 Ibid para 27.
119 Ibid paras 87 and 89. The Court also found violations of Article 3 ECHR in respect of the first 
applicant and of Article 8 ECHR in respect of the second and third applicants.
120 Ibid para 87.
121 Valiuliené v Lithuania App no 33234/07 (ECtHR, 26 March 2013).
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could be considered a vulnerable person because of her age, gender or social 
status, the state argued:
[T]he applicant and J.H.L. had shared ownership of an apartment and, moreover, 
they had been business partners. The applicant thus had not been financially 
dependent on J.H.L.; she was an educated, independent woman who owned her 
own property.122
The problem with this sort of statement is that it perpetuates the myth that 
domestic violence does not happen to educated, property-owning and financially 
independent women. Put differently, the stereotypical view is that strong and 
independent women are not vulnerable to domestic violence. Embedded in this 
misconception is the sex role stereotyping that women vulnerable to domestic 
violence are those who are financially dependent and uneducated. The United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women has identified, albeit 
in another context, among the common misconceptions about violence against 
women the ideas that this ‘is a phenomenon that takes place in poor and broken 
homes’ and that ‘victims of violence are inherently vulnerable women needing 
special protection’.123
These stereotypes seem to implicitly influence the state’s reluctance to 
characterise the issue as one of ill-treatment within the meaning of Article  3 
ECHR. Indeed, the argument quoted above was part of the state’s efforts to 
exclude the treatment the applicant complained of from the scope of this ECHR 
provision.124 Moreover, the fact that the applicant did not fit the stereotypical 
image of domestic violence victims appears to be one of the elements that led 
the state to question whether the applicant’s case was actually one of domestic 
violence.125 In short, in emphasising how the applicant falls short of stereotypical 
views of domestic violence female victims, the state attempts to impede the harms 
from becoming legally cognisable.
The Strasbourg Court rejects the state’s argument about the triviality and 
non-continuing character of the physical aggression126 and concludes that 
the ill-treatment of the applicant ‘was sufficiently serious to reach the level of 
122 Ibid para 60.
123 United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Report on 2008 Visit to 
Moldova, referred to by the Court in Eremia v the Republic of Moldova (2014) 58 EHRR 2, para 
37.
124 Valiuliené v Lithuania App no 33234/07 (ECtHR, 26 March 2013) paras 54–60. This 
contention was part of the broader argument that context in itself cannot necessarily attract 
the responsibility of the state and that, in any case, the situation of women in Lithuania was 
different from that of women in Turkey (referring to Opuz v Turkey). The other elements 
included the ‘trivial nature’ of the injuries and the non-premeditated and non-continuing 
character of the violence.
125 Ibid paras 54–62.
126 Ibid paras 64–68.
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severity under of Article 3 [sic]’.127 Yet the Court does not take issue with the 
misconceptions informing the state’s understanding of domestic violence. It does 
not unmask the gender stereotypes at the core of such misconceptions either.
2.1.5. Women are Mothers and Homemakers (and Other Gender Stereotypes)
One judgment illustrating how gender stereotypes can lay at the root of domestic 
violence is Opuz v Turkey.128 The case concerned violence against the applicant 
and her mother by a (former) husband. The husband had repeatedly assaulted 
them. He had stabbed the applicant seven times129 and attempted to run over 
the applicant and her mother.130 One of these assaults resulted in the mother’s 
death.131
In the context of one of these multiple incidents, the husband asked the 
applicant upon her return home: ‘Why are you wandering outside? Why haven’t 
you cooked anything for me?’132 He continued: ‘Why are you going to your mother 
so often? Don’t go there so much, stay at home and look after the children!’133 These 
remarks, made before stabbing the applicant, remind us of the traditional division 
of labour between men and women on which sex role stereotypes are based. The 
first remark implicitly confines the applicant as a woman to the domestic sphere: 
she was not supposed to be ‘wandering outside’. What follows is a series of other 
comments referring to the specific domestic tasks that the applicant should have 
devoted herself to: cooking and looking after their children. Both of them resonate 
with the well-known stereotypes based on gender roles that women should be 
‘homemakers’ and ‘caregivers’. One of them, ‘why haven’t you cooked anything 
for me’, additionally contains stereotypes of female servitude, that is to say, that 
women are supposed to serve men.
Gender stereotypes also come into to play in the husband’s motives for killing 
the applicant’s mother. The husband stated these motives at the police, during 
the investigation against him for murder. He claimed that ‘he had killed the 
applicant’s mother because she had induced his wife to lead an immoral life’.134 He 
further alleged that when he asked the deceased where his wife was, the deceased 
had replied ‘F… off, I will take away your wife, and sell [her]’.135 He added that ‘he 
had lost his temper and had shot her for the sake of his honour and children’.136
127 Ibid para 70.
128 Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28.
129 Ibid paras 37 and 44.
130 Ibid para 23.
131 Ibid paras 53–54.
132 This is what the husband himself reported at the police. ibid para 38.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid para 56. See also paras 49 and 52.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
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These statements signal stereotypical notions about ‘proper’ female sexual 
behaviour and the threat that women’s nonconformity to such behaviour 
represents to the man’s ‘honour’. They embody sexual stereotypes, which 
condemn women but not men for what is socially viewed as licentious sexual 
behaviour.137 It has been argued that ‘[f]rameworks of “honour”, and its corollary 
“shame”, operate to control, direct and regulate women’s sexuality and freedom of 
movement by male members of the family’.138 In fact, the applicant argued before 
the Strasbourg Court that the husband’s alleged need to protect his honour had 
resulted in a lenient sentence.139
Opuz is not just an example of how gender stereotypes operate in causing 
violence. It also exemplifies the impact of gender stereotypes on state responses to 
domestic violence. One of these stereotypes is, once again, embedded in the idea 
of ‘provocation’. The domestic courts reduced the sentence originally imposed 
on the applicant’s husband for murdering her mother ‘taking into account the 
fact that the accused had committed the offence as a result of provocation by the 
deceased and his good conduct during the trial’.140 The sentence thus changed 
from life imprisonment to fifteen years and ten months’ imprisonment and a 
fine.141 Similar to the cases of B. and E.M. examined above, the stereotype that 
domestic violence victims ‘asked for it’ is at work in the domestic court’s decision. 
This time, however, the links between this stereotype and the consequence for the 
woman are obvious and concrete: they served to mitigate the original sentence 
against the perpetrator. Amnesty International’s report on domestic violence in 
Turkey, referred to by the Court in the judgment, highlighted how the Turkish 
police and courts ‘accord [men] undue leniency in sentencing, on the grounds of 
“provocation” by their victim and on the flimsiest of evidence’.142
Opuz is a landmark case in many respects, including that, for the first time, 
the Court addressed domestic violence as an issue of gender discrimination.143 
The Court did not just find violations of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR but also of Article 
14 ECHR, read jointly with the two other provisions. The Court reasoned:
Bearing in mind its finding above that the general and discriminatory judicial 
passivity in Turkey, albeit unintentional, mainly affected women, the Court 
137 Cook and Cusack (n 5) 27.
138 Radhika Coomaraswamy, ‘Violence against Women and “Crimes of Honour”’ in Lynn 
Welchman and Sara Hossain (eds), ‘Honour’: Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence against Women 
(Spinifex Press and Zed Books 2005) xi.
139 Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, para 121.
140 Ibid para 57 (emphasis added).
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid para 101. See also para 103.
143 Also, and following Bevacqua and S. v Bulgaria App no 71127/01 (ECtHR, 12 June 2008), 
para 83, the Court rejects the state’s argument that no assistance was required as the dispute 
concerned a ‘family’ or ‘private matter’. The Court found the lack of assistance incompatible 
with the state positive obligations to secure the enjoyment of the applicants’ rights. ibid. paras 
143–144.
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considers that the violence suffered by the applicant and her mother may be 
regarded as gender-based violence which is a form of discrimination against 
women.144
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied, inter alia, on reports suggesting 
that the Turkish authorities tolerated domestic violence.145 The Court noted for 
example how these authorities usually considered the problem a ‘private matter’ 
and mitigated sentences ‘on the grounds of custom, tradition or honour’.146
In this way, and even though the word ‘stereotype’ does not feature in the 
reasoning, the Court makes an effort to name some of the police and courts’ 
attitudes underpinning their unresponsiveness to domestic violence. The 
Court acknowledges that honour was one of the grounds on which Turkish 
courts mitigated sentences. However, the Court does not address the victim’s 
‘provocation’ – let alone the embedded gender stereotypes – that led to reducing 
the sentence against the applicant’s husband for murdering her mother. The Court 
could have scrutinised the role of provocation when assessing the effectiveness 
of the criminal investigations into the killing of the applicant’s mother under 
Article 2 ECHR. Moreover, it could have brought the gender stereotypes implicit 
in this notion more centre stage when assessing the domestic authorities’ attitudes 
behind their overall passiveness under Article 14 ECHR. In sum, the links with 
the gender stereotypes at the root of both the violent incidents and the ensuing 
state responses remain partly elusive in the Court’s reasoning in Opuz.
Before moving on to the next part, several remarks can be made based on 
the analysis of the cases discussed above. One of them concerns the image of 
the female victim of domestic violence. The broad stereotypical image of women 
underlying all the cases examined in this part is that of the passive, helpless, 
submissive, tolerant, dependent and vulnerable woman. In all cases, the applicants 
seem to be sanctioned either with violence from male partners/relatives or with 
inadequate protection from the state because they are perceived as defying these 
notions of ‘proper’ female attributes or roles. Thus, the Opuz applicant appears 
to be ‘punished’ with violence for ‘wandering outside’ her marital home instead 
of devoting herself to homemaking and caregiving. The applicants in the other 
cases are denied effective protection and access to justice to varying extents partly 
for asserting themselves against male dominance. Some applicants do it by using 
violence, thereby defying the stereotype that women ought to stand violence 
passively. Others do it by ‘provoking’ the perpetrator, thus flouting the stereotype 
that women ought to submit to male authority.
As a result, states end up interrogating women’s behaviour while obscuring 
or justifying that of the perpetrators. This focus on women as the problem thus 
144 Ibid para 200.
145 Ibid para 197.
146 Ibid paras 195–196.
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minimises the violent behaviours of the perpetrators or, even worse, renders 
them invisible. Moreover, and as Melanie Randall explains, ‘a focus on, and 
preoccupation with, women’s reactions to sexual assault, or, for that matter, to 
any form of gendered violence, begs the question of why the violence against 
women occurred in the first place’.147
To be sure, the Court does not re-enact the gender stereotypes implicit in 
the state responses at the domestic level or in their submissions at Strasbourg. 
Perhaps most important, the Court has largely stayed away from the protective 
and patronising depictions of women feminists worry about. The Court has 
actually been reluctant to consider women inherently vulnerable to domestic 
violence148 while acknowledging, in some cases, that the issue affected them 
disproportionately.149 In fact, the Court has recognised that domestic violence does 
not only affect women but that ‘men may also be the victims of domestic violence 
and, indeed … children, too, are often casualties of the phenomenon, whether 
directly or indirectly’.150 Though the Court has not shown much appreciation of 
intersectionality in its domestic violence case law, it has recognised in Opuz v 
Turkey that some women may be particularly vulnerable to domestic violence 
as a result of their individual experiences and social background.151 As we have 
seen above, the Court has also condemned, albeit rarely, some of the problematic 
attitudes underpinning states’ ineffective responses to domestic violence. Yet, 
despite the significance of all these efforts, the Court has remained largely silent 
on what international human rights law has considered one of the causes at the 
root of domestic violence and state unresponsiveness: gender stereotypes. In 
other words, these stereotypes still remain relatively under-scrutinised in the 
Strasbourg domestic violence cases.
We therefore argue that the Strasbourg Court’s reasoning in these cases 
should include efforts to name any gender stereotypes at the root of the problem 
and to scrutinise any harmful burdens placed on the victim. In adopting this 
approach, the Court will contribute to illuminating the structural causes of 
gendered violence rather than simply placing the responsibility on the actions of 
isolated individual perpetrators. Moreover, this approach will enable the Court 
to frame the case as one that is gender-based with the implications discussed in 
the next part.
147 Melanie Randall, ‘Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and “Ideal Victims”: Consent, Resistance, 
and Victim Blaming’ (2010) 22 Can JWL 423.
148 The Court has increasingly acknowledged the vulnerability of domestic violence victims but 
has not considered women as such inherently vulnerable to domestic violence. The recognition 
has ranged from a more individualised and contextualised assessment of the vulnerability of 
particular victims (eg Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, para 160; and Eremia v the Republic 
of Moldova (2014) 58 EHRR 2, para 61) to more categorical declarations that domestic violence 
victims are particularly vulnerable (eg Bevacqua and S. v Bulgaria App no 71127/01 (ECtHR, 
12 June 2008) para 65).
149 Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28.
150 Ibid para 132.
151 Ibid para 160.
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2 .2 . CONTESTING GENDER STER EOTYPES
The preceding part showed that many of the Strasbourg Court’s domestic violence 
cases contain evidence of gender stereotyping. How the Court should proceed 
to contest these stereotypes depends on where the stereotyping comes from: the 
individual perpetrator of violence, or the state.
2.2.1. Contesting Individuals’ Stereotyping: States’ Positive Obligations
The preceding part showed that the Strasbourg Court has come across at least one 
instance (Opuz) where a man was violent because his partner did not cook, spent 
too much time outside the house, or was otherwise not conforming to her ‘proper’ 
roles. We propose that the Court explicitly calls attention to these incidents of 
stereotyping in its legal reasoning, in an effort to name the problem. The Court 
thereby assumes a more pedagogical role, pointing out to the member states 
where the roots of the problem of domestic violence often lay. In our view, the 
Court could do this under Article 2 ECHR (the right to life), Article 3 ECHR (the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 8 ECHR (the 
right to respect for private and family life) or Article 14 ECHR (the prohibition 
of non-discrimination); whichever is more appropriate depending on the facts of 
the case.
This raises the question what the legal responsibility of the state is in such cases. 
In response to the dilemma of how the state can address violence perpetrated by 
individuals in the private sphere, international human rights law has developed 
the standard of due diligence.152 In essence, this entails that states shall act with due 
diligence to prevent, investigate, punish and provide for reparation for violence 
committed by non-state actors.153 In the past, the due diligence standard has been 
criticised for being vague,154 but the Istanbul Convention draws out the precise 
implications of this standard in several provisions. Two of these provisions focus 
explicitly on gender stereotypes. Thus, in the Chapter on prevention, Article 12.1 
IC provides that states should take ‘measures to promote changes in the social 
and cultural patterns of behaviour of women and men with a view to eradicating 
prejudices, customs, traditions and all other practices which are based on the 
idea of the inferiority of women or on stereotyped roles for women and men’; 
and Article 14.1 IC stipulates that states shall take ‘the necessary steps to include 
152 See eg Carin Benninger-Budel (ed), Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from 
Violence (Martinus Nijhoff 2008).
153 The Istanbul Convention has codified this standard as follows: ‘Parties shall take the necessary 
legislative and other measures to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, punish and 
provide reparation for acts of violence covered by the scope of this Convention that are 
perpetrated by non-State actors’ (Article 5(2)).
154 eg Holtmaat (n 28) 88.
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teaching material on issues such as equality between women and men, non-
stereotyped gender roles…’.
Apart from in the Opuz judgment,155 the term ‘due diligence’ has not really 
taken root in the case law of the Strasbourg Court.156 Instead, the Court prefers 
to use the concept of ‘positive obligations’. Mowbray has described positive 
obligations as ‘the duty upon states to undertake specific affirmative tasks’.157 
Under Article 3 ECHR, for example, the Court has stipulated that Council of 
Europe States must set up ‘a legislative framework aimed at preventing and 
punishing ill-treatment by private individuals’ and that, when the authorities 
are aware of an imminent risk of violence, they should apply the relevant laws, 
thus protecting the victims and punishing the perpetrators.158 The Court has 
also developed jurisprudence on the kind of investigation states have to lead in 
domestic violence cases.159
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to map all positive obligations related 
to domestic violence.160 Important for our purposes is that, as it stands, the 
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence does not contain any positive obligations which 
require the state to actively address the root causes of domestic violence. To 
borrow a metaphor from Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack:161 the Court treats 
the symptoms, but not the disease. There is nothing on the states’ duty to promote 
a change in societal attitude regarding violence against women, nor is there any 
mention of obligations to address the widespread existence of gender stereotypes 
which cause this violence. In light of the state-of-the-art in international human 
rights law and the Istanbul Convention, we think this is a gap that the Court 
should close. In cases where gender stereotypes clearly caused individuals to be 
violent towards their partners or family members, the Court should point this 
dynamic out and use this to convince the states of the importance of combating 
gender stereotyping as a root cause of domestic violence against women. The 
Court could refer to the Istanbul Convention in order to give the argument added 
force,162 especially when the respondent state has ratified this Convention, and 
155 See Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28 para 131: ‘As it appears from the parties’ submissions, a 
crucial question in the instant case is whether the local authorities displayed due diligence to 
prevent violence against the applicant and her mother, in particular by pursuing criminal or 
other appropriate preventive measures against H.O. despite the withdrawal of complaints by 
the victims’.
156 The most elaborate treatment of the due diligence standard is Valiuliené v Lithuania no 
33234/07 (ECtHR, 26 March 2013) (Concurring Opinion by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque).
157 Alistair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2004) 2.
158 eg Eremia v the Republic of Moldova (2014) 58 EHRR 2 para 56 (Article 3).
159 Valiuliené v Lithuania App no 33234/07 (ECtHR, 26 March 2013).
160 For further reading see eg Patricia Londono, ‘Human Rights, Positive Obligations and 
Domestic Violence: Kalucza v Hungary in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 
1 International Human Rights L Rev 339.
161 Cook and Cusack (n 5) 3 and 40.
162 The Court is already referring to the Istanbul Convention in its international materials section. 
eg Valiuliené v Lithuania App no 33234/07 (ECtHR, 26 March 2013) para 41; and Rohlena v the 
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encourage the states to initiate educational programmes, awareness campaigns or 
other initiatives to combat such stereotypes. The choice of means falls within the 
state’s margin of appreciation.
2.2.2. Contesting Gender Stereotyping by the State: Discrimination
When the state uses gender stereotypes in cases of domestic violence, we again 
propose that the Court explicitly calls attention to this dynamic. In this part we 
will argue that when there is any indication in a case file that the state gender 
stereotyped the victim and/or the perpetrator of domestic violence the Strasbourg 
Court has to analyse the case as one of direct sex discrimination.
So far, however, the ECtHR’s approach to discrimination in domestic violence 
cases is inconsistent and confusing. Arguably, the Court’s case law in that sense 
reflects the contestation in international human rights law regarding the extent 
to which domestic violence is gendered.163 Looking at judgments concerning 
domestic violence against women164 delivered in the period since the ground-
breaking judgment in Opuz – the first judgment to find a violation of Article 14 
ECHR – the statistics are as follows:
– violation of Article 14: four cases (including Opuz itself);165
– no violation of Article 14: one case;166
– Article 14 complaints inadmissible: two cases;167
– no examination of Article 14 whatsoever: seven cases.168
These statistics show that in half of the cases the Court does not examine domestic 
violence from a discrimination perspective at all. What lies behind these statistics 
is incoherent and often unconvincing legal reasoning of the Court. In Opuz the 
Court held that ‘the State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence 
breaches their right to equal protection of the law and that this failure does not 
need to be intentional’.169 It noted that there was general ‘judicial passivity’ in 
Czech Republic App no 59552/08 (ECtHR GC, 27 January 2015) para 38.
163 See above section 2.2 and Römkens (n 32).
164 Thus, these statistics do not include (in)admissibility decisions, nor do they include cases 
where the only victims of domestic violence were children.
165 Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28, and later followed Eremia v the Republic of Moldova (2014) 
58 EHRR 2; Mudric v the Republic of Moldova App no 74839/10 (ECtHR, 16 July 2013); and 
T.M. and C.M. v the Republic of Moldova App no 26608/11 (ECtHR, 28 January 2014).
166 Rumor v Italy App no 72964/10 (ECtHR, 27 May 2014).
167 A. v Croatia (2015) 60 EHRR 26; Kalucza v Hungary App no 57693/10 (ECtHR, 24 April 2012).
168 E.S. and others v Slovakia App no 8227/04 (ECtHR, 15 September 2009); Hajduová v Slovakia 
(2011) 53 EHRR 8; Y.C. v the United Kingdom App no 4547/10 (ECtHR, 13 March 2012); 
Valiuliené v Lithuania App no 33234/07 (ECtHR, 26 March 2013), apart from the dissent; 
B. v the Republic of Moldova App no 61382/09 (ECtHR, 16 July 2013); N.A. v the Republic of 
Moldova App no 13424/06 (ECtHR, 24 September 2013); Durmaz v Turkey App no 3621/07 
(ECtHR, 13 November 2014).
169 Opuz v Turkey (2010) 50 EHRR 28 para 191.
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Turkey, which amounted to discrimination as this ‘created a climate that was 
conducive to domestic violence.’170 In the other three cases in which the Court 
found a violation of Article 14 ECHR – incidentally all three cases against the 
Republic of Moldova – it also noted that the passivity of the authorities in the 
face of domestic violence amounted to condoning such violence and thereby 
discriminating against women. In these four cases the Court took a gender 
perspective to domestic violence – which then let it find a violation of Article 14.
In the numerous domestic violence cases where the Court did not examine 
at all whether there was an issue of discrimination, however, the Court omitted 
to take a gender perspective. In these cases the Court makes a purely individual 
assessment, without really taking into account the fact that, as was explained 
in section 1.2, domestic violence is a distinctly gendered phenomenon which 
affects women disproportionality and as such a systemic problem affecting state 
response.
In the preceding part we identified either implicit or explicit gender 
stereotyping by the state in the cases of Opuz v Turkey, Eremia v Moldova, Kalucza 
v Hungary, E.M. v Romania, B. v the Republic of Moldova, and Valiulienė v 
Lithuania. These are cases of sex discrimination, we will argue further below. First 
we wish to emphasise however that evidence of gender stereotyping should not be 
seen as sine qua non for a finding of discrimination: consistent passivity in the 
face of domestic violence – such as occurred in the cases of Mudric v the Republic 
of Moldova and T.M. and C.M. v the Republic of Moldova – can also be enough 
to find a violation of Article 14 ECHR. In other words: gender stereotyping is a 
sufficient condition for a finding of discrimination, but not a necessary condition.
Explicating the connections between gender stereotyping and discrimination 
in domestic violence cases is no easy task for the Strasbourg Court. Section 2.2 
showed that these connections are complex and that there is the added concern 
of reinforcing patronising stereotypes of women as helpless victims. It might be 
helpful for the Court to conceive of the relation between gender stereotyping and 
discrimination as one of a vicious, self-reinforcing circle.171 Gender stereotyping 
is both the cause and manifestation of gender discrimination. Gender stereotypes 
are also used to rationalise/justify discrimination, which in turn further reinforces 
discrimination. The circle thus looks like this:
In the context of domestic violence this circle goes as follows: most domestic 
violence victims are women. This situation is rationalised or justified by the 
authorities by gender stereotypes such as ‘women ought to be submissive’ and 
‘women (ought to) endure men’s aggressiveness’. These ideas make that the 
authorities do not act at all on the violence, or act weakly (eg with lots of delays). 
This in turn causes domestic violence to continue with impunity, both at an 
individual level and in society.
170 Ibid para 198.
171 See also Timmer (2015) (n 4) 281–282.
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The Court can build on its existing case law, specifically Konstantin Markin, 
in affirming that gender stereotypes cannot be a justification for discrimination. 
In the context of domestic violence, this means that the state cannot rely on 
gender stereotypes in order to defend its passivity in domestic violence cases. 
What the Court urgently needs to develop in terms of new legal reasoning 
is the idea that gender stereotyping causes discrimination (ie the third part of 
the circle). Regrettably, there are many cases currently pending which concern 
domestic violence against women,172 so the Court will have plenty of opportunity 
to develop its reasoning.
3. CONCLUSION
International human rights law has made significant progress in recognising the 
role that gender stereotypes play in violence against women and in combating 
these stereotypes. The Strasbourg Court, however, has remained largely 
silent on the issue. To be sure, the Court has recognised that justifications for 
differences in treatment based on gender stereotypes will render such differences 
discriminatory. This recognition, we have argued, should make headway in 
the Court’s domestic violence case law. States should not be allowed to rely on 
gender stereotypes to justify their unresponsiveness in domestic violence cases. 
Moreover, states should be required to actively address the gender stereotypes 
at the root of domestic violence. In naming and contesting gender stereotypes, 
the Court will be not just illuminating the structural causes of the phenomenon. 
It will be joining international human rights law efforts to tackle them.
172 eg Kılıç v Turkey App no 63034/11; Cămărăşescu v Romania App no 49645/09; and Munteanu 
v Republic of Moldova App no 34168/11.
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Verónica Undurraga*
This chapter reviews the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(the Inter-American Court or the Court) on gender stereotyping. The text begins 
with a brief introduction to the inter-American human rights system. The 
following sections concentrate on the flagship cases of the jurisprudence of the 
Court on stereotyping, González (‘Cotton Field’) Case v Mexico1 and the case of 
Atala Riffo and Daughters v Chile,2 to show how these rulings are representative 
of the Court’s approach to the issue of stereotyping, and more generally, of its 
conception of equality – and gender equality – as substantive and transformative. 
The strong concern of the Court regarding structural patterns of discrimination 
results in an analysis of individual human rights violations that is enriched by 
an understanding of those cases as instances of more pervasive situations of 
subordination, exclusion and violence. Through its rulings, the Court seeks 
not only to redress the individual victims of the cases, but also to improve the 
underlying conditions that made the rights violations possible, and to generate an 
institutional and cultural environment that would prevent those violations from 
happening again. In particular, the mission assumed by the Court of debunking 
gender stereotypes through adjudication is fraught with difficulties. The last part 
of the text refers to some challenges the Court has confronted or may confront 
in the future which deserve attention from human rights scholars and activists.
* A previous draft of this chapter served as inspiration for an article I co-authored with Catalina 
Eggers and that is included in Gabriela Pacheco and others (eds), Estudios en Homenaje a 
Cecilia Medina Quiroga (Tirant Lo Blanch (forthcoming)). I want to thank Catalina Eggers for 
her valuable contribution as research assistant in this English version.
1 González (‘Cotton Field’) Case IACtHR Ser C No 205 (16 November 2009).
2 Atala Riffo and Daughters Case IACtHR Ser C No 239 (24 February 2012).
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1. THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SYSTEM
The inter-American human rights system is the regional mechanism for the 
protection of human rights in the Americas. It includes the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (the Inter-American Commission or the 
Commission) and the Inter-American Court. The Commission, an autonomous 
organ of the Organization of American States (OAS), promotes and protects human 
rights and serves as a consultative organ of the OAS on human rights issues.3 The 
Commission monitors the human rights situation in member states by making 
country visits and issuing thematic or country reports. It also has a quasi-judicial 
function, as it processes and analyses individual petitions regarding human rights 
violations, supervises friendly settlements, issues recommendations to states, 
intervenes in urgent cases by adopting precautionary measures, and takes cases 
to the Court. The Commission’s competence in relation to the State Parties to the 
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention)4 is established 
in that treaty, while its competence with respect to states that are members of OAS 
but not parties to the American Convention is based on the provisions of the OAS 
Charter and on its own practice. When the Commission rules on a case regarding 
a state that is nor party to the American Convention (such as the United States or 
Canada) it bases its report on the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man,5 which despite having been adopted as a declaration and not as a treaty, 
is considered a source of international obligations for states that are members of 
the OAS.6
The Court interprets and applies the American Convention and the other 
human rights instruments adopted by member states. The Court decides on cases 
that are brought before it by the Commission or by State Parties to the American 
3 Charter of the Organization of American States (entered into force 13 December 1951) 119 
UNTS 3; amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires (entered into force  27 February 1970) 721 
UNTS 324 OAS Treaty Series No 1-A; amended by Protocol of Cartagena (entered into force 
16 November 1988) OAS Treaty Series No 66 25 ILM 527; amended by Protocol of Washington 
(entered into force  25 September 1997) 1-E Rev OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 
Add. 3 (SEPF) 33 ILM 1005; amended by Protocol of Managua (entered into force 29 January 
1996) 1-F Rev OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add 4 (SEPF) 33 ILM 1009.
4 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 
1978) OAS Treaty Series No 36 1144 UNTS 123; reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to 
Human Rights in the Inter-American System OEA/Ser LV/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 26 (1992).
5 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man OAS XXX adopted by the Ninth 
International Conference of American States (1948) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining 
to Human Rights in the Inter-American System (BDPHR) OEA/Ser LV/II.82 Doc 6 Rev1 at 17 
(1992).
6 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the 
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion 
OC-10, IACtHR Ser A No 10 (14 July 1989); Statute of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACmHR), OAS Res 477 (IX-O/79) OAS Rec OEA/Ser P/IX.0.2/80, Vol 1–88 
Annual Report of the IACmHR OEA/Ser. L/V11.50 doc 13 Rev 1–10 (1980) reprinted in the 
BDPHR OAS/Ser LV/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 93 (1992).
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Convention, and it might intervene in urgent cases by issuing provisional 
measures. The Court also delivers advisory opinions in response to consultations 
regarding the interpretation of the American Convention or other inter-American 
human rights treaties.
2. GENDER AND GENDER STEREOTYPING 
IN THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SYSTEM
The Court delivered its first decision on the merits in 1988.7 But not until 2006 
did its then President declare that the Court had been presented for the first time 
with a case involving women’s rights issues.8 It was the case of the Miguel Castro 
Castro Prison v Peru.9
This statement is surprising, to say the least, considering that the Court had 
in the past decided on several cases involving women victims, including a case 
where a woman was abducted, kept naked during detention and then made to 
disappear,10 another where a woman was sexually threatened in the context of an 
armed conflict,11 a third case where a prisoner was bound, blindfolded, beaten, 
touched all over her body, undressed, repeatedly raped by a gang of military men 
and then plunged into the sea,12 and a case were almost all the girls and women of 
a Mayan village were separated from their male and older relatives to be raped and 
then were shot at and burned to death.13 The President of the Court’s declaration 
can be interpreted as a covert criticism to the Commission for not having taken 
women rights cases to the Court, but what it really shows is that until 2006 the 
Court was blind to the fact that these previous cases had also involved women’s 
rights violations. It was not the facts of the Castro Castro case that were special 
in comparison to previous cases involving women’s victims. It was the Court’s 
perspective that had changed.
The Court for the first time explicitly addressed the issue of stereotyping in 
the González Case v Mexico,14 decided on in 2009, best known as the Cotton Field 
case, because the dead bodies of the victims were found in a cotton field of Ciudad 
Juárez, in Mexico. To date, the Court has also referred to gender and compound 
stereotypes in the cases of Atala Riffo and Daughters v Chile,15 Artavia Murillo 
7 Velásquez Rodríguez Case IACtHR Ser C No 4 (29 July 1988).
8 Miguel Castro Castro Prison Case IACtHR Ser C No 160 (25 November 2006) Opinion of Judge 
García, para 6.
9 Miguel Castro Castro Prison Case IACtHR Ser C No 160 (25 November 2006).
10 Caballero Delgado and Santana Case IACtHR Ser C No 22 (8 December 1995).
11 Maritza Urrutia Case IACtHR Ser C No 103 (27 November 2003).
12 Loayza Tamayo Case IACtHR Ser C No 47 (8 March 1998).
13 Plan de Sánchez Massacre Case IACtHR Ser C No 105 (29 April 2004).
14 González (‘Cotton Field’) Case IACtHR Ser C No 205 (16 November 2009).
15 Atala Riffo and Daughters Case IACtHR Ser C No 239 (24 February 2012).
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(‘In Vitro Fertilization’) v Costa Rica,16 Fornerón and Daughter v Argentina,17 Veliz 
Franco v Guatemala,18 and in Espinoza Gonzales v Peru.19 In my comments below 
I will make reference to these cases, except for Veliz Franco, which applies the 
same reasoning of the Cotton Field case to the disappearance of a young woman 
in Guatemala, and Espinoza Gonzales, which is an interesting case in which 
the Court makes a thorough analysis of the operation of gender stereotypes in 
forensic reports resulting in Peruvian courts discarding the testimony of a victim 
of torture during the armed conflict in Peru. Recently, the Court issued its first 
decision on ethnic stereotyping in Norin Catrimán v Chile,20 which the Court 
built upon its precedents on gender stereotyping.21
In the following sections of this text, I present the two leading cases of 
the jurisprudence of the Court on stereotyping: the Cotton Field case and the 
Atala case. I will show how the Court identified and named the stereotypes at 
work on those decisions and how the operation of stereotypes resulted in the 
violation of women’s rights under the American Convention. I will argue that 
the most valuable aspect of the Court’s approach is the connection it makes 
between stereotyping and structural discrimination and its attempts to redress 
that relationship by means of reparation measures imposed on states that were 
found responsible under international human rights law. I will then refer to some 
challenges the Court has confronted or may confront in the future regarding its 
assumed mission of debunking gender stereotypes through adjudication.
2 .1. THE COTTON FIELD  CASE
The case of González v Mexico is about the disappearances and murders of three 
young and underprivileged women, Laura Ramos, a 17-year-old student, Claudia 
González, a 20-year-old worker in the maquiladora industry, and Esmeralda 
Herrera, a 15-year-old domestic employee. They disappeared in different 
circumstances in September and October of 2001.
When the victims’ next of kin requested the help of the state officials and 
municipal authorities, these officials did not begin any effective search, minimised 
the gravity of the situation,22 discredited the reports of the family members by 
16 Artavia Murillo (‘In Vitro Fertilization’) Case IACtHR Ser C No 257 (28 November 2012).
17 Fornerón and Daughter Case IACtHR Ser C No 242 (27 April 2012).
18 Veliz Franco v Guatemala Case IACtHR Ser C No 277 (19 May 2014).
19 Espinoza Gonzáles v Peru Case IACtHR Ser C No 289 (20 November 2014).
20 Norín Catrimán (Leaders, members and activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) Case 
IACtHR Ser C No 279 (29 May 2014).
21 The Commission has also confronted interesting individual cases dealing with gender 
stereotyping. See Morales de la Sierra Case IACmHR No 11.625 Rep No 28/98 OEA/Ser L/V/
II.95 Doc 7 Rev at 136 (1997); Jessica Gonzalez Case IACmHR No 1490-05 Report No 52/07 
OEA/Ser L/V/II.130 Doc 22 Rev 1 (2007); MZ Case IACmHR No 12.350 Report No 103/14 
OEA/Ser L/V/II.153 Doc 19 Rev (2014).
22 González (‘Cotton Field’) Case IACtHR Ser C No 205 (16 November 2009) para 200.
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comments such as that ‘they were young girls who were out with their boyfriends 
or friends having a good time’, that ‘girls were very flighty and threw themselves 
at men’,23 blamed the victims for not staying at home as good girls do24 and 
even criticised their mothers for allowing their daughters to go out alone.25 The 
relatives were made to fill missing person forms with information regarding the 
routines, sexual preferences and behaviour of the victims. This information was 
required to determine whether the missing women should or should not justify 
immediate search, which would be undertaken only if their cases met the criteria 
of ‘high risk disappearances’. Under this policy, the authorities asked for evidence 
that the victims were young women who followed stable routines, had no reason 
to abandon their homes and had disappeared in circumstances similar to those 
associated with serial killings.26
A worker passing through a cotton field in Ciudad Juárez found the bodies of 
Laura, Claudia and Esmeralda, in November of 2001. They were partly nude, with 
signs that showed that they were subjected to extreme cruelty and most probably 
rape.27 Esmeralda suffered the mutilation of her right breast and left nipple, and 
Laura of one of her nipples.
After the bodies were found, the custody of the crime scene, the collection 
and handling of evidence, autopsies and identification and return of the victims’ 
remains, among other aspects, were handled by the authorities in highly irregular 
ways. There was unjustified delay in the investigations and, when authorities 
faced public pressure for their lack of substantial progress, they falsely accused 
two men, who were tortured and made to confess to the crimes. Public officials 
involved in these irregularities were not punished.
The context of the case is relevant. Ciudad Juárez is an industrial city located 
on the border of El Paso, Texas, where the maquila industry has flourished, 
especially since the North Free Trade Agreement entered into force in 1994. It is a 
place of transit and, at the time of the facts of the case, it was the site of all kinds 
of organised crimes, such as people trafficking, drug deals, arms smuggling and 
money laundering – a site of great social inequalities and violence.
The crimes of Laura, Claudia and Esmeralda were by no means extraordinary 
or isolated events. From the late 1990s, Ciudad Juárez became a focus of the 
attention of the international human rights community due to the critical 
situation of violence against women,28 including an anomalous increase of 
murders of women, which doubled the coefficient of murders of men and was 
disproportionally higher than the murder rates of other border cities with similar 
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid para 202.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid para 505.
27 The autopsies performed on the bodies of the victims were incomplete; there was no record of 
any specific test having been carried out to look for evidence of sexual assault. ibid paras 213, 
311.
28 Ibid para 116.
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characteristics. The Court found that the manifestations of gender violence in 
Ciudad Juárez, including the murders, kidnappings, disappearances and also 
cases of domestic violence, constituted a social and cultural phenomenon of 
structural gender discrimination.29
The Court described the patterns common to most of the cases of gender 
violence in Ciudad Juárez: victims were, disproportionately, young and 
vulnerable students or factory workers; they were abducted, kept against their 
will and after days or months their bodies were found on empty lots, bearing 
the signs of violence, including rape and other type of sexual abuse; there were 
delays and gross irregularities in conducting the investigations, incompetence 
and insensitivity on the part of the authorities, discriminatory attitudes towards 
the victims and their relatives, which included blaming them for their fate, made 
light of the events and the use of sexist stereotypes; lack of transparency in the 
procedures; and a general climate of impunity.
The context analysis offered by the Court was essential to rebut the State’s 
contentions denying its responsibility for the crimes. The Court condemned the 
State not because state officials were the direct perpetrators, but because it failed 
to act diligently to protect the victims once the State had concrete information 
about their disappearances. The concrete duty to act in these cases resulted from 
the fact that, at the time the state officials received the testimony of the next of 
kin informing that the women were missing, the State had clear knowledge of 
the situation of high risk for women in Ciudad Juárez, and that there was a real 
and imminent danger that the victims would be sexually abused and killed.30 
The general standard of the due diligence obligation is reinforced when victims 
are children (as Esmeralda and Laura were) who are accorded special protection 
under Article 19 of the American Convention,31 and when the state is under the 
specific conventional mandate to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against 
women contained in Article 7(c) of the Belem do Pará Convention.32
The Court cited Mexico’s observations to the Report produced by the 
CEDAW Committee under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW,33 
recognising that the homicides of women in Ciudad Juárez were ‘influenced by a 
culture of discrimination against women based on the erroneous idea that women 
are inferior’ and that such culture also influenced the fact that the murders ‘were 
not perceived at the outset as a significant problem requiring immediate and 
forceful action on the part of the relevant authorities.’34
29 Ibid para 133.
30 Ibid para 283.
31 Ibid para 408.
32 Ibid paras 258, 284.
33 UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ‘Inquiry 
procedure’ in ‘Report on Mexico under Article 8 of the Optional Protocol of the Convention, 
and replay from the Government of Mexico’ (27 January 2005) UN Doc CEDAW/C/2005/
OP.8/MEXICO.
34 González (‘Cotton Field’) Case IACtHR Ser C No 205 (16 November 2009) para 398.
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The Court noted that the sudden and dramatic transformation of gender roles, 
resulting from the massive incorporation of women in the maquila industry, led 
to conflicts within the families because women, who traditionally had complied 
with their stereotyped role of housewives, challenged that stereotype by becoming 
the household providers and were perceived as more competitive and financially 
independent. This economic transformation was not accompanied by a change 
in traditional patriarchal mentalities. The abnormal increase of crimes against 
women could be explained as motivated by a hierarchical use of terror and 
violence aimed at keeping women in their traditionally subordinated roles.35 The 
sexual nature of most of the crimes, including not only rape but also mutilation of 
breasts and genitalia, and the fact that the bodies were left in the open to be found, 
are signs that show the gendered character of the crimes and their expressive 
function.
The Court drew on the definition of gender-based violence contained in the 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence against Women (Belem do Pará Convention)36 and on the definition of 
femicide violence established in the Mexican General Law on Access of Women 
to a Life Free of Violence,37 to conclude that the crimes of Laura, Claudia and 
Esmeralda should be qualified as gender-based violence – violence directed toward 
a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately  – 
and not merely acts of generalised violence. It also relied on the Belem do Pará 
Convention, on CEDAW’s General Recommendation No 19 on Violence Against 
Women,38 and on several reports of human rights bodies and organisations, to 
consider gender-based violence as a form of discrimination.39 The Court found 
35 María Mercedes Gómez, ‘Los Usos Jerárquicos y Excluyentes de la Violencia’ in Rodolfo 
Arango et al (ed), Más allá del Derecho: Justicia y Género en América Latina (Bogotá Siglo del 
Hombre, Red Alas Los Andes U 2005).
36 The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
against Women (adopted 9 June 1994 entered into force 5 March 1995) IACmHR (1994) 33 
ILM 1534. Article 1 defines violence against women as ‘any act or conduct, based on gender, 
which causes death or physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether 
in the public or the private sphere’.
37 Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia, 2007 (Mexico) 
<www.consejeria.df.gob.mx/portal_old/uploads/gacetas/Enero08_%2029_263.pdf> accessed 
5  September 2015. Article (VII) defines femicide violence as ‘the extreme form of gender 
violence against women, resulting from the violation of their human rights that can lead to 
homicide or other forms of violent death of women’.
38 UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, ‘General 
Recommendation No 19’ in ‘Note by Secretariat, Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (29 July 1994) UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev 1.
39 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted to 
signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) UN General Assembly 
resolution 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp. No 46 at 193 UN Doc A/34/46, 1249 UNTS 13. Article 1 
defines discrimination against women as ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on 
the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality 
of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
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that the subordination of women is exacerbated when stereotypes are reflected 
in the attitude and behaviour of the police and authorities, as they were in this 
case. Their indifference reproduces the violence that it claims to be trying to 
counter and perpetuates it by sending the message that violence against women is 
tolerated. This too constitutes discrimination regarding access to justice.
Besides identifying a violation to the obligation not to discriminate contained 
in Article 1(1) of the Convention, the Court held that the State of Mexico violated 
the rights of life (Article 4(1)), personal integrity (Article 5(1) and (2)) and 
personal liberty (Article 7(1)) of the three victims because it did not comply with 
its obligation to guarantee such rights (Article 1(1)) and the obligation to adopt 
domestic legal provisions (Article 2) as required by the American Convention, 
in connection to the obligations established in Articles 7(b) and (c) of the 
Belem do Pará Convention. The Court further held that the State violated the 
right to personal integrity (Article 5(1) and (2)) and the right to access to justice 
(Article 8(1)) and the right to judicial protection (Article 25(1)) in connection with 
Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention and Article 7(b) and (c) of the 
Belém do Pará Convention, as regards the victims’ next of kin.
2 .2 . THE ATALA  CASE
In 2012, the Court ruled on the case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v Chile.40 
It declared that the Chilean state was responsible for discriminatory treatment 
and arbitrary interference in on account of Ms Atala’s sexual orientation during 
in the legal process that resulted in the loss of care and custody of her three 
daughters, and thus for gravely affecting Ms Atala and her daughters’ private and 
family life.
Ms Atala, a judge, was married to a public defender. When they divorced 
they agreed that she would have custody of their children, who would spend 
weekends with their father. Although this was a divorce agreement, it was also 
the default rule under the Chilean family law at the time, which said that children 
of divorced parents would remain under the custody of the mother unless agreed 
otherwise or unless the mother is declared legally incompetent. Both Ms Atala 
and her ex-husband began new relationships. However, when the girls’ father 
got to know that Ms Atala’s partner was a woman and that she was living under 
the same roof with the children, he filed a custody suit. He argued that, given 
Ms Atala’s new sexual lifestyle and her lesbian cohabitation, she was not longer 
social, cultural, civil or any other field.’ The definition of discrimination against women 
‘includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman [i] because 
she is a woman or [ii] that affects women disproportionately.’ Gender-based violence ‘is a form 
of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a 
basis of equality with men’; ibid (n 1) para 133.
40 Atala Riffo and Daughters Case IACtHR Ser C No 239 (24 February 2012).
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capable of watching over the girls, that the physical and emotional development of 
the girls was seriously at risk,41 that Ms Atala had over the years displayed hardly 
maternal and violent behaviour, and that the respondent’s need to be happy and 
fulfil herself as a person in all areas of her life was not compatible with being a 
parent and exercising maternal capabilities which, it seemed, the respondent had 
selfishly disregarded. He also claimed that the children had the right to live in a 
family made up of a father and a mother of different sexes.42
The Family Court granted provisional custody to the father, even though 
it expressly acknowledged that there was no evidence to presume the legal 
incompetence of the mother. The Court argued that Ms Atala had altered the 
normal family routine, giving preference to her personal interests and well-being 
over carrying out her role as a mother, under conditions that could affect the 
development of the children. It also said that the father presented more favourable 
arguments on behalf of the best interest of the girls, arguments that bear great 
weight in the context of a heterosexual and traditional society.43
However, in its decision on the merits, the Acting Judge of the Family Court 
(the regular judge had been disqualified to continue intervening in the custody 
proceedings) declared that Ms Atala was a competent mother and dismissed the 
case. Ms Atala’s case also prevailed in the Court of Appeals, but the Supreme 
Court reversed the decision.
The Supreme Court argued that the best interest of the children should 
be given priority and that in this case there was a justified cause to entrust the 
personal care of the girls to the father. The Court said that the lower courts had 
not given due consideration either to the deterioration of the social environment 
since the mother began to cohabit with her partner or to the possibility that the 
girls could be the target of social discrimination arising from this fact, nor to 
games and attitudes of the girls that reflected confusion about the sexuality of 
the mother. It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court was not legally empowered 
to review the lower courts’ appreciation of the facts, and further, that the lower 
courts had decided that the evidence regarding these allegations were speculative, 
reflecting fears and suppositions instead of real facts.
The Supreme Court considered that Ms Atala had put her own interests before 
those of her daughters when she chose to live in the same home with a same-sex 
partner and the girls. The Supreme Court concluded that the lower judges failed 
by having ignored the right of the minors to live and grow within a family that 
is normally structured and socially valued within its environment, and which 
responds to the proper traditional model.44
41 Ibid para 31. He argued that the girls would be under constant risk of contracting sexually 
transmitted diseases such as herpes and AIDS.
42 Ibid para 39.
43 Ibid para 41.
44 Ibid para 57.
76 Intersentia
Verónica Undurraga
Another aspect of the dispute concerns a disciplinary procedure that was 
conducted by the Court of Appeals against Ms Atala, triggered in part by the 
publications that appeared in two tabloids informing of the custody suit and of Ms 
Atala’s sexual orientation. The disciplinary procedure involved the checking of Ms 
Atala’s computer and the websites she had visited, the sending of a questionnaire 
and interrogations of staff members including questions about Ms Atala’s sexual 
orientation. The investigating judge, in his report, concluded that Ms Atala, by 
openly expressing her ‘peculiar emotional relationship’ had clearly ‘damaged the 
reputation of both, Ms Atala and the Judiciary.’
The Inter-American Court noted that Ms Atala was subject to a difference 
of treatment during the custody process, because it revolved around her sexual 
orientation and not on her individual ability as a mother. The Court explained 
that a determination based, as it was in this case, on unfounded and stereotyped 
assumptions about the parent’s capacity and suitability to ensure and promote 
the child’s well-being and development is not appropriate for the purpose of 
guaranteeing the legitimate goal of protecting the children’s best interest.
The Court declared that the State was responsible for the violation of the 
rights to equality and non-discrimination enshrined in Article 24 in conjunction 
with Article 1(1) and Article 19 of the American Convention, to the detriment 
of Ms Atala and her daughters; that the State was responsible for the violation of 
the victims’ right to privacy (Article 11(2) in conjunction with Article 1(1)), of the 
rights of the family (Article 17(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1)) and of the right 
of the child to be heard (Article 8(1), in conjunction with Articles 19 and 1(1)), 
and finally, that the State violated the guarantee of impartiality (Article 8(1), in 
conjunction with Article 1(1)) with respect to the disciplinary investigation, to the 
detriment of Ms Atala.45
The Court declared for the first time that under the American Convention 
sexual orientation is a prohibited ground of discrimination. It said that sexual 
minorities had suffered historical and structural discrimination and that states 
are under the obligation to apply strict scrutiny when differential treatment is 
based on sexual orientation. States must not only abstain from carrying out any 
action that, directly or indirectly is aimed at creating situations of de jure or de 
facto discrimination, but are also obliged to take affirmative measures to reverse 
or change discriminatory situations that exist in their society to the detriment of 
a specific group of persons.
The Court clearly identified some of the stereotypes that were playing a role 
in this case. For example, the stereotype that a good mother should sacrifice even 
her legitimate interests and essential aspects of her identity for the sake of her 
children, the stereotype that lesbians are immoral and do not have nurturing 
capacities and the stereotype that parents are heterosexual. The operation of these 
stereotypes made the Chilean judiciary rule on the case based not on Ms Atala’s 
45 Ibid para 314.
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actual parenting capacities, but on the judges’ prejudices about how women are 
and how women should behave, resulting in discriminatory treatment during the 
custody and the disciplinary procedures and in the violation of Ms Atala’s and 
her children’ rights.
A noteworthy aspect of this case is how the stereotype of lesbians as bad 
mothers won over the stereotype of women as natural caregivers, which was 
entrenched in the law of custody and was present in the negotiation of the divorce 
agreement. Ms Atala was considered a fit mother until she made public that she 
was a lesbian. From that moment, she was seen as selfish, hardly maternal, unfit, 
dangerous and contagious.
3. SOME COMMON APPROACHES TO BOTH CASES
These two cases, although very different, are representative of the challenges 
the inter-American system is confronting at the present time. After a long 
period in which the Commission and the Court dealt mainly with executions, 
disappearances and other crimes committed by Latin American dictatorships, 
now they are facing a context of weak representative democracies threatened by 
alarming levels of endemic inequality, exclusion, social and institutional violence 
and ineffective justice systems, all of which create conditions for human rights 
violations that particularly affect vulnerable and marginalised populations.46 All 
these circumstances are aggravated by the fact that most Latin American societies 
have recently undergone either armed conflicts or repressive political regimes. In 
this new context, the work of the Commission and the Court has gone beyond 
ruling on individual cases; it has adopted a more general and preventive approach 
aimed at improving domestic institutions and practices by putting forward 
human rights standards and educating local officials, judges and civil society. 
Also, the Commission and the Court have shown a strong concern regarding 
structural patterns of discrimination. Their analysis of individual human rights 
violations is enriched by their understanding of those cases as instances of more 
pervasive situations of subordination, exclusion and violence, which could not be 
dealt with the traditional formal approach to equal treatment, but instead require 
a substantive and transformative conception of equality.47
This substantive conception of equality is articulated in the Court’s decisions 
in several ways that are apparent in the Cotton Field and the Atala cases.
First, the Court recognises a particular human rights violation as part of a 
pattern of violations affecting individuals of subordinated or vulnerable groups, 
46 Victor Abramovich, ‘From Massive Violations to Structural Patterns: New Approaches and 
Classic Tensions in the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2009) 6 (11) Sur-Intl JHR 7.
47 Ibid 18–23. See also Oscar Parra, ‘Derechos Humanos y Pobreza en el Sistema Interamericano: 
el rol del análisis estructural a partir de informes y siete escenarios estratégicos basados en la 
responsabilidad internacional’ (2012) 56 Int-Am Inst HRJ 273.
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such as women or sexual minorities (LGBTI people or LGBTI). Usually, the 
Court also detects situations in which the victims’ situation is aggravated by 
the intersection of several sources of oppression or disadvantages, such as being 
women, young and poor, in the Cotton Field case, or being a woman and a lesbian, 
in the Atala case. This first step requires the Court to pay careful attention to 
the facts of the case to identify particular features revealing the structural and 
collective nature of the wrongful actions suffered by the victims. In the Cotton 
Field case, the Court situated the disappearances and murders of Laura, Claudia 
and Esmeralda, in the broader context of an increase of violence against women 
in Ciudad Juárez, which in turn was the effect of a patriarchal reaction to the 
abrupt transformation of gender roles that resulted from the incorporation of 
young women to paid labour. Further, the Court realised that the dismissive 
attitude of the authorities could be explained by the devaluation of the victims, 
for being young and poor women who were deemed to have exposed themselves 
to the risk by not conforming to stereotypical feminine roles. The Court identified 
the extreme violence suffered by the three women as gendered violence, violence 
that the victims experienced for being women or that women disproportionately 
suffer. In the Atala case, the Court contextualised the case as an instance of 
discrimination against women and LGBTI people. It carefully explained how 
wrongful stereotypes against women and also specific prejudices against lesbians 
influenced the outcome of the decision of the Chilean Supreme Court, which 
substituted an individual assessment of Ms Atala’s parental capacities with 
unproved preconceptions about non-conforming sexual minorities.
Second, the Court declares that there is a reinforced state obligation to 
protect victims that are in situations of vulnerability – such as children48– or are 
members of subordinated groups with a history of discrimination, such as women 
or LGBTI people.49 In the Cotton Field case, the Court grounded the reinforced 
obligations towards the victims in the specific conventional mandates contained 
in Article 19 of the American Convention regarding the right of the child – 
Esmeralda was 15 and Laura was 17 at the time they disappeared – in Article 7 of 
the Belem do Pará Convention, and in the fact the state authorities were informed 
and aware of the vulnerable condition of women in Ciudad Juárez at the time the 
crimes occurred. In the Atala case, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard to 
review the differential treatment applied to Ms Atala, because she was a member 
of sexual minorities historically discriminated for their sexual orientation.50
48 See Street Children (Villagrán Morales) Case IACtHR Ser C No 63 (19 November 1999); Juvenile 
Reeducation Institute Case IACtHR Ser C No 112 (2 September 2004); Servellón García Case 
IACtHR Ser C No 152 (21 September 2006). See also Judicial Condition and Rights of Children, 
Advisory Opinion OC-17 IACtHR Ser A No 17 (28 August 2002).
49 Other groups in situation of vulnerability identified by the Courts are indigenous people, 
Afro-descendant populations, the mentally ill who have been institutionalised, undocumented 
immigrants, rural population displaced from their land and poor people living with HIV/
AIDS.
50 Atala Riffo and Daughters Case IACtHR Ser C No 239 (24 February 2012) para 131.
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Third, the Court emphasises the demanding and active role the state must play 
in guaranteeing the human rights of victims living under situations of structural 
inequality and vulnerability. The Court requires the state not only to recognise 
rights but also to ensure that their holders are in fact protected from third parties’ 
infringements and that institutional, cultural and material conditions necessary 
for the exercise of those rights are in place. In the Cotton Field case, the Court 
condemned Mexico for falling below the required standard of due diligence in the 
protection of the victims, noting the failure of the state’s response to the crimes 
and giving extensive details of the institutional flaws during investigations. Also, 
the Court found that Mexico did not comply with the affirmative obligation to 
take all necessary measures to debunk wrongful stereotypes about women and for 
reinforcing patterns of violence and discrimination against women through the 
practices of its authorities. In the Atala case, the Court could have limited itself to 
declare the breach by the Chilean Supreme Court of its obligation to abstain from 
discriminating Ms Atala in its judgment. However, the Court went further and 
reminded the State that its human rights obligations are not only negative in kind, 
but that it is required to take affirmative measures to change cultural demeaning 
stereotypes against women and sexual minorities that impede the full enjoyment 
of their human rights.
Finally, the most original and substantive contribution of the Court in 
advancing a transformative conception of equality has taken place in its decisions 
regarding the measures of reparations for the victims of human rights violations. 
The Court has creatively interpreted Article 63(1) of the American Convention51 
to develop the most comprehensive legal regime on reparations existing in 
international human rights law.52 This regime has been labelled ‘victim-centred’, 
due to its clear commitment to meet the victims’ needs of recognition, restoration 
and accountability.53 The vast experience of the Court in dealing with gross 
and systematic violations of human rights early proved that a restrictive focus 
on declaratory relief and compensation payments for pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages was not enough. In that kind of cases it is impossible to 
get full restitution to the situation that existed before the violation, and what 
the family of the victims’ most ask for is to know what happened to their loved 
ones and to be given the opportunity to bury their corpses, to hear an apology 
51 Art 63(1): ‘If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by 
this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his 
right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of 
the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and 
that fair compensation be paid to the injured party’. American Convention on Human Rights 
(adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) OAS Treaty Series No 36 1144 
UNTS 123; reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American 
System OEA/Ser LV/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 26 (1992).
52 Claudio Grossman, ‘Introduction. Reparations in the Inter-American System: A Comparative 
Approach Conference’ (2007) 56 Am UL Rev 1376.
53 Thomas M Antkowiak, ‘An Emerging Mandate for International Courts: Victim Centered 
Remedies and Restorative Justice’ (2011) 47 Stan J Intl L 279.
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from the state, to be able to rebuild their lives and their community bonds, and 
guarantees that others would not have to suffer from similar crimes in the future. 
The Court also realised that in those situations it is not possible or realistic to 
entrust the domestic authorities of the states with the design of the reparation 
regime and that the Court would have itself to undertake that duty and supervise 
the state’s compliance.54 The Court’s approach has been one of favouring integral 
reparations, sensitive to the claims of the victims, and appreciative not only of 
the individual, but also of the collective dimensions of the harm produced by 
human rights violations. Most importantly, the focus of the Court has been on 
addressing, as much as possible, the underlying causes that made the violations 
possible and in restating or generating legal, institutional and cultural conditions 
at the domestic level aimed at rehabilitating legal order compatible with the 
American Convention.55
In dealing with current cases of human rights violations and understanding 
their connection to systemic patterns of exclusion, structural discrimination, 
pervasive violence and institutional breakdown, the Court has expanded the 
scope of its reparations, particularly the measures assigned to comply with the 
guarantee of non repetition, towards the ambitious goal of transforming the pre-
existing conditions that enable the rights infringements to happen in the first 
place. When gender discrimination and gender violence is one of such pre-existing 
conditions, this approach requires nothing less than devising mechanisms aimed 
at subverting existing oppressive gender hierarchies.56 In the Cotton Field 
and in the Atala cases, the Court declared that when discriminatory acts and 
violations are related to the perpetuation of stereotypes that are associated with 
the structural discrimination suffered by particular groups (in these particular 
cases, women and LGBTI people), reparations cannot consist in reinstating the 
situation prior to the violation and must seek to transform such pre-existing 
situation by identifying and eliminating the factors that cause discrimination.57 
Also the Court said that reparations must have a causal nexus with the facts of the 
case, the violations declared and the damage verified,58 and must be adopted from 
a gender perspective.59 Among other measures, the Court ordered Mexico and 
Chile to hold public acts of recognition of international responsibility and apology 
to the victims, with the presence of high rank state authorities, including, in the 
54 The European Court, on the contrary, defers to the respondent state and the Committee of 
Ministers, which offers only recommendations as to the reparation measures design and 
implementation. ibid 320.
55 Sergio García Ramírez, ‘Reparations in the Inter-American System: A Comparative Approach 
Conference’ (2007) 56 Am ULRev 1433.
56 Ruth Rubio-Marín and Clara Sandoval, ‘Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton Field Judgment’ (2011) 
33 HRQ 1062.
57 González (‘Cotton Field’) Case IACtHR Ser C No 205 (16 November 2009) para 450; Atala Riffo 
and Daughters Case IACtHR Ser C No 239 (24 February 2012) para 267.
58 Atala Riffo and Daughters Case IACtHR Ser C No 239 (24 February 2012) para 242.
59 González (‘Cotton Field’) Case IACtHR Ser C No 205 (16 November 2009) para 450.
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Atala case, members of the judiciary. The Mexican State was obliged to broadcast 
the act honouring the victims on local and federal television and radio and to 
consult the next of kin regarding the organisation and details of the ceremony. 
The Court ordered the states to publish the judgments in their websites and in a 
daily newspaper with widespread circulation, and to provide effective training to 
public officials and the community on human rights law and non-discrimination, 
including the very specific training to identify and dismantle wrongful gender 
stereotypes. In the Cotton Field case, the Court mandated the erection of a 
monument in memory of the victims of gender violence of Ciudad Juárez. The 
Court also specified several measures aimed at the investigation of the crimes, and 
the prosecution and, if appropriate, the punishment of those responsible for them, 
which should include a gender perspective and involve specific lines of inquiry 
concerning sexual violence, as well as the creation of a database with genetic and 
other information that would help in the search for other women disappeared 
nationwide. The Court extensively reviewed all the legal and institutional reforms 
and policies Mexico had taken in the years previous to the judgment regarding 
the prevention of discrimination and violence against women, and made clear 
that human rights compliance required proof of effectiveness of those reforms 
and policies, which was absent in the case due to lack of information that should 
have been provided by the parties. As is common in its judgments, in both cases 
the Court announced that it would monitor full compliance with the judgments 
and would consider the case closed when the respective states had complied with 
all the measures ordered in them.
4. DEBUNKING GENDER STEREOTYPES 
THROUGH ADJUDICATION
Although human rights justice systems are mostly built on a model of individual 
adjudication, human rights violations usually occur because there are economic, 
political, institutional and cultural conditions that make them possible, and 
the victims are individuals or groups in disadvantaged positions within such 
structural arrangements.
The Inter-American Commission and Court have assertively confronted this 
reality and used all the powers within their mandates to create and enforce clear 
human rights standards on several issues and to boost processes of transformation 
within the states that would change underlying conditions that make people 
vulnerable to human rights violations.60 The Court, particularly through its 
60 The Commission’s thematic reports are the best example of the creation of human rights 
standards for the region. Thematic reports dealing with the issue of stereotyping includes: 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Access to Justice for Women Victims 
of Violence in the Americas’ (20 January 2007) OEA/Ser L/V/II Doc 68 <www.cidh.org/ 
women/Access07/Report%20Access%20to%20Justice%20Report%20English%20020507.pdf> 
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decisions on reparations, has ordered the states to reform constitutional61 and 
legal provisions,62 to annul criminal sentences,63 to restitute traditional lands,64 
to provide basic public services such as water and education,65 to provide human 
rights training,66 among many others. The aim is not only to provide redress to 
the few victims and cases that make their way to the Court, but also to foster 
the domestic capacities of the states to prevent and respond to human rights 
violations.
When the Court identifies discrimination and violence against women 
as structural conditions and orders transformative measures such as those 
contained in the Cotton Field and the Atala judgments, the Court is acting on 
certain assumptions about gender, which it seeks to modify. The gender system is 
basically a system of beliefs and power mechanisms that maintain and perpetuate 
those beliefs. The need to expose and eliminate wrongful gender stereotypes is 
based on the thesis that gender is socially constructed and not natural and that, 
within that gender system, women are assigned subservient roles and considered 
as having inferior attributes and characteristics than men.67 Subordination and 
exclusion of women take place through the uncritical application of stereotyped 
accessed 5  September 2015; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Access to 
maternal health services from a human right perspective’ (7 June 2010) OEA/Ser L/V/II 
Doc 69 <www.oas.org/en/IACmHR /women/docs/pdf/MaternalHealth2010.pdf> accessed 
5 September 2015; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Road to Substantive 
Democracy; Women’s political participation in the Americas’ (18 April 2011) OEA/Ser L/V/
II Doc 79 <www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/POLITICAL%20PARTICIPATION.pdf> accessed 
5 September 2015; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The work, education 
and resources of women: The road to equality in guaranteeing economic, social and cultural 
rights’ (2 November 2011) OEA/Ser L/V/II.143 Doc 59 <www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/
womendesc2011.pdf> accessed 5  September 2015; Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, ‘Legal standards related to gender equality and women’s rights in the Inter-American 
Human Rights System: development and application’ (3 November 2011) OEA/Ser L/V/II.143 
Doc 60 <www.oas.org/en/IACmHR/women/docs/pdf/REGIONAL%20STANDARDS.pdf> 
accessed 5 September 2015; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘The situation of 
people of African descent in the Americas’ (5 December 2011) OEA/Ser L/V/II Doc 62 <www.
cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/AFROS%202011%20ENG.pdf> accessed 5 September 2015; Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Access to Justice for Women Victims of Sexual 
Violence: Education and Health’ (28 December 2011) OEA/Ser L/V/II Doc 65 <www.oas.
org/en/IACmHR /women/docs/pdf/sexualviolenceeduchealth.pdf> accessed 5 September 
2015; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Human Rights of Migrants and Other 
Persons in the Context of Human Mobility in Mexico’ (13 December 2013) OEA/Ser L/V/
II Doc 48/13, paras 225 and  485 <www.oas.org/en/IACmHR/migrants/docs/pdf/Report-
Migrants-Mexico-2013.pdf> accessed 5 September 2015.
61 ‘The Last Temptation of Christ’ (Olmedo-Bustos) Case IACtHR Ser C No 73 (5 February 2001).
62 Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v Dominican Republic IACtHR SerC No 282 
(28 August 2014).
63 Norín Catrimán (Leaders, members and activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) Case 
IACtHR SerC No 279 (29 May 2014).
64 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community IACtHR SerC No 146 (29 March 2006) para 210.
65 Ibid para 230.
66 Atala Riffo and Daughters Case IACtHR SerC No 239 (24 February 2012) paras 271–272.
67 Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: transnational legal perspectives 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) 2.
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ideas, symbols and roles.68 Stereotypes harm women by devaluing them, limiting 
their ability to autonomously design their life plans, and by the very concrete 
impositions of unjust burdens and denial of benefits that are available to men. 
Sometimes, as the Cotton Field case proves, stereotyping may even lead to murder 
and impunity. By showing the relationship between gender subordination and 
violence, the Court considers the hierarchical and exclusionary uses of violence 
as a disciplinary mechanism to maintain gender hierarchies.69
The judicial enforcement of the human rights obligation of states to eliminate 
wrongful gender stereotypes, an obligation that is contained in the CEDAW70 and 
Belem do Pará71 conventions, and is also built into the American Convention by 
the Court, is a mission of enormous reach and ambition. The Court performs an 
extraordinarily expressive and educational role when it brings into its decisions 
the language on stereotypes as it does in the Cotton Field and the Atala cases. 
That role is brought to its maximum expression when the Court makes the 
state take actions directed at deconstructing gender and other hierarchies and 
dignifying the victims it previously dismissed, and particularly, when it obliges 
state authorities to artificially create symbolic spaces of equality and respect in 
which the victims or their next of kin are the main protagonists, as it occurs in 
the ceremonies in which the states officially recognise its human rights violations 
and present its public apologies to the victims.
However, the mission assumed by the Court of debunking gender stereotypes 
though adjudication is fraught with difficulties. I will briefly refer to two different 
challenges the Court has confronted o may confront in the future. I believe each 
of them deserves more attention by human rights scholars and activists.
5. SEPARATING THE WHEAT FROM THE CHAFF
First, the Court must open new grounds in human rights adjudication with little 
guide on how to deal with stereotypes. Although it is not hard for a judge to 
appreciate that stereotyping may be unfair to the individual being stereotyped, it 
is not immediately obvious what is exactly wrong about stereotyping. Stereotypes 
perform important cognitive functions that help us to make sense of our reality by 
68 Ibid.
69 María Mercedes Gómez, ‘Los Usos Jerárquicos y Excluyentes de la Violencia’ in Rodolfo 
Arango et al (eds), Más allá del Derecho: Justicia y Género en América Latina (Bogotá Siglo del 
Hombre, Red Alas Los Andes U 2005).
70 Article 5(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (adopted to signature 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) UN 
General Assembly resolution 34/180, 34 UN GAOR Supp No 46 at 193 UN Doc A/34/46, 1249 
UNTS 13.
71 Articles 6(b), 7(e) and 8(b) of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment 
and Eradication of Violence against Women (adopted 9 June 1994 entered into force 5 March 
1995) IACmHR (1994) 33 ILM 1534.
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reducing its complexity and by helping to anticipate other people’s behaviour.72 
Most importantly, legal reasoning is only possible if based on generalisations, 
and individual considerations in adjudication for long has been considered more 
of a risk to equal rights than a condition for their recognition. The universality 
and blindness of the law, which inevitably implies grouping individuals into 
different categories and treating them in the same way is justly represented as a 
guarantee against judicial arbitrariness and favouritism. Not only generalisation, 
but also profiling73 plays an important role in law and public policy. When 
time and resources are scarce, it might seem just fair and rational to trust in the 
probabilistic accuracy of some group categorisation even though one knows that 
this will mean to treat some members of the group in a way that is not respectful 
to their individual characteristics, as it happens when we grant voting rights at 
eighteen years old. So the first challenge for a human rights court is to be able to 
identify why it is wrong to apply stereotypes when considering a specific situation.
This might prove to be very difficult, as all existing criteria for distinguishing 
between good and bad stereotyping require a reasoned application that 
depends very much on the context. Wrongful application of a stereotype does 
not necessarily depend on its being based on factors with no statistical import 
in reaching generalisations, because even the operation of statistically accurate 
stereotypes may be wrongful and result in human rights violations under 
certain circumstances. For example, an Argentinean Court held that although 
it is statically true that women are physically weaker than men, this is not an 
acceptable reason to refuse hiring women whose physique make them competent 
for the job.74 Neither it is completely safe to rely on the difference between 
hostile and benevolent stereotypes. Although hostile stereotypes are clearly 
problematic and reflect prejudices or biases that may result in the devaluation, 
marginalisation and subordination of individuals, benevolent stereotypes can 
also be detrimental as they perpetuate rigid roles and beliefs that may encroach 
upon individual autonomy. For example, labour laws enacted to protect women 
from certain hazards of paid work have the effect of reducing the employment 
available to women. There is also a close connection between stereotypes and 
identity.75 I develop my own sense of self, and hopefully a sense of self-worth and 
authenticity, by identifying myself as member of one or more communities and 
by being recognised as such by the other members of those groups. We recognise 
the communality of our experiences; see ourselves as sharing some common 
72 Rebecca Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: transnational legal perspectives 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2009) 14- 20.
73 Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities and Stereotypes (Harvard University Press Belknap 
Press 2003).
74 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Civil, ‘Fundación Mujeres en Igualdad y otro c/ Freddo 
S. A. s/Amparo’ Sala H Buenos Aires 16 de diciembre de 2002 <www.derechoshumanos.unlp.
edu.ar/assets/files/documentos/fallo-fundacion-mujeres-en-igualdad-y-otros-contra-freddo-
sa-sobre-amparo.pdf> accessed 5 September 2015.
75 Anthony Appiah, ‘Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity’ (2000) 88 Cal LRev 4.
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attributes, practices and, most of all, a common narrative on how we are. But 
generalisations or stereotypes about particular groups may eventually perform 
a disciplinary function over some non-conforming members of the group and 
become oppressive as far as they dictate the self-understanding that its members 
should have.76 Also, members of subordinated groups unconsciously internalise 
oppressive stereotypes imposed by people who – being outside of the group and 
trying to distinguish themselves from it – have the social and cultural power to 
script the identity of ‘the other’.77 A human rights court should then be able to 
differentiate between stereotypes that help to build authentic, non-essentialist, 
and dignified subjectivities from those stereotypes that hinder them. This exercise 
is likely to be exceedingly complicated for judges who are called to act within the 
constrained framework of the judicial procedure, with limited knowledge of the 
cultural and sociological realities behind the cases and whose information on the 
cases is reduced to what the representatives of the parties bring before the Court.
Secondly, the Court must define the extent and depth of its investigation on 
stereotypes for a particular case. In doing so, the court must determine what exactly 
is the court called to do when it identifies the operation of a wrongful stereotype. 
These definitions require a clear notion of the individual and collective impacts 
of the decision and of what expressive, preventive and reparatory objectives the 
court aims to achieve with its judgment. This is especially important regarding 
the reparatory measures the court orders the state to comply with. The more costly 
the measures are for the states, the more the states will demand that reparations 
have a causal nexus with the individual human rights violation and the weaker 
that nexus looks, the more they will contest the political legitimacy of the court’s 
collective remedies.
Reparations aimed at eradicating wrongful gender stereotyping are typically 
collective and preventive, and therefore they demand a robust and clear 
justification from the court. The court must be able to explain the connection 
between the operation of the stereotype in the case, the individual human rights 
violation such operation made possible and the way in which the reparatory 
measure ordered by the court to modify the cultural patterns of conduct based 
on stereotypes would prevent the repetition of similar human rights violations.
In early cases, the Court failed to identify the gendered nature of some 
human rights violations, and the stereotypes that played a role in their 
occurrence.78 Moreover, the Court itself wrongfully stereotyped women in some 
of its judgments.79 The Cotton Field and the Atala cases show the impressive 
progress the Court has made in the last decade. The Court has proven its 
76 Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Community of Judgment and Human Rights’ (2000) Theor Inq in L 1.2.
77 Pierre Bourdieu, La dominación masculina (Editorial Anagrama 2000); Simone De Beauvoir, 
El segundo sexo (Alicia Martorell tr, Cátedra 1998).
78 Patricia Palacios, ‘The Path to Gender Justice in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
(2007–2008) 17 (2) Tex J WL 227.
79 See Loayza Tamayo Case IACtHR Ser C No 47 (8 March 1998).
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understanding of the phenomena of gender discrimination and gender violence 
and has demonstrated a creative commitment to eradicating cultural practices 
that contribute to their persistence. However, in some other incursions into the 
issue of gender stereotyping, the Court has been more hesitant about what to do.
In the case of Artavia Murillo (‘In Vitro Fertilization) v Costa Rica,80 for 
example, the Court found indirect gender discrimination due to the differentiated 
disproportional impacts a ban on in vitro fertilisation had on infertile women in 
comparison to infertile men owing, in part, to the existence of the stereotype 
that women must be mothers and the fact that ‘motherhood has been assigned 
to women as an essential part of their gender identity.’81 However, the Court 
also named the stereotype affecting infertile men, who felt ‘a strong sense of 
impotence’ and ‘unmanly’ and thus questioned in their gender identity. The Court 
added that these gender stereotypes are incompatible with international human 
rights law and that measures must be taken to eliminate them. The Court made 
clear that it was not validating these stereotypes and only recognised them and 
defined them in order to describe the disproportionate impact of the interference 
caused by the state’s IVF prohibition.82 Besides the fact that the Court did not 
make clear how gender stereotypes in this case could sustain the Court’s indirect 
gender discrimination assertion given the fact that both women and men were 
affected in their gender identity, what is interesting about this case is that in order 
to support its indirect discrimination argument, the Court relied on the existence 
of wrongful stereotypes. This made the Court feel the need to explain that it 
was not validating these stereotypes and that they should be eliminated. The 
uneasiness of the Court comes from the fact that stereotypes in this case appear 
in a different position than in the Cotton Field or the Atala cases. In the IVF 
case, the existence of gender stereotypes were not conditions that made possible 
the infringements of rights. They were conditions that created or increased the 
suffering of the victims. If women’s sense of self worth would not rely on their 
fertility and men’s confidence in their sexual potency, the ban on IVF would 
not have made the victims felt as miserable as they did. In this case, the Court 
correctly identified and named the gender stereotypes,83 but this was not a case in 
which the Court could have done something else out of that finding, for example, 
regarding reparations. Even if, as a result of existing stereotyping, women suffered 
80 Artavia Murillo (‘In Vitro Fertilization’) Case IACtHR Ser C No 257 (28 November 2012).
81 Ibid para 298.
82 Ibid para 302.
83 However, where the Court refers to ‘the stereotype that protection of the fetus should prevail 
over the health of the mother’ it makes a mistake in the identification of another stereotype 
present in the case. The stereotype behind that statement is that women should sacrifice for 
their (even unborn) children. The inference is that the protection of the fetus is given priority 
over the right to health of the pregnant woman. Artavia Murillo (‘In Vitro Fertilization’) Case 
IACtHR Ser C No 257 (28 November 2012) para 297. See Simone Cusack, ‘Eliminating Judicial 
Stereotyping: Equal Access to Justice for Women in Gender-Based Violence Cases’ (Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014) <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/
Women/WRGS/StudyGenderStereotyping.doc> accessed 5 September 2015.
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more than men, and even admitting – as the Court does – that the state has a legal 
duty to eliminate wrongful gender stereotypes, it still seems that it would be too 
far-fetched to make the state pay a larger amount of pecuniary damages to the 
women than to the men exposed to the IVF ban. This makes the Court’s incursion 
into the issue of stereotyping in this case somehow superfluous. In another case, 
this time against Paraguay, the Court did awarded US $5,000 more to the mother 
than to the father of a child that was killed by military forces. In this case the 
mother had an emotional breakdown during her testimonial hearing before the 
Court.84 However understanding one might be of the empathetic reaction of 
the members of the Court towards the mother, this is probably an example in 
which the endorsement of the maternal stereotype by the Court was not only 
superfluous, but counterproductive and maybe unfair to the father. It reinforced 
the stereotypical beliefs of women as more dedicated and closer to their children 
than men, and also as weaker and in greater need of protection than men.
However – and this shows how contextual the analysis on stereotypes should 
be – there might be cases in which stereotypes that operate to increase the suffering 
of the victims of human rights violations should be disclosed and even taken into 
account for the purposes of making the state compensate for such extra suffering. 
One of such cases is Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru.85 In this case police and 
military forces under the political command of former president Fujimori were 
the perpetrators of atrocious crimes against members of the opposition movement 
Shining Path who were detained in the Castro Castro prison. There is evidence in 
the case of their deliberate exploitation of several gender stereotypes to increase 
the emotional impact of the attacks on the victims and their relatives. As it is 
common in sexual violence cases in the context of armed conflicts, the attack on 
women’s victims was – at least partly – aimed at humiliating and demoralising 
the male members of Shining Path who helplessly saw how explosives and heavy 
artillery were being used against the women’s pavilion of the Castro Castro 
prison, all this during visiting day, before the eyes of the ‘mothers, sisters, wives 
and children’86 of the inmates who had planned to celebrate Peruvian mother’s 
day, and who were at the gates desperately trying to find out what was happening. 
The women inmates who survived the prison attack were kept under inhuman 
conditions and subjected to all kinds of assaults, including rape, violent vaginal 
inspections, forced nudity, and lack of gynaecological care to pregnant women. 
As stated in the arguments of the common intervener, the captors devised 
the ‘offering of a “prize” system to those who “abandoned” their freedom of 
thought in exchange for “returning them” their femininity giving them access to 
implements such as comb, lipstick, etc., and to be reintegrated into their role of 
being a “good mother.”’ Those women who accepted submission could see their 
84 Vargas Areco Case IACtHR Ser C No 155 (26 September 2006).
85 Miguel Castro Castro Prison Case IACtHR Ser C No 160 (25 November 2006).
86 Ibid para 197.18.
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children again.87 The Court judgment in Castro Castro rightly took into account 
most of the gender dimensions involved in this case and this was reflected in its 
decisions on reparation.
The case of Fornerón and Daughter v Argentina88 is a different and extremely 
interesting case. Mr Fornerón was a single father who was consistently denied by 
the Argentinian courts, first the custody, then visitation rights and finally his right 
to oppose the adoption of his biological daughter, who had being surrendered 
by her mother to a married couple upon birth. In this case the Court correctly 
identified a compound gender stereotype: that single young men are not able to be 
the primary caretakers of their children, and explained the connection between 
the operation of the stereotype and the violation to Mr Fornerón’s rights to judicial 
guarantees and judicial protection. However, the Court failed by not realising 
that this case was also a gender discrimination case against Mr Fornerón, and a 
violation to the equality provisions of the American Convention.
As in the Atala case, the Argentinian courts’ decisions were not based on 
Mr Fornerón’s parental capacities, but on stereotypes. What is interesting about 
this case is that the Court, by having adopted an anti-subordination theory of 
equality in previous gender cases, failed this time to find gender discrimination 
because Mr Fornerón, being a heterosexual man, was not a member of a historically 
disadvantaged group, like women or sexual minorities. The Court did not make 
the connection between gender stereotypes and structural discrimination, as it 
did in Cotton Field and Atala, and for that reason it did not find an infringement 
of the right to equality and non-discrimination under the American Convention. 
The Court was short-sighted. Fornerón was a particularly promising case to show 
how gender stereotyping, by reinforcing a ‘separate-spheres’ mentality steer men 
out of traditionally female roles making women to assume those roles. The Court 
should had remembered that the subordination of women would continue as long 
as men were required to behave in traditionally masculine ways, and that as long 
as women’s pursuits remained off-limits to men, neither sex would be free from 
discrimination.89
Fornerón is an example of a case in which the Court should have gone 
further in its inquiry on stereotypes and could have legitimately used the case to 
educate on the collective impact of gender stereotyping and to impose integral 
preventive reparatory measures aiming at stopping the state for enforcing sex role 
stereotypes.
87 Ibid para 260 r).
88 Fornerón and Daughter Case IACtHR Ser C No 242 (27 April 2012).
89 It was Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her colleagues at the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project who 
decided to challenge the constitutionality of sex-based state action by taking cases with male 
plaintiffs. Her strategy has recently been revisited and considered as grounded on a theory 
of equal protection involving constitutional limitations on the state’s power to enforce sex-
role stereotypes. See Cary Franklin, ‘The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law’ (2010) 85 NYU L Rev 83.
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6. PREPARING FOR BACKLASH
The Court’s approach to gender equality and gender stereotyping is beginning to 
find significant opposition from influential conservative groups in Latin America. 
These same groups oppose the regional progressive agenda of legal reforms 
concerning rights of women and LGBTI people, such as same-sex partnership 
or same-sex marriage proposals, the recognition of parenting rights to LGBTI 
couples, bills aimed at legally recognising transgender persons their gender 
identity, abortion decriminalisation bills, and even general anti-discrimination 
laws. The conservative opposition to these legal reforms is being articulated in 
different countries of the Americas through a discourse that attacks what these 
groups call ‘the gender ideology’ advanced by ‘radical feminists’ and ‘the gay 
lobby’ in a global crusade to redefine sex, sexuality and human nature, and that 
is said to endanger the ‘natural family’ and the ‘human rights of children to be 
raised by a mother and a father’.90 In Latin America, this conservative discourse 
on gender issues is not necessarily exclusive of the political right. The criticism 
against the ‘gender ideology’ and the agenda for women’s and LGBTI people’s 
rights are shared by some left-wing political leaders.91
The terms coined and the framing of the arguments are the same as those 
used by conservative groups in France, Italy, Poland, Belgium, Spain, and other 
90 See in Chile: Hernán Corral, ‘No discriminación, transexuales e identidad de género’ (Derecho 
y Academia 2011) <https://corraltalciani.wordpress.com/2011/11/20/no-discriminacion-
transexuales-e-identidad-de-genero/> accessed 3 September 2015; Julio Alvear T, ‘La Sentencia 
de la CIDH en el Caso Atala: Una Iniciativa para el Adoctrinamiento en Ideologías Radicales. 
Notas breves a la sentencia del 24 de febrero de 2012’ (2012) 13(26) Revista Actualidad 
Jurídica 577 <www.academia.edu/3652709/Julio_Alvear._Critica_Corte_IDH_Caso_Atala> 
accessed 3 September 2015; Max Silva Abbott, ‘Algunas Consideraciones sobre la Penetración 
del Derecho Internacional en los Ordenamientos Estatales Influido por la Perspectiva de 
Género’ (2012) 21 Díkaion 385 <http://dikaion.unisabana.edu.co/index.php/dikaion/article/
download/2921/3065> accessed 3 September 2015; Hernán Corral, ‘Madre hay una sola’ 
(Derecho y Academia 2013) <https://corraltalciani.wordpress.com/2013/04/21/madre-hay-
una-sola/> accessed 3 September 2015; Álvaro Ferrer, ‘Proyecto de ley de ideología de género: 
atentado contra la identidad’ (Chile B 24 April 2014) <www.chileb.cl/perspectiva/proyecto-
de-ley-de-ideologia-de-genero-atentado-contra-la-identidad/> accessed 3 September 2015; 
Álvaro Ferrer, ‘Chile ‘se está cayendo a pedazos; por un tsunami llamado ideología de género’ 
(Porta Luz 9 May 2014) <www.portaluz.org/chile-se-esta-cayendo-a-pedazos-alerta-el-
destacado-jurista-alvaro-572.htm>accessed 3 September 2015. See in Argentina: Gabriel 
Cortina, ‘La Ideología de Género, por Jorge Scala’ El Diario Exterior (7 June 2010) <www.
eldiarioexterior.com/la-ideologia-de-genero-por-38219.htm> accessed 3 September 2015; 
See in México: Beatriz Campillo, ‘Un acercamiento a la ideología de género’ (Universidad 
Pontificia Bolivariana) <http://oeticapoliticaysociedad.medellin.upb.edu.co/index.php/areas- 
de-trabajo/bioetica-y-bioderecho/item/16-un-acercamiento-a-la-ideologia-de-genero.html> 
accessed 3 September 2015. In Peru: ‘Peru, próximo objetivo de la ideología de género en 
Latinoamérica’ (Forum Lebitas 7 September 2013) <www.forumlibertas.com/frontend/
forumlibertas/noticia.php?id_noticia=27269> accessed 3 September 2015.
91 ‘Ecuador: Correa rechaza ideología de género y afirma que defender la familia es cuestión 
moral’ Aciprensa (Quito, 3 January 2014) <https://www.aciprensa.com/noticias/ecuador-
correa-rechaza-ideologia-de-genero-y-afirma-que-defender-la-familia-es-cuestion-moral- 
37571/> accessed 3 September 2015.
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European countries,92 and their common and primary intellectual source is 
a collection of multidisciplinary essays published by the Pontifical Council for 
the Family, called Lexicon: Ambiguous and Debatable Terms Regarding Family 
Life and Ethical Questions.93 According to the Preface to the Lexicon, written 
by Cardinal Alfonso López Trujillo, President of the Pontifical Council for the 
Family, the authors ‘seek to enlighten people on some ambiguous or confusing 
terms and jargon difficult to assess.’ It explains that these expressions are ‘used 
in parliaments and world forums’ and ‘exploit the uninformed people who use 
them and, since they are deceived by their ambiguity, they are not aware of 
the deception.’94 Some of the topics covered by the Lexicon are: ‘An ideology of 
gender: dangers and scope’, ‘Contraceptive mentality’, ‘Discrimination against 
women and CEDAW’, ‘Homosexual marriage’, ‘Motherhood and feminism’, ‘New 
definitions of gender’, ‘Sexual and reproductive rights’ and ‘Sexual identity and 
difference.’
The concept of ‘gender ideology’ appeared in the aftermath of the United 
Nations conferences in Cairo in 1994 and Beijing in 1995, which marked the 
international recognition of sexual and reproductive rights and have set the agenda 
of international human rights organisations, governments and human rights 
NGOs regarding women’s rights.95 The Lexicon publication and its translation to 
different languages can be read as reaction to confront the advances of the ‘gender 
ideology’ at the global level. Although most of the conservative criticism has been 
directed to the United Nations Human Rights System and the European Union 
Parliament, now that the Inter-American Court is developing a more robust 
jurisprudence on women rights and beginning to consider LGBTI people’s rights 
in the inter-American human rights system, the arguments about the Court’s 
unwelcome and dangerous attention to ‘the gender ideology’ and the ‘gay lobby’ 
are also emerging in conservative critical reviews of the Court’s decisions.96
In conservative arguments, gender is either an unnecessary and dangerous 
concept that there is no reason to include in the discussions or the texts of legal 
reforms, or it is re-defined to mean something completely different than the idea 
92 David Paternotte, ‘Christian Trouble: The Catholic Church and the Subversion of Gender’ 
(Council for European Studies, 8 May 2014) <http://councilforeuropeanstudies.org/critcom/
Christian-trouble-the-catholic-church-and-the-subversion-of-gender/> accessed 3 September 
2015; Sara Garbagnoli, ‘L’ideologia del genere’: l’irresistibile ascesa di un’invenzione retorica 
vaticana contro la denaturalizzazione dell’ordine sessuale’ (2014) 3 About Gender 250.
93 Consejo Pontificio para la Familia, Lexicón: términos ambiguos y discutidos sobre familia, vida 
y cuestiones éticas (3rd edn, Ediciones Palabra 2007).
94 Alfonso Card. López Trujillo, ‘Prefacio’ in Consejo Pontificio para la Familia, Lexicón. 
Términos ambiguos y discutidos sobre familia, vida y cuestiones éticas (3rd edn, Ediciones 
Palabra 2007) 7–16.
95 Doris Buss and Didi Herman, Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in International 
Politics (University of Minnesota Press 2003.
96 Julio Alvear T, ‘La Sentencia de la CIDH en el Caso Atala: Una Iniciativa para el Adoctrinamiento 
en Ideologías Radicales. Notas breves a la sentencia del 24 de febrero de 2012’ (2012) 13(26) 
Revista Actualidad Jurídica 577.
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that our social and cultural beliefs on femininity and masculinity are not natural 
but historically and socially constructed. In the Lexicon, gender is defined as a 
transcendental dimension of human sexuality, which incorporates the body, the 
mind and the soul, and that, though changeable, must obey the natural order fixed 
by the body.97 When the strategy used is to redefine gender (or other concepts 
such as those covered in the Lexicon), efforts are made for the new definitions to 
be included in legal documents as an interpretative tool in the application of laws 
and policies regarding women or LGBTI people.98
As Paternotte explains, the ‘gender ideology’ label neither designates the 
body of work produced by gender studies scholars of various disciplines, nor 
acknowledges the differences and debates within gender and sexuality studies 
and the complex interplay between activism and the academy.99 It is basically a 
term created to oppose women’s and LGBTI rights activism and to react against 
the critical edge of gender as an analytical category that deconstructs common 
naturalistic assumptions about differences between sexes and social relationships 
based on those differences, and reveals relationships of power involved in gender 
representations. The term ‘gender ideology’ amalgams, reduces and conflates 
many different theoretical proposals and very diverse women’s and LGBTI 
demands and agendas into radical slogans that usually borrows from Judith 
Butler’s work.100
Among the alleged evil consequences of the ‘gender ideology’, that results 
from its destruction of sex differences and the disrespect of the nature of human 
being as man and woman are war between sexes, the devaluation of motherhood, 
promotion of contraception and abortion, acceptance of homosexual partnerships 
and parentage, and the decline of marriage.101 This disregard of the natural order 
would result, according to Benedict XVI, in ‘the self-destruction of man himself, 
and hence, the destruction of God’s own work.’102
Although it is more than fanciful to see the Court – and any international 
human rights body so far – as advancing anything like a ‘gender ideology’ – let 
97 Beatriz Vollmer de Colles, ‘Nuevas definiciones de género’ in Consejo Pontificio para la 
Familia, Lexicón. Términos ambiguos y discutidos sobre familia, vida y cuestiones éticas 
(3rd edn, Ediciones Palabra 2007) 835.
98 The following is a proposal for a definition of gender made by the Unión Demócrata 
Independiente, a Chilean conservative right-wing party, which asks it to be included in 
the statute that created the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Chile: ‘For the purpose of this 
law, gender is a cultural expression, which changes according to historical and social 
circumstances, of those aspects and characteristics that are naturally constituted by the 
genetic, hormonal, morphological, psychological, emotional, cognitive and behavioral of a 
person, as differentiated as a man or a woman.’
99 Paternotte (n 92).
100 Ibid.
101 Tony Anatrella, ‘Caritas in Veritate, La famille et la théorie du genre’, Speech at SECAM 
(the Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar) in Accra, Ghana (31 
July 2010), cited by Mary Anne Case, ‘After Gender the Destruction of Man – The Vatican’s 
Nightmare Vision of the “Gender Agenda” for Law’ (2011) 31 Pace L Rev 805.
102 Ibid 802.
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alone Butler’s queer theory! – it must be admitted that there are real and significant 
differences between the conservative positions in their present form and the 
Court’s approach to gender equality and stereotypes. The Court does believe 
that social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female 
and the relationships between women and men are learned through socialisation 
processes and that in most societies gender norms produce inequalities between 
women and men in the responsibilities assigned, control over resources and 
decision-making opportunities.103 And the Court has shown its commitment to 
enforce human rights obligations to eliminate wrongful gender stereotypes that 
impede women and LGBTI the full and equal enjoyment of their human rights. 
This is not acceptable to conservative critics who believe that traditional gender 
roles are intrinsically linked to the different identities of men and women and 
that measures to debunk gender stereotypes result in the trivialisation of sexual 
specificity.
These paragraphs about the opposition the Court is beginning to confront and 
which will likely increase in time, are justified because, within the inter-American 
system, the conservative reaction will be more intense and bitter than it has been 
in the UN or the European Union, given the greater influence and political power 
the Catholic Church has in Latin American countries, and the fact that, unlike 
what happens in those other international forums, in the inter-American system 
cautious diplomatic manners and practices that are typical of big bureaucratic 
international and multicultural institutions, and that play an important buffer 
role in conflicting negotiations, are not yet sufficiently developed.
The Court should be aware and forewarned about this coming opposition, 
and understand that what these documents call ‘the gender ideology’ by no 
means represents the Court’s or other international human rights’ organs 
standing on gender equality. The Court must rely on the valuable global 
expertise and experience the international and regional human rights systems 
have acquired through decades of confronting different kinds of inequalities 
and discriminations happening in different settings and cultures. One lesson 
that I think can be safely drawn from that experience is that appeals to culture, 
103 It would be fair to say that the Court’s, as well as other international human rights bodies’ 
understanding of gender is consistent with the definition given by UN Women, the United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, which states that ‘gender 
refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the 
relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between 
women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially 
constructed and are learned through socialisation processes. They are context/time-specific 
and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a women or a man 
in a given context. In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and 
men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, 
as well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context. 
Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic 
group and age.’ ‘Concepts and definitions’ (UN Women) <www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/
conceptsandefinitions.htm> accessed 3 September 2015.
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religion and science to justify difference of treatment between individuals 
and groups many times serve the purpose of rationalising prejudice and of 
legitimising existing power relationships. Another is that reducing intolerance 
and discrimination through judicial adjudication is a slow and difficult process 
that requires deep understanding of the arguments opposing legal changes, and a 
rigorous justification of all decisions made in pursuit of equality.
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Stereotypes, Stigma and Sanism
Michael Perlin
It is impossible to meaningfully consider the power of stereotypes in mental 
disability law without considering the pernicious power of ‘sanism’: an irrational 
prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause 
and are reflected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and 
ethnic bigotry.1 Sanism2 pervades and infects every area of mental disability 
law, be it civil or criminal,3 or domestic or international.4 Based on stereotypes 
and stigma, it explains our laws and our court rulings on commitment law, right 
to treatment law, right to refuse treatment law, deinstitutionalisation law, anti-
discrimination law, the whole range of criminal law issues, from competency 
determinations to the insanity defence to sentencing to the death penalty, and to 
such important meta-issues as adequacy of counsel. In the context of international 
human rights law, sanism is also the key to the way that mental disability law is 
(or is not) applied worldwide, a factor that has grown since the ratification of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).5
1 See eg Michael L Perlin, ‘On “Sanism”’ (1992) 46 SMUL Rev 373.
2 The word ‘sanism’ was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr Morton Birnbaum. See 
Morton Birnbaum, ‘The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on its Development’ in Frank 
Ayed (ed), Medical, Moral and Legal Issues in Health Care (Williams & Wilkins 1974), 
discussed in this context in Michael L Perlin, ‘The Deinstitutionalization Myths: Old Wine in 
New Bottles’ in Karl Menninger and Heather Watts (eds), The Second National Conference on 
the Legal Rights of the Mentally Disabled (Kansas Bar Associations 1979) Conf Rep.
3 See eg Michael L Perlin, The Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (American 
Psychological Press 2000); Michael L Perlin, A Prescription for Dignity: Rethinking Criminal 
Justice and Mental Disability Law (Ashgate 2013).
4 See eg Michael L Perlin, International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law: When the 
Silenced Are Heard (OUP 2011).
5 See generally, ibid. See also Michael L Perlin, ‘“A Change Is Gonna Come”: The Implications 
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic 
Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law’ (2009) 29 No Ill U L Rev 483.
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There are seven major points to be considered in the context of stereotyping 
and human rights law in the context of persons with mental disabilities:
(1) Stereotypes, by typifying in negative ways, especially in their implicit (and 
sometimes explicit ways of characterising certain persons as ‘less than 
human’), necessarily limit the enjoyment of human rights.
(2) Because persons with mental disabilities are regularly dehumanised, they 
are frequently treated in the courtroom in ways that do not comport with 
dignity.
(3) Whenever an anti-discrimination law is proposed, these invidiousness 
stereotypes emerge, and inevitably alter and infect the ensuing debate. Often, 
the resulting laws reflect this.
(4) We have done an extraordinarily poor job of answering the question that has 
bedevilled civil rights activists since the 1950s: how to capture ‘the hearts 
and minds’ of the public so as to best insure that statutorily and judicially 
articulated rights are incorporated – freely and willingly – into the day-to-
day fabric and psyche of society?
(5) Litigators should aggressively and affirmatively take test cases that involve 
such stereotypes to the regional courts/commissions on human rights, so as 
to seek explicit pronouncements that official perpetuation of such stereotypes 
violates international human rights law.
(6) Advocates working with and on behalf of persons with mental disabilities 
must follow strategies effectively employed in cases involving racial, gender-
based, and gender preference-based stereotypes both in terms of litigation 
and in terms of raising public awareness.
(7) It is essential that all participants in this system take seriously the CRPD, and 
begin to employ it in litigation, in local domestic legislative debates, and in 
the public arena to best combat these stereotypes.
In considering each of these points, it is also essential to assess the importance 
of therapeutic jurisprudence as a potentially remediative tool in this area of law 
and policy.
In 1997, Bob Dylan released an album, Time Out of Mind, widely seen as his 
best piece of work in over two decades. One of the stunning songs on that album, 
Not Dark Yet, suggested to the listener that it was almost a valedictory for Dylan 
as he saw the end of his career near,6 beginning as it does:
Shadows are falling and I’ve been here all day
It’s too hot to sleep, time is running away
6 As it turns out, that was not so; Dylan has continued to record, and his 2012 album, Tempest, 
is widely considered to be one of the greatest of his five decade career. See eg Ann Margaret 
Daniel, ‘Bob Dylan’s Near Perfect Storm’ <www.hotpress.com/9102928.htm> accessed 
8 November 2013 (characterising album as ‘breathtaking, mythmaking, heartbreaking’).
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Elsewhere in the song, Dylan sings:
Well, my sense of humanity has gone down the drain
Behind every beautiful thing there’s been some kind of pain.7
A thoughtful analysis of this song suggests that it focuses on how ‘the darkest 
moment … leads the way towards light.’8 This line is relevant in this context 
because our lazy, unthinking use of the stereotypes we employ when we write, 
think, talk and decide cases about persons with mental disabilities reflects how 
our sense of humanity has ‘gone down the drain,’ but that, if we consider these 
issues seriously, it may lead us ‘towards light.’ It is hoped that this chapter – vide 
Dylan – helps in efforts to seek remediation.
1. HOW STEREOTYPES LIMIT HUMAN RIGHTS
First, consider the use of stereotypes in the law. The Americans with Disabilities 
Act stresses the pernicious role of stereotypes in disability discrimination:
Individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been 
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful 
unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our 
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals 
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual 
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society.9
In construing laws affecting family leave policies, the Supreme Court has stressed 
that ‘the impact of the discrimination targeted by the [Family Medical Leave 
Act], which is based on mutually reinforcing stereotypes that only women are 
responsible for family caregiving and that men lack domestic responsibilities, 
is significant,’10 and that such mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-
fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the 
role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views 
about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.’11
7 See <www.bobdylancom/us/songs/not-dark-yet>.
8 See Tony Atwood, ‘Untold Dylan’ (10 November 2008) <http://bob-dylanorg.uk/archives/12> 
accessed 8 November 2013.
9 42 US C § 12101(a)(7) (emphasis added).
10 Nevada Dept of Human Resources v Hibbs, 538 US 721, 722 (2003).
11 Ibid 736. See also, ibid: Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel 
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men Because employers 
continued to regard the family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar 
accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave. Hibbs is discussed favourably in 
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Although it has been suggested that there are positive as well as negative 
stereotypes – that, for instance, ‘stereotyping can, for example, be a useful tool to 
help process the social complexity of the world’12 – these may be pernicious as well. 
By way of example, people who hold positive stereotypes of Asian Americans see 
little evidence of discrimination against them.13 By way of example, a purportedly 
‘“positive stereotype” about gay men – that they allegedly have good fashion 
sense or are more sensitive [–] often comes with the implied codicils that they are 
superficial and flighty or not tough enough in business’.14
Stereotyping is especially pernicious when applied to persons with 
disabilities, and there is no evidence of any ‘positive’ stereotyping with regard to 
this population. We would do well to heed the admonition of Judge David Bazelon 
over forty years ago: that we need to be vigilant about not ‘overgeneraliz[ing] 
about citizens whom it is easy to overgeneralize about.’15
Ten stereotypes are commonly applied;16 this is the first one:
Mentally ill individuals are ‘different,’ and, perhaps, less than human. They are 
erratic, deviant, morally weak, sexually uncontrollable, emotionally unstable, 
superstitious, lazy, ignorant and demonstrate a primitive morality. They lack the 
capacity to show love or affection. They smell different from ‘normal’ individuals, 
and are somehow worth less.17
this context in Reva Siegel, ‘You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to 
Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs’ (2006) 58 Stan L Rev 1871, 88.
12 Simone Cusack and Rebecca Cook, ‘Stereotyping Women in the Health Sector: Lessons from 
CEDAW’ (2009) 16 Wash & Lee J Civil Rts & Soc Just 47, 51.
13 Miranda Oshige McGowan and James Lindgren, ‘Testing the “Model Minority Myth”’ (2006) 
100 NwUL Rev 331, 333. See also, in a very different context, Debra Lyn Bassett, ‘The Rural 
Venue’ (2006) 57 Ala L Rev 941, 960 (‘positive stereotypes found in land use laws are often 
circular and conclusory’).
14 Todd Brower, ‘Pride and Prejudice: Results of an Empirical Study of Sexual Orientation Fairness 
in the Courts of England and Wales’ (2005–06) 13 Buff Women’s LJ 17, 75–76. See also, ibid: 
‘Moreover, whether stereotypes are good or bad, they often underline social difference as they 
countenance a view of people by reference to group features, and not as individuals. Although 
majority group stereotypes exist, people rarely take them seriously as a shared characteristic, 
but as something that applies to only some persons’.
15 David Bazelon, ‘Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process’ (1975) 
75 Colum L Rev 897, 909, as quoted in Michael L Perlin and John Douard, ‘Equality, I Spoke 
That Word/As If a Wedding Vow: Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized 
Persons’ (2008–09) 53 NYLSchLRev 9, 26.
16 See eg Perlin (n 1) 393–397 (other stereotypes relate, inter alia, to presumptive and inherent 
danger, presumptive incompetency, ease of identification, need for segregation, acceptability 
of using pejorative language in descriptions, and inherent laziness).
17 See eg Perlin (n 1) 393; see also eg Michael L Perlin, ‘Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else 
Expecting Rain: Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized 
Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia’ (2008) 83 Wash L Rev 481, 
503. On how conflicting stereotypes are employed in the matter of sexuality and persons with 
psychiatric disabilities, see Michael L Perlin and Alison J Lynch, ‘“All His Sexless Patients”: 
Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex’ (2014) 89 Wash L Rev 
257, 298: ‘[Legislative] policies flowed, in large part, from two contradictory stereotypes: one 
of infantilization (denying the reality that institutionalized persons with disabilities may 
retain the same sort of sexual urges, desires, and needs the rest of us have and generally upon 
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Persons institutionalised in psychiatric hospitals are often treated as less than 
human, and the conditions of their confinement sometimes leads them to think 
of themselves as ‘less than human.’18 As recently as 1960, a state Supreme Court 
rejected the notion that the Due Process clause applied to this population: 
‘[the patient’s] loss of liberty is not such liberty as is within the meaning of 
the constitutional provision that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.”’19 Even today, in court proceedings across 
the United States, ‘persons with mental disabilities are regularly treated as third-
class citizens by (at the best) bored or (at the worst) malevolent trial judges.’20 The 
treatment of these individuals as ‘less than human’ continues even after death.21
Interestingly, even traditional human rights NGOs have taken similar 
positions, rejecting the notion that the rights of persons with mental disabilities 
are worth their attention.22 As Aaron Dhir has noted, ‘[f]or decades, the 
rights of mentally disabled persons were virtually ignored by the human rights 
movement.’23 Adds Anna Lawson, ‘[t]raditionally, disability has not been 
regarded as a human rights issue.’24
which the rest of us act) and, paradoxically, one of demonization (expressing fear of their 
hypersexuality and the correlative need of protections and limitations to best stop them from 
acting on these primitive urges).’
18 Renee Gruber, ‘A Civil Prison – Fear or Reason? Unbiased Reform of Involuntary Commitment 
Proceedings for Non-Criminals Admitted into Mental Facilities’ (2013) 90 U Det Mercy L Rev 
203, 217 (‘ the experience of having once been a mental patient teaches you to think of yourself 
as less than human’), quoting Mental Patients’ Liberation: Why? How?, Antipsychiatry.org 
(1970) <www.antipsychiatry.org/mplib.htm> accessed 8 November 2013.
19 Prochaska v Brinegar, 102 NW 2d 870, 872 (Iowa 1960).
20 Michael L Perlin, ‘“There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of Eden”: Mental Health Courts, the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence’ in Bernadette McSherry and Ian Freckelton (eds), Coercive Care: Law and 
Policy (Routledge 2013) 193, 209.
21 See Perlin (n 1) 393 n 144: ‘For a stark example of difference in the way mentally disabled 
persons are treated, even after death, see eg Joan Gallen, ‘Mental Patients Finally Put to Rest 
With Dignity’ (The News Tribune NJ) 10 October 1991 (nearly 1,000 patients buried on New 
Jersey state hospital grounds in unmarked graves); David Corcoran, ‘Graves Without Names 
for the Forgotten Mentally Retarded’ NY Times, 9 December 1991, B6 (850 residents of New 
York state school for mentally retarded similarly buried).
22 Symposium Transcript, ‘The Application of International Human Rights Law to Institutional 
Mental Disability Law’ (2002) 21 NYL Sch J Intl & Comp L 387, 391 (Comments of 
Eric Rosenthal, head of Disability Rights International [then, Mental Disability Rights 
International, then and now, the most prominent US-based NGO in this area of law and 
policy): ‘I began my research … by examining the human rights studies of non-governmental 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International I also looked at the 
US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. What I found is 
shocking: those human rights organizations and human rights reports criticized governments 
when political dissidents were put in psychiatric facilities, but they did not speak out about the 
abuses against other people who may or may not have mental disabilities.’ See also Krasimir 
Kanev, ‘State, Human Rights, and Mental Health in Bulgaria’ (2002) 21 NYL Sch J Intl & Comp 
L 435, 435 (Amnesty International first involved itself in this issue in Bulgaria in 2001).
23 Aaron Dhir, ‘Relationships of Force: Reflections on Law, Psychiatry, and Human Rights’ 
(2008) 25 Windsor Rev L & Soc Issues 103, 105.
24 Anna Lawson, ‘Disability, Degradation, and Dignity: The Role of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2006) 56 NIreLQ 462, 462.
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The use of stereotypes perpetuates stigma. And, in many ways sanism is 
more pernicious than other stereotypes because it is engaged in by many who 
would (appropriately) take quick umbrage at the use of stereotypes about other 
marginalised groups.25 Because we unthinkingly consider persons with mental 
disabilities to be ‘less than human’, we can comfortably take refuge in the 
reductive stereotypes of stigmatising sanism. What is especially troubling here 
is that these stereotypes are employed not solely by lay people (and the popular 
press) but by judges and the very lawyers assigned to represent this population.26 
Sanist lawyers trivialise both their clients’ problems and the importance of any 
eventual solution to these problems, and implicitly and explicitly question their 
clients’ competence and credibility, a move that significantly impairs the lawyers’ 
advocacy efforts.27 Sanist judges reflect and project the conventional morality of 
the community; ‘judicial decisions in all areas of mental disability law continue 
to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes’.
The pervasiveness of sanism infects all aspects of the legal process and of life. 
We cannot make any meaningful progress in coping with stigmatic stereotypes 
until we come to grips with this.
1.1. LACK OF DIGNITY28
For the purposes of this discussion, dignity means that people ‘possess an 
intrinsic worth that should be recognized and respected’, and that they should 
not be subjected to treatment by the state that is inconsistent with that intrinsic 
worth.29 Treating people with dignity and respect makes them more likely to 
view procedures as fair and the motives behind law enforcement’s actions as 
25 See Perlin (n 1) 373: ‘Imagine the uproar if a published appellate court decision in 1974 
referred to an adult person of colour as a “boy.” Imagine the fallout if the New York Times 
stated in 1964 that Plessy v Ferguson was the lead case on the question of “separate but 
equal” accommodations. Imagine if, ten years after Roe v Wade, a Congressman had been 
complimented for his “thoughtful” remarks when he stated that, not only was it still legal to 
criminalise first-trimester abortions, but that a state could also lawfully bar all women from 
using contraception Imagine if left-liberal candidates in one of the most progressive legislative 
districts in the country ran for office on a platform of excluding racial minorities from living 
in that district.’ These acts would quickly, and correctly, be labelled either as racist, sexist or 
bizarre, and would be decried by well-meaning citizens at virtually all points on the political 
spectrum. Yet, when we substitute ‘mentally disabled person’ for ‘person of colour’ or ‘racial 
minority’ or ‘woman’, we let such acts pass without notice or comment.
26 See Perlin, ‘The Hidden Prejudice’ (n 3) 51–55 (discussing sanist judges).
27 See Michael L Perlin, ‘“Simplify You, Classify You”: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in 
Disability Classification Systems’ (2009) 25 GaStULRev 607, 622.
28 This section is generally adapted from Michael L Perlin, ‘“The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside”: 
Mental Health Courts, Dignity and Due Process’ (2013) 3 Ment Health L & Pol’y 1.
29 Carol Sanger, ‘Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of 
Law’ (2009) 18 Colum J Gender & L 409, 415.
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well meaning.30 What individuals want most ‘is a process that allows them to 
participate, seeks to merit their trust, and treats them with dignity and respect.’31 
All concepts of human rights have their basis in some understanding of human 
dignity.32 Dignity has been characterised as one of ‘those very great political 
values that defines our constitutional morality.’33
The legal process upholds human dignity by allowing the litigant to tell his 
or her own story.34 A notion of individual dignity, ‘generally articulated through 
concepts of autonomy, respect, equality, and freedom from undue government 
interference, was at the heart of a jurisprudential and moral outlook that resulted 
in the reform, not only of criminal procedure, but of the various institutions more 
or less directly linked with the criminal justice system, including juvenile courts, 
prisons, and mental institutions.’35 Fair process norms such as the right to counsel 
‘operate as substantive and procedural restraints on state power to ensure that the 
individual suspect is treated with dignity and respect.’36 Dignity concepts are 
expansive; a Canadian Supreme Court case has declared that disenfranchisement 
of incarcerated persons violated their dignity interests.37 By way of example, ‘the 
moral dignity of the criminal process would be frustrated if grossly incompetent 
defendants were permitted to plead guilty.’38 One of the critical functions of 
counsel is to ‘protect the dignity and autonomy of a person on trial.’39 Perhaps 
30 Tamar R Birckhead, ‘Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles’ (2009) 57 Buff L Rev 
1447, 1474.
31 Luther Munford, ‘The Peacemaker Test: Designing Legal Rights to Reduce Legal Warfare’ 
(2007) 12 HarvNegot L Rev 377, 393.
32 Buddhism and Human Dignity, SGI Q (July 2000) Soka Gakkai International <www.sgi.org/
buddhism/buddhist-concepts/buddhism-and-human-dignity.html> accessed 8 November 
2013.
33 William A Parent, ‘Constitutional Values and Human Dignity’ in Michael J Meyer and 
William A Parent (eds), The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values 
(Cornell University Press 1992) 47, 71.
34 Katherine Kruse, ‘The Human Dignity of Clients’ (2008) 93 Cornell L Rev 1343, 1353.
35 Eric Miller, ‘Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial 
Interventionism’ (2004) 65 Ohio St LJ 1479, 1569 (n 463).
36 Peter Arenella, ‘Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger 
Courts’ Competing Ideologies’ (1983) 72 Geo LJ 185, 200.
37 Sauvé v Canada, [2002] 3 SCR 519, discussed in this context in Michael Pinard, ‘Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity’ (2010) 85 
NYU L Rev 457, 464.
38 Bruce J Winick, ‘Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated 
Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie’ (1995) 85 J Crim. L & Criminology 571, 593. 
But compare Michael L Perlin, ‘“Dignity Was the First to Leave”: Godinez v Moran, Colin 
Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants’ (1996) 14 Behav Sci & L 61 
(critiquing the US Supreme Court’s decision in Godinez v Moran, 509 US 389 (1993) (setting 
standard for competence to plead guilty same as for competence to stand trial) as robbing the 
legal process of dignity.
39 Jones v Barnes, 463 US 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J, dissenting). See also eg Philip Halpern, 
‘Government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship: an interest analysis of rights and 
remedies’ (1983) 32 Buff L Rev 127, 172 (‘the right to counsel embraces two separate interests: 
reliable and fair determinations in criminal proceedings, and treatment of defendants with 
dignity and respect regardless of the effect on the outcome of criminal proceedings’).
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counterintuitively to much of the lay public, dignity may trump ‘truth’ as a core 
value of the criminal justice system.40
By engaging in stigmatic stereotypes, we rob persons with mental disabilities 
of their dignity, often shaming and humiliating them in the process.41 It is essential 
that dignity be present in all aspects of the legal process in matters involving 
persons with mental disabilities.42 The absence of dignity allows/encourages 
stigma and stereotypes to fester and grow, unchallenged. Sanist thinking makes 
it highly unlikely that the legal process will reflect ‘dignity’ values;43 it is essential 
that such thinking be eradicated from this process.
1.2 . STER EOTYPES CONTAMINATE LEGISLATIVE 
DEBATE 4 4
A reading of legislative debate over non-discrimination laws reveals the extensive 
use of stereotypes by opponents of the laws. Consider first the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.45 A reading of the legislative history, the early commentaries 
and even the practice manuals barely acknowledges the application of the ADA to 
persons with a mental disability.46 When enacting the ADA, Congress appeared to 
treat mental disability issues as a ‘poor stepchild’ to matters dealing with physical 
disability.47 There was little legislative debate, and what there was suggested a 
‘fairly wide gap’ between Congress’ concerns in writing the legislation, and the 
40 Erik Luna and Paul G. Cassell, ‘Mandatory Minimalism’ (2010) 32 Cardozo L Rev 1, 52. On 
the application of human dignity principles to limit the scope of criminalisation of victimless 
crimes (specifically, drug offences) see generally, Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, ‘Drugs, Dignity, 
and Danger: Human Dignity as a Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization’ 
(2013) 80 Tenn L Rev 291.
41 See Michael L Perlin and Naomi Weinstein, ‘“Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman 
of Shame”: Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation’ (2014) So Cal Rev L & Socl Just 
(forthcoming).
42 See eg Perlin, Dignity (n 3); Perlin (n 17); Perlin (n 20); Perlin (n 28); Michael L Perlin, 
‘Understanding the Intersection between International Human Rights and Mental Disability 
Law: The Role of Dignity’ in Bruce Arrigo and Heather Bersot (eds), The Routledge Handbook 
of International Crime and Justice Studies (Routledge 2013) 191.
43 Michael L Perlin, ‘A Law of Healing’ (2000) 68 U Cin L Rev 407, 420–21.
44 The relationship between stereotypes and discrimination has been studied most closely in the 
context of sex discrimination law. Case law has held that gender stereotypes may be actionable 
under anti-sex discrimination laws. See eg Nev Dep’t of Human Res v Hibbs, 538 US 721, 736 
(2003); Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US 636, 653 (1975); see generally, Stephanie Bornstein, 
‘The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Conflicts of Men’ (2012) 63 Hastings 
LJ 1297.
45 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101ff.
46 Almost none of the early scholarship about the ADA even mentioned persons with mental 
disabilities. See Michael L Perlin, ‘The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist 
Attitudes Be Undone?’ (1003-94) 8 J L & Health 15, 19 (n 21) (listing articles).
47 Michael L Perlin, ‘What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find out When You Reach 
the Top, You’re on the Bottom: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v LC.) 
Anything More than Idiot Wind?’ (2001–02) 35 U Mich J L Ref 235, 247.
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extent of discrimination faced by persons with mental disabilities.48 Of the scant 
attention paid to persons with mental illness in the ADA legislative debate, most 
focused on an ultimately unsuccessful attempt led by Senator Helms to jettison 
most persons with mental disabilities from the Act’s protections.49 While this 
attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, the tenor of the debate reflects the basest 
sort of sanism, and serves as a paradigm for my ultimate concern about the Act’s 
prophylactic value, and its ability to eradicate the stigmatic stereotype of sanism.
Again, Senator Helms’ remarks were especially revealing. In his colloquy 
with Senator Harkin about hiring practices, he asked, ‘[h]ow is an employer … 
supposed to find out whether a man is a pedophile or a schizophrenic?’50 He also 
asked whether an ‘employer’s own moral standards’ enabled him to make hiring 
judgments about transvestites, kleptomaniacs, or manic depressives. Interestingly 
and revealingly, he made it clear that his attack was not meant to cover persons 
with physical disabilities: ‘If this were a bill involving people in a wheelchair 
or those who had been injured in the war, that is one thing.’51 This separating 
out persons with physical disabilities – especially those whose disability was 
battle-caused – from persons with mental disabilities cannot be ignored for the 
purposes of this analysis.52 To a great extent, this reflects social attitudes that 
link mental illness inextricably to evil,53 and even to the supernatural world.54 
These conflations have profound implications for both the criminal justice and 
the mental disability law systems, and are, in large part, responsible for our need 
to blame individuals with mental disabilities for their mental disabilities, as part 
of our ‘culture of punishment’.55
Senator Helms’ malignant twinning of paedophiles with schizophrenics, or 
the notion that one might have a moral reason to violate one’s civil and human 
48 Ibid.
49 See 112 Cong Rec S10, 765–97 (daily ed 7 September 1989). The implications of this attempt 
are discussed in Robert L Burgdorf, Jr, ‘The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute’ (1991) 26 Harv CR-CL L Rev 413.
50 See 112 Cong Rec S10, 766. There is no question that the sort of bigotry displayed here by 
Helms flows from his use of invidious stereotypes. For a parallel example in the area of bigotry 
towards gay persons via the use of stereotypes, see Franciasco Valdes, ‘Queers, Sissies, Dykes, 
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in 
Euro-American Law and Society’ (1995) 83 Cal L Rev 1, 191–92 (1995).
51 Perlin (n 46) 28, citing and quoting 112 Cong Rec S10, 765–766; S10, 768. See also ibid S10, 
783 (statements of Sen Humphrey): ‘[W]e are not simply talking about the blind, the deaf, or 
persons confined to wheelchairs.’
52 On our ambivalence about the treatment of veterans with mental illness, see Michael L Perlin, 
‘“John Brown Went Off to War”: Considering Veterans’ Courts as Problem-Solving Courts’ 
(2013) 37 Nova L Rev 445.
53 See eg Judith S Neaman, Suggestion of the Devil: The Origins of Madness (Anchor Press/
Doubleday 1975) 31, 144.
54 See eg Christopher Harding and Richard W Ireland, Punishment: Rhetoric, Rule, and Practice 
(Routledge 1989) 153–155.
55 See Michael L Perlin, ‘The Borderline Which Separated You From Me: The Insanity Defense, 
the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment’ (1997) 82 Iowa 
L Rev 1375.
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rights is, for want of a better word, revolting. There is no reason to doubt that 
these statements reflect the positions of many of his constituents.
The debate on the CRPD was more nuanced. But there are issues to consider 
nonetheless. In the floor debate, states repeatedly tried to return to a mere non-
discrimination model, simply repeating rights already recognised in existing 
treaties and hence losing the distinctive quality of the disability-specific text.56 
Subsequently, in analysing a debate over a provision on women and girls with 
disabilities and gender, a commentator has argued that the conflation of women 
and children in this context reflected ‘a stereotypical nod to patriarchal patterns.’57
A careful consideration of legislative debates should be part of any serious 
scholarly agenda that seeks to get at the roots of the way we stigmatise, and why 
we stigmatise persons with mental disabilities.
1.3. ‘HEARTS AND MINDS’
One question underlies these considerations: how can disability rights activists 
and advocates capture ‘the hearts and minds’ of the public ‘so as to best insure 
that statutorily and judicially articulated rights are incorporated – freely and 
willingly – into the day-to-day fabric and psyche of society.’58 The phrase – first 
used in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka59 
– was at the heart of the strategy employed by Dr Martin Luther King ‘to change 
[the] hearts and minds of white Americans.’60
This phrase needs to be read alongside of a famous quotation of Dr King’s: 
‘The law may not be able to make a man love me, but at least it can keep him 
from lynching me.’61 And there is valid and reliable credible evidence that, after 
56 Tara Melish, ‘An Eye Toward Effective Enforcement: A Technical-Comparative Approach to 
the Negotiations’ in Maya Sabatello and Marianne Schulze (eds), Human Rights and Disability 
Advocacy (University of Pennsylvania Press 2014) 70, 92.
57 Mi Yeon Kim, ‘Women with Disabilities: The Convention Through the Prism of Gender’ 
in Maya Sabatello and Marianne Schulze (eds), Human Rights and Disability Advocacy 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2014) 113, 121.
58 Perlin (n 46) 22. See, inter alia, in the context of the insanity defence, Perlin (n 55) 1381; of the 
death penalty, Michael L Perlin, ‘Life Is In Mirrors, Death Disappears: Giving Life to Atkins’ 
(2003) 33 N Mex L Rev 315, 339–340; of the relationship between lawyers and their clients 
with mental disabilities, Michael L Perlin, ‘You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks: Sanism 
in Clinical Teaching’ (2003) 9 Clin L Rev 683, 719 (2003), and of the civil rights movement in 
general, Michael L Perlin, ‘Tangled Up In Law: The Jurisprudence of Bob Dylan’ (2011) 38 Ford 
Urb LJ 1395, 1404.
59 347 US 483, 494 (1954); see also, eg Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 US 409, 445 (1968); In re 
Demos, 500 US 16 (1991) (Marshall, J, dissenting from denial of certiorari).
60 Donald T Phillips, Martin Luther King, Jr. on Leadership: Inspiration & Wisdom for Challenging 
Times (Prince Frederick Recorded Books 1999) 52–67, as cited in Andrew E Taslitz, ‘Foreword: 
The Political Geography of Race Data in the Criminal Justice System’ (2003) 66 Law & 
Contemp Probs 1, 14 n 46.
61 Martin Luther King, Jr, ‘Sermon to St. Paul’s Church Cleveland Heights, Ohio’ (14 May 1963) 
<www.stpauls-church.org/archives/sermons/king05141963.html>, as quoted in Lee J Strang, 
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the enactment of civil rights legislation, when society became more meaningfully 
integrated, racial hate crime incidents diminished.62 Similarly, there is convincing 
evidence that increased contact with persons with mental illness is associated 
with lower stigma.63 We know that, by way of example, ‘[m]embers of the general 
public are more likely to diminish prejudicial attitudes and discriminating 
behaviours when they have contact with people with mental illness.’64
But this is all just theory until we are able to figure out how to combat the 
power of heuristic thinking and false ‘ordinary common sense’ in this enterprise. 
Heuristics refers to ‘cognitive-simplifying device[s] through which a ‘single vivid, 
memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which 
rational choices should be made’;65 ‘ordinary common sense’ to a ‘self-referential 
and non-reflective’ way of thinking that ‘presupposes two self-evident truths: 
1) everyone knows how to assess an individual’s behavior, and 2) everyone knows 
when to blame someone for doing wrong.’66 Sanism is perpetuated and sustained 
by heuristic thinking and reliance on ‘ordinary common sense.’67 We must break 
this cycle of non-reflective thinking to make any serious progress in this area.
As of the writing of this article, the United States has still not ratified the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.68 Perhaps ratification of 
this Convention will be a modest step towards this goal.
‘The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions within Constitutional 
Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical Tradition’ (2005) 
28 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 909, 920 n 28.
62 See eg Donald P Green et al, ‘Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated 
Crime’ (1998) 104 Am J Sociology 372.
63 See eg Monika E Kolodziej and Blair T Johnson, ‘Interpersonal Contact and Acceptance of 
Persons with Psychiatric Disorders: A Research Synthesis’ (1996) 64 J Consulting & Clinical 
Psychol 1387; David L Penn and Shannon M Couture, ‘Strategies for Reducing Stigma toward 
Persons with Mental Illness’ (2002) 1 World Psychiatry 20; Patrick W Corrigan and David 
L Penn, ‘Lessons from Social Psychology on Discrediting Psychiatric Stigma’ (1999) 54 Am 
Psychologist 765.
64 Patrick W Corrigan and Alicia K Matthews, ‘Stigma and Disclosure: Implications for Coming 
Out of the Closet’ (2003) 12 J Mental Health 235, 235.
65 Perlin (n 55) 1417.
66 Michael L Perlin, ‘And I See Through Your Brain: Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, 
and the Impact of Antipsychotic Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial 
Process’ (2009) Stanford Technol LJ 1, 24 n 84.
67 See Michael L Perlin, ‘They Keep It All Hid: The Ghettoization of Mental Disability Law and Its 
Implications for Legal Education’ (2010) 54 St Louis U L J 857, 873–74.
68 See Michelle Diament, ‘Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty’, Disability Scoop 
(18 May 2012) <http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/18/Obama-Urges-Senate-Treaty/ 
15654/>. The Senate failed to ratify the CRPD on 4 December 2012, for lack of a supermajority 
of votes. See US Intl Council on Disabilities <http://usicd.org/index.cfm> accessed 16 
September 2013. The Democratic leadership has promised to bring the Convention up again 
for ratification in 2015. See Michael L Perlin, ‘“Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: The 
International Human Rights Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes’ (2013) 46 Texas 
Tech L Rev 301, 305 n 19.
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1.4. VALUE OF TEST CASES
A handful of American court decisions have come to grips with the impact that 
sanism can have on how society treats persons with mental disabilities. It is critical 
that litigators appearing before regional human rights courts and commissions 
emulate what the litigators in these cases have done, and force judiciaries around 
the world to confront the impact of stigma and stereotyping on persons with 
mental disabilities.
The First Circuit, by way of example, has noted that ‘the belief that the mentally 
ill are disproportionately dangerous is precisely the type of discriminatory myth 
that the Rehabilitation Act and ADA were intended to confront.’69 The New 
Mexico Supreme Court has acknowledged that ‘[e]ven within the disability 
community, persons with mental illness are often the poor stepchild, and remain 
the last hidden minority.’70
Perhaps the most profoundly significant of these is the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Montana in In re K.G.F.,71 ‘without doubt, the most comprehensive 
decision on the scope and meaning of the right to counsel in this context from 
any jurisdiction in the world.’72 K.G.F. was a voluntary patient at a community 
hospital in Montana whose expressed desire to leave the facility prompted 
a State petition alleging her need for commitment. Counsel was appointed, 
and a commitment hearing was scheduled for the next day. The State’s expert 
recommended commitment; patient’s counsel presented the testimony of the 
plaintiff herself and a mental health professional who recommended that the 
patient be kept in the hospital a few days so that a community-based treatment 
plan could be arranged nearer to her home. The court ordered commitment. 
K.G.F.’s appeal was premised, in part, on allegations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.73
In a thoughtful and scholarly opinion, the Montana Supreme Court relied 
on state statutory and constitutional sources to find that ‘the right to counsel … 
provides an individual subject to an involuntary commitment proceeding the 
right to effective assistance of counsel. In turn, this right affords the individual 
with the right to raise the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in 
69 Quiles-Quiles v Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2006), quoting Perlin (n 46) 27.
70 Breen v Carlsbad Mun Schools, 120 P.3d 413, 421 (NM 2005), quoting Perlin (n 46) 20. See 
also, In re Eden F., 741 A.2d 873, 900 (Conn 1999), quoting Perlin (n 46) 26: ‘Surveys show that 
mental disabilities are the most negatively perceived of all disabilities’.
71 29 P.3d 485 (Mont 2001).
72 Michael L Perlin, ‘I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial: A Global 
Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, and Its Implications for 
Clinical Legal Education’ (2008) 28 Wash U J L & Socl Poly 241, 245. See generally, Michael 
L Perlin, ‘“There Must Be Some Way Out of Here”: Why the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities Is Potentially the Best Weapon in the Fight Against Sanism’ (2013) 20 
Psychiatry, PsychoL & L 462.
73 K.G.F., 29 P. 3d 488.
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challenging a commitment order.’74 The court concluded that ‘reasonable 
professional assistance’75 – the standard for assessing effective of counsel in 
criminal cases in the United States – ‘cannot be presumed in a proceeding that 
routinely accepts – and even requires – an unreasonably low standard of legal 
assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation.’76
In assessing the contours of effective assistance of counsel, the court 
emphasised that it was not limiting its inquiry to courtroom performance; even 
more important was counsel’s ‘failure to fully investigate and comprehend a 
patient’s circumstances prior to an involuntary civil commitment hearing or 
trial, which may, in turn, lead to critical decision-making between counsel and 
client as to how best to proceed.’ Such pre-hearing matters, the court continued, 
‘clearly involve effective preparation prior to a hearing or trial.’ The court further 
emphasised the role of state laws guaranteeing the patient’s ‘dignity and personal 
integrity’ and ‘privacy and dignity’ in its decision: ‘“[q]uality counsel provides 
the most likely way – perhaps the only likely way” to ensure the due process 
protection of dignity and privacy interests in cases such as the one at bar.’77
After similarly elaborating on counsel’s role in the client interview and the 
need to ensure that the patient understands the scope of the right to remain silent, 
the court concluded by underscoring counsel’s responsibilities ‘as an advocate 
and adversary’.78 The lawyer must ‘represent the perspective of the [patient] and … 
serve as a vigorous advocate for the [patient’s] wishes’, engaging in ‘all aspects of 
advocacy and vigorously argu[ing] to the best of his or her ability for the ends 
desired by the client’, and operating on the ‘presumption that a client wishes 
to not be involuntarily committed’. Thus, ‘evidence that counsel independently 
advocated or otherwise acquiesced to an involuntary commitment – in the absence 
of any evidence of a voluntary and knowing consent by the patient-respondent – 
will establish the presumption that counsel was ineffective.’79 In conclusion, the 
court stated:
[I]t is not only counsel for the patient-respondent, but also courts, that are charged 
with the duty of safeguarding the due process rights of individuals involved at 
every stage of the proceedings, and must therefore rigorously adhere to the 
standards expressed herein, as well as those mandated under [state statute].80
74 Ibid 491.
75 Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 689 (1984) (establishing weak effectiveness of counsel 
standard). See generally 4 Michael L Perlin, Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal (2nd edn, 
LexisNexis 2002), § 2B-11.2, 261–267, critiquing Strickland.
76 K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 492 (citing Michael L Perlin, ‘Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation 
of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases’ (1992) 16 Law & Hum Behav 39, 53–54 
(‘identifying the Strickland standard as “sterile and perfunctory” where “reasonably effective 
assistance” is objectively measured by the “prevailing professional norms”’).
77 K.G.F., 29 P. 3d 492–494, quoting Mont Code Ann § 53-21-101(1), Mont Code Ann § 53-21-
142(1)), and Perlin (n 76) 47; see generally, Perlin, Funeral (n 72).
78 K.G.F., 29 P. 3d 500.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid 501.
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And there are more cases that reflect similar values. ‘Certainly, not all judges 
write in a sanist voice’:81
Some decisions express true empathy and understanding about the plight of 
the institutionalised mentally disabled. A handful of judges have spent their 
careers rooting out sanist myths and stereotypes, and raising the legal system’s 
consciousness about sanism’s impact on all of society. Other judges, in less known 
cases, have also shown real sensitivity to the underlying issues. These examples, 
however, clearly constitute the minority of cases. Sanism regularly and relentlessly 
infects the courts in the same ways that it infects public discourse.82
There are some cases brought in other parts of the world with similar focuses.83 
I shall elaborate on a case within a supranational human rights protection 
system. Victor Rosario Congo v Ecuador, a case examined by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, involved a 48-year-old Ecuadorian who, as a 
result of the State’s gross negligence and wilful acts, died of malnutrition, hydro-
electrolytic imbalance, and heart and lung failure. Specifically, a guard beat 
Mr Congo with a club on the scalp, deprived him of medical treatment, kept him 
naked, and forced him to endure complete isolation.84 
The Inter-American Commission85 found that the State was responsible 
for its agents’ conduct that violated Mr Congo’s right to humane treatment 
under Article  5 of the American Convention on Human Rights (American 
Convention).86 The Inter-American Commission determined that Article 5 of 
the American Convention must be interpreted in light of the Principles for the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental 
Health Care (MI  Principles).87 This is particularly important because it made 
81 See Michael L Perlin, ‘Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency’ (1993) 47 
U Miami L Rev 625, 682–83, and see cases discussed ibid 682–683.
82 Ibid 683–684. See also, Michael L Perlin, ‘“Abandoned Love”: The Impact of Wyatt v Stickney 
On The Intersection Between International Human Rights And Domestic Mental Disability 
Law’ (2011) 35 L & Psychol Rev 121 (discussing Judge Frank Johnson’s decisions in Wyatt v 
Stickney, 344 F Supp 373 (MD Ala 1972), affd in part, revd in part, 344 F Supp 387 (MD Ala 
1972), affd in part, revd in part sub nom Wyatt v Aderholt, 503 F2d 1305 (5th Cir 1974) (omnibus 
right to treatment case).
83 See Michael L Perlin and Meredith R Shriver, ‘“You That Hide Behind Walls”: The Relationship 
between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention 
Against Torture and the Treatment of Institutionalized Forensic Patients’ in American 
University Center on Humanitarian Law (ed), Torture and Ill-Treatment in Health-Care 
Settings: A Compilation (2013) 195.
84 Victor Rosario Congo v Ecuador, Case 11.427, IACmHR, Rep No 63/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc 
7 Rev § 9 (1999) (Matter of Congo).
85 On the differences between the Court and the Commission, see Terrence Rogers, ‘Using 
International Human Rights Law to Combat Racial Discrimination in the US Criminal Justice 
System’ (2011)14 Scholar 375.
86 <www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html> accessed 8 November 2013.
87 Matter of Congo (n 74) para 54. The Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness 
and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care, widely referred to as the ‘MI Principles.’ 
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the MI Principles hard law, or in other words, binding upon the UN member 
states that have signed it,88 nearly a decade before the CRPD was ratified. Thus, it 
guaranteed more extensive rights for persons with mental disabilities.
The Inter-American Commission found that the solitary confinement 
of Mr  Congo constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of 
Article 5(2) of the American Convention, especially in light of the fact he was left 
in isolation unable to satisfy his basic needs.89 Thus, the State violated Mr Congo’s 
right to ‘be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’.90 
Further, the Inter-American Commission found that there is a duty upon the 
State to ensure the physical, mental and moral integrity of persons suffering from 
mental illness.91
The Inter-American Commission also found that the State violated Article 4(1) 
of the American Convention because the State failed to take measures in its power 
to ensure the right to life of a person who ‘partly because of his state of health 
and in part owing to injuries inflicted on him by a State agent, was defenseless, 
isolated and under its control’.92 Under Article 25(1) of the American Convention, 
Mr Congo had a right to judicial protection, a right which the State violated 
because there were no judicial avenues available to establish the responsibility 
for his sustained injuries and death.93 As a result of this case, the Inter-American 
Commission recommended that the persons responsible for the violations be 
punished, the family of Mr Congo be compensated, medical and psychiatric care 
be provided for persons suffering from mental illness, and individuals confined 
GA Res 119, UN GAOR, 46th Sess, Supp No 49, Annex 189, UN Doc A/46/49 (1991). The MI 
Principles are the predecessor to the CRPD. Their publication ‘inspired lawyers, advocates, 
professors and progressive mental health professionals to begin thinking seriously about the 
intersection between international human rights law and mental disability law.’ See Perlin, ‘The 
Fight Against Sanism’ (n 72) 463. But see Tina Minkowitz, ‘The United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to be Free from Nonconsensual 
Psychiatric Interventions’ (2007) 34 Syracuse J Intl L & Com 405, 407 (criticising MI Principles 
for not being sufficiently protective of the rights of persons with psychosocial disabilities, 
especially in the context of the right to refuse treatment); TW Harding, ‘Human Rights Law 
in the Field of Mental Health: A Critical Review’ (2000) 101 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 
24, 24 (discussing how the MI Principles are ‘basically flawed’ and specifically referring to the 
right to refuse treatment). The MI Principles retain significance today in those nations that 
have neither signed nor ratified the CRPD. See Perlin (n 4) 9–10 (n 13). On how the discrediting 
of the MI Principles made them ‘virtually invisible throughout the disability convention 
process,’ see Janet E. Lord, ‘Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Voice Accountability and NGOs in 
Human Rights Standard Setting’ (2004) 5 Seton Hall J Dipl & Intl ReL 93, 101.
88 On how soft law becomes hard law via court decisions, see Gerald L Neuman, ‘Import, Export, 
and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 Eur J Intl 
L 101, 111; see generally, Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard Versus Soft Law in 
International Security’ (2011) 52 BC L Rev 1147, 1165.
89 Matter of Congo (n 74) 59.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid 62.
92 Ibid 69.
93 Ibid 86. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights 
(22 November 1969), 1144 UNTS 123 art 25(1).
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to the penitentiary system be assigned specialists to identify any psychiatric 
disorders.94
There have been cases as well from the African Commission on Human 
Rights95 and the European Court on Human Rights,96 as well as from domestic 
courts in other nations. But, by and large, litigators around the world have not 
been vigorous in seeking to attack patterns and practices of sanism. For stigma 
and stereotypes to abate, this must be done.
1.5. R ELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SORTS OF STIGMA 
AND STER EOTYPES
Sanism has never been taken as seriously as racism, sexism or homophobia, other 
than by (1) persons with disabilities, (2) (in some cases) their families, and (3) their 
advocates. However, a close reading of major US Supreme Court cases involving 
persons who have been the targets of sanist attitudes offers much to consider.
In her opinion for the Court in Olmstead v L.C.,97 holding that ‘[u]njustified 
isolation … is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability’,98 and 
ordering that states be required to maintain ‘a comprehensive, effectively working 
plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive 
settings’99 – thus explicitly endorsing the ADA’s ‘integration mandate’100 – Justice 
Ruth Ginsburg made these important points:
94 Ibid 98. On how Congo ‘[broke] new ground’ in this area of the law, see Perlin (n 4) 12.
95 See eg Michael L Perlin, ‘Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a 
Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2012) 44 Geo Wash Intl L Rev 1, 7–8, discussing how, in Purohit & Moore v The 
Gambia, Afr Commn on Hum and Peoples’ Rts, Comm No 241/2001, P 85 (2003), the African 
Commission found unlawful both the way that persons with mental disabilities were treated 
in Gambia as well as prevailing sections of the Lunatic Detention Act of Gambia. Of note, 
the Commission found that Gambian domestic law violated the African Charter on Human 
Rights by classifying persons with mental disabilities as ‘lunatics’ and ‘idiots.’ ibid P 43. But see 
Mashood A Baderin, ‘Recent Developments in the African Regional Human Rights System’ 
(2005) 5 Hum Rts L Rev 117, 122 (alleging that State Parties did not implement the African 
Commission’s recommendations), discussed in this context in Perlin (n 95).
96 See eg Michael L Perlin, ‘“Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship 
Law’ (2013) 117 Penn St L Rev 1159, 1169–1120, discussing how, in Stanev v Bulgaria, 
App No 36760/06, ECtHR (2012) <http://bit.ly/Typ5zW> accessed 8 November 2013, the 
European Court of Human Rights found that Bulgaria violated Articles 3, 5, 6, and 13 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in denying an individual with schizophrenia under 
guardianship the right to both challenge his confinement to a decrepit and unclean social care 
home and seek restoration of his legal capacity. For other European cases, see Michael L Perlin 
et al, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental Disability Law: Cases and 
Materials (Carolina Academic Press 2006) 455–782.
97 527 US 581 (1999).
98 Ibid 597.
99 Ibid 605–06.
100 28 C.F.R. pt 35 app A (1998).
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First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from 
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so 
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life, cf. Allen 
v. Wright (‘There can be no doubt that [stigmatising injury often caused by 
racial discrimination] is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory 
government action’), and Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, (‘In 
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women resulting from sex stereotypes’). Second, confinement in an institution 
severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family 
relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational 
advancement, and cultural enrichment. Dissimilar treatment correspondingly 
exists in this key respect: in order to receive needed medical services, persons with 
mental disabilities must, because of those disabilities, relinquish participation 
in community life they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while 
persons without mental disabilities can receive the medical services they need 
without similar sacrifice.101
This portion of the opinion – in some ways the most critical part of Olmstead – 
makes two novel, interlocking points never made before by the Supreme Court. 
First, the Court acknowledged that the effect of discrimination against persons 
with mental disability is like the effect of discrimination against other persons 
traditionally marginalised – blacks and women (as signified by the Court in the 
cases it cited (Allen and Manhart) supporting the Olmstead language).102 Second, 
the decision recognises that the pernicious impact of discrimination cannot 
separate institutional isolation from other discriminatory behaviour, integrating 
the issue of isolation with issues of ‘family relations, social contacts, work options, 
economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.’103 
This suggests that the Olmstead Court ‘got’ one of the most important structures of 
the ADA: that questions of institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation are far 
broader than simply inquiries into whether a patient is ‘behind the wall’ (not for 
a moment to minimise the seriousness of that inquiry), and that these questions 
touch on virtually every important aspect of interpersonal interaction.104 There is 
no question that these insights cut at the core assumptions of sanism.
More than a decade before Olmstead, in his separate opinion in City of 
Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr.,105 striking down as unconstitutional a Texas 
municipal ordinance banning group homes for persons with mental disabilities, 
101 Olmstead, 527 US at 600–601 (citations omitted). On the significance of this portion of the 
Olmstead opinion, see Michael L Perlin, ‘Their Promises of Paradise: Will Olmstead v LC 
Resuscitate The Constitutional Least Restrictive Alternative Principle in Mental Disability 
Law?’ (2000) 37 Houston L Rev 999, 1035–37.
102 Perlin (n 47) 253.
103 Olmstead, 527 US 601.
104 Perlin (n 47) 254–255.
105 473 US 432 (1985).
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Justice Marshall stressed that individuals with mental disabilities have been 
subject to ‘[a] regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation … that in 
its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim 
Crow.’106 This remarkably strong opinion, again, acknowledges the pernicious 
power of sanism, and shows that at least one justice of the Supreme Court from 
nearly three decades ago understood the underlying issues.
While Justice Ginsburg’s comment about how institutional segregation 
‘perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable 
or unworthy of participating in community life’107 has been cited frequently by 
courts and academics,108 remarkably, Justice Marshall’s observation has only been 
cited once subsequently in a reported decision – by Justice Marshall himself in an 
opinion dissenting from a denial of certiorari in a death penalty case involving a 
prisoner with a significant mental disability.109 It has been referred to a handful 
of times in the academic literature,110 but it certainly has not been incorporated 
into the ‘scholarly unconscious’ of those who write about this topic. Litigators 
and scholars must embrace these persuasive and vivid arguments and use them 
regularly in their representation of and advocacy on behalf of this population.
1.6. IMPACT OF THE CRPD111
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD)112 is ‘regarded as having finally empowered the “world’s largest minority” 
to claim their rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on 
an equal basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition and 
106 Ibid 462.
107 Olmstead, 527 US at 600.
108 See eg Lane v Kitzhaber, 841 F Supp 2d 1199, 1205 (D Or 2012); Haddad v Dudek, 784 FSupp2d 
1308, 1321–1322 (MDFla. 2011); Benjamin v Department of Public Welfare of Penn 768 FSupp2d 
747, 752 (MD Pa 2011); Samuel Bagenstos, ‘The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization 
Litigation’ (2012) 34 Cardozo L Rev 1, 32; Kevin M Cremin, ‘Challenges to Institutionalization: 
The Definition of ‘Institution’ and the Future of Olmstead Litigation’ (2012) 17 L143, 155; 
Leslie Salzman, ‘Guardianship for Persons With Mental Illness – A Legal and Appropriate 
Alternative?’ (2012) 4 St Louis U J Health L & Poly 279, 283 n 19.
109 See Smith v Francis, 474 US 925, 927 n 1 (1985) (Marshall, J, dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). See also ibid 927: ‘I believe, however, that the courts bear a special responsibility 
when faced with the possible execution of a member of a group that has been subject for so long 
to irrational social stigma.’
110 See eg Leslie Salzman, ‘Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as 
a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act’ 
(2010) 81 U Colo L Rev 157, 164 n 19; Michael E Waterstone and Michael Ashley Stein, 
‘Disabling Prejudice’ (2008) 102 Nw U L Rev 1351, 1359 n 59; Edward Haas, ‘Associate Justice 
Thurgood Marshall: An Indispensable Voice in the Struggle for the Civil Rights of People with 
Disabilities’ (2002) 12 Seton Hall Const LJ 371, 431.
111 This section is generally adapted from Perlin and Schriver (n 83).
112 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, GA Res 61/106, UN Doc A/RES/61/106 
(24 January 2007) (CRPD); see generally Perlin (n 4) 143–59.
Intersentia 113
‘My Sense of Humanity Has Gone Down the Drain’
protection.’113 This Convention is the most revolutionary international human 
rights document ever created that applies to persons with disabilities.114 It furthers 
the human rights approach to disability and recognises the right of people with 
disabilities to equality in most every aspect of life.115 It firmly endorses a social 
model of disability and reconceptualises mental health rights as disability rights 
– a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-
and-parcel of mental disability law.116 ‘The Convention sketches the full range of 
human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular application 
to the lives of persons with disabilities.’117 It provides a framework for insuring 
that mental health laws ‘fully recognize the rights of those with mental illness’.118 
There is no question that it has ‘ushered in a new era of disability rights policy’.119
It describes disability as a condition arising from ‘interaction with various 
barriers [that] may hinder their full and effective participation in society on 
an equal basis with others’ instead of inherent limitations,120 and extends 
existing human rights to take into account the specific rights experiences of 
persons with disabilities.121 It calls for ‘respect for inherent dignity’122 and 
‘non-discrimination’.123 Subsequent articles declare freedom from ‘arbitrary or 
unlawful interference’ with privacy,124 ‘freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment’.125 ‘freedom from exploitation, violence 
and abuse’,126 and a right to protection of the ‘integrity of the person’.127
113 Rosemary Kayess and Phillip French, ‘Out of darkness into light? Introducing the convention 
on the rights of persons with disabilities’ (2008) 8 HRLRev 1, 4 n 17.
114 See generally, Michael L Perlin and Eva Szeli, ‘Mental Health Law and Human Rights: 
Evolution and Contemporary Challenges’ in Michael Dudley et al (eds), Mental Health and 
Human Rights: Vision, Praxis, and Courage (OUP 2012) 98; Perlin (n 4) 3–21; Perlin (n 5).
115 See eg Aaron Dhir, ‘Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of Mental Disability: The 
Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of 
Persons with Disabilities’ (2005) 41 Stan J Intl L 181.
116 Phillip Fennel, ‘Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder’ (2008) 27 Med & L 95. See 
generally, Perlin (n 95).
117 Janet E Lord and Michael A Stein, ‘Social Rights and the Relational Value of the Rights to 
Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play’ (2009) 27 BU Intl L J 249, 256; see also, Ronald 
McCallum, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some 
Reflections’ <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563883> accessed 8 November 2013.
118 Bernadette McSherry, ‘International Trends in Mental Health Laws: Introduction’ (2008) 26 
Law In Context 1, 8.
119 Paul Harpur, ‘Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities to Drive Change’ (2011) 45 Val U L Rev 1271, 1295.
120 CRPD (n 102) Art 1 and PmbL para E.
121 Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or 
Disability Rights?’ (2008) 30 HRQ 514–515; see Perlin (n 4) 143–158.
122 CRPD (n 102) Art 3(A).
123 Ibid Art 3(B).
124 Ibid Art 14(1).
125 Ibid Art 15.
126 Ibid Art 16.
127 Ibid Art 17.
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The CRPD is unique because it is the first legally binding instrument devoted 
to the comprehensive protection of the rights of persons with disabilities.128 It not 
only clarifies that states should not discriminate against persons with disabilities, 
but also sets out explicitly the many steps that states must take to create an 
enabling environment so that persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic 
equality in society.129
These Articles provide us with the clearest anti-sanism blueprint ever drafted. 
If taken seriously, the CRPD can potentially be the best weapon – ever – in the 
fight against sanist stereotypes that stigmatise persons with mental disabilities.
2. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE130
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past two decades 
has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence.131 
Initially employed in cases involving individuals with mental disabilities, but 
subsequently expanded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic jurisprudence 
presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation, 
recognising that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that can have therapeutic or 
anti-therapeutic consequences.132 The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence 
is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should 
128 See generally, Perlin (n 95).
129 On the changes that ratifying states need to make in their domestic involuntary civil 
commitment laws to comply with Convention mandates, see Bryan Y Lee, ‘The UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact upon Involuntary Civil Commitment 
of Individuals with Developmental Disabilities’ (2011) 44 Colum J L & Socl Probs 393. See 
also, István Hoffman and György Könczei, ‘Legal Regulations Relating to the Passive and 
Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in Light 
of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Impending Reform of 
the Hungarian Civil Code’ (2010) 33 Loy LA Intl & Comp. L Rev 143 (on the application of 
the CRPD to capacity issues); Kathryn D DeMarco, ‘Disabled by Solitude: The Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact on The Use of Supermax Solitary 
Confinement’ (2012) 66 U Miami L Rev 523 (on the application of the CRPD to solitary 
confinement in correctional institutions).
130 This section is largely adapted from Perlin and Schriver (n 83), and from Michael L Perlin and 
Alison J Lynch, ‘“Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of Despair”: Risk, Security, Danger, 
the Constitution, and the Clinician’s Dilemma’ (2015) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2363494>.
131 See eg David B Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent (Carolina 
Academic Press 1990); David B Wexler and Bruce J Winick, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Recent 
Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press 1996); Bruce J Winick, 
Civil Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model (Carolina Academic Press 2005); David 
B Wexler, ‘Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (2008) 24 Touro L Rev 17. Wexler first 
used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health in 1987. See 
David B Wexler, ‘Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ 
(1992) 16 L & Hum Behav 27, 27, 32–33.
132 See Michael L Perlin, ‘“His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors 
Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?’ (2009) 42 Akron L Rev 885, 
912; see Kate Diesfeld and Ian Freckelton, ‘Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ 
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be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due 
process principles.133 There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David 
Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: ‘the law’s use of ‘mental health 
information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice 
concerns.’134 Put another way, ‘[a]n inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not 
mean that therapeutic concerns “trump” civil rights and civil liberties.’135
Therapeutic jurisprudence ‘asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people’s 
lives’136 and focuses on the law’s influence on emotional life and psychological 
well-being.137 It suggests that ‘law should value psychological health, should strive 
to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when 
consistent with other values served by law should attempt to bring about healing 
and wellness’.138 Therapeutic jurisprudence understands that, ‘when attorneys fail 
to acknowledge their clients’ negative emotional reactions to the judicial process, 
the clients are inclined to regard the lawyer as indifferent and a part of a criminal 
system bent on punishment.’139 By way of example, therapeutic jurisprudence 
‘aims to offer social science evidence that limits the use of the incompetency 
label by narrowly defining its use and minimizing its psychological and social 
disadvantage.’140
in Ian Freckelton and Kate Peterson (eds), Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law 91 (Federation 
Press 2006) (for a transnational perspective).
133 Perlin, ‘Lepers’ (n 58); Michael L Perlin, ‘And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What 
It Is I’ve Got: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases’ (2005) 
42 San Diego L Rev 735. On how TJ ‘might be a redemptive tool in efforts to combat sanism, as 
a means of ‘strip[ping] bare the law’s sanist façade’, see Michael L Perlin, ‘“Baby, Look Inside 
Your Mirror”’: The Legal Profession’s Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental 
Disabilities’ (2008) 69 U Pitt L Rev 589, 591. See also Bernard P Perlmutter, ‘George’s Story: 
Voice and Transformation through the Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
in a Law School Child Advocacy Clinic’ (2005) 17 St Thomas L Rev 561, 599 n 111 (same); 
Ian Freckelton, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and 
Risks of Influence’ (2008) 30 T Jefferson L Rev 575, 585–586 (same).
134 David B Wexler, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship’ 
(1993) 11 Behav Sci & L 17, 21. See also eg David Wexler, ‘Applying the Law Therapeutically’ 
(1996) 5 Appl & Prevent Psychol 179.
135 Perlin (n 35) 412; Michael L Perlin, ‘Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline: Mental 
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them’ (1998) 31 Loy LA L Rev 775, 782.
136 Bruce J Winick, ‘Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With Victims 
of Crime’ (2009) 33 Nova L Rev 535, 535.
137 David B Wexler, ‘Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and 
Strategies, in Daniel P Stolle, David B Wexler and Bruce J Winick (eds), Practicing Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping Profession (Carolina Academic Press 2000) 45.
138 Bruce Winick, ‘A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment’ in Kate Diesfeld 
and Ian Freckelton (eds), Involuntary Detention and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: International 
Perspective on Civil Commitment (Ashgate 2003) 23, 26.
139 Evelyn H Cruz, ‘Competent Voices: Noncitizen Defendants and the Right to Know the 
Immigration Consequences of Plea Agreements’ (2010) 13 Harv Latino L Rev 47, 59.
140 Claire B Steinberger, ‘Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Make A Difference?’ (2003) 27 Law & Psychol Rev 55, 65. The most thoughtful 
sympathetic critique of TJ remains Christopher Slobogin, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five 
Dilemmas to Ponder’ (1995) 1 Psychol Pub Poly & L 193.
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In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote 
well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been described as ‘a sea-change 
in ethical thinking about the role of law’.141 That is, therapeutic jurisprudence 
supports an ethic of care.142
One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is a commitment 
to dignity.143 Professor Amy Ronner describes the ‘three Vs’: voice, validation and 
voluntariness,144 arguing:
What ‘the three Vs’ commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or 
a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal 
has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant 
feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with 
a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice 
and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant 
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of 
litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end 
result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate 
healing and bring about improved behaviour in the future. In general, human 
beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, 
their own decisions.145 
The question to be addressed here is this: given the pervasiveness of stigma and 
sanism, is it remotely possible that Prof. Ronner’s vision – of voice, voluntariness 
and validation – will be fulfilled?146 Therapeutic jurisprudence – by forcing us 
to focus on the therapeutic and anti-therapeutic outcomes of court decisions, 
statutes, rules and roles – illuminates the way that pretextuality and sanism drive 
the mental disability law system.147 Just as, in domestic law in the United States, 
the application of the ADA to key areas of patients’ civil rights law can ‘combat 
141 Warren Brookbanks, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework’ (2001) 
8 JL & Med 328, 329–330.
142 See eg Bruce J Winick and David B Wexler, ‘The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law 
School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic’ (2006) 13 Clinical L Rev 
605, 605–07. The use of the phrase dates to Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard 
University Press 1982).
143 See Bruce J Winick, Civil Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model (Carolina 
Academic Press 2005) 161.
144 Amy D Ronner, ‘The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome’ (2008) 24 Touro L Rev 601, 627. On the 
importance of ‘voice,’ see also Freckelton (n 133) 588.
145 Amy D Ronner, ‘Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles’ (2002) 71 U Cin L Rev 89, 94–95; See generally, Amy D 
Ronner, Law, Literature and Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press 2010).
146 On the relationship between therapeutic jurisprudence and the scope of international human 
rights law, see Michael L Perlin, ‘“The Ladder of the Law Has No Top and No Bottom’: How 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Can Give Life to International Human Rights’ (2014) 37 Intl J L & 
Psychiatry 535.
147 Michael L Perlin, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases 
of Mental Disability Law’ (1994) 20 N Eng J Crim & Civ Confinement 369, 374.
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sanism, … and provide a building block of therapeutic jurisprudence,’148 so can 
– and should – the CRPD have the same impact on international human rights 
law.149
3. CONCLUSION
These seven points are, of course, not exhaustive. But they provide a basic blueprint 
for efforts to combat the pernicious stereotypes that diminish the quality of life 
of persons with mental disabilities, both in institutions and in the community. 
A  careful consideration of therapeutic jurisprudence values will make it more 
likely that important progress be made in this area so that Professor Ronner’s 
values of ‘voice, validation and voluntariness’ can be fulfilled.
Return to the title of this chapter and its focus on ‘humanity’. Not Dark Yet 
is a fairly pessimistic song, but as noted earlier, not one without hope. And Dylan 
has shown us, in the eighteen-plus years since Time out of Mind (the album on 
which Not Dark Yet was released), that be still searches for, and finds, ‘the light’.150 
This should be an inspiration to all of us.
148 Michael L Perlin, ‘“Make Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric 
Hospitalization’ (1997) 46 De Paul L Rev 947, 956–57. Importantly, the ADA was amended in 
2008 precisely to ‘legislatively overrule’ specific US Supreme Court decisions – see eg Sutton v 
United Air Lines, 527 US 471 (1999); Toyota Motor Mfg. v Williams, 534 US 184 (2002) – that had 
limited the definition of and significance of ‘disability’ under the ADA, see ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, (2008) Pub L No 110–325, and making it clear that, in the employment sector, 
the ADA was designed to protect: people with disabilities who can do the job with reasonable 
accommodations, but who don’t get hired because of unfounded stereotypes,’ Elizabeth 
Pendo, ‘Substantially Limited Justice?: The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawlsian Analysis 
of Disability-Based Discrimination’ (2003) 77 St. John’s L Rev 225, 263, quoting Professor Scott 
C Burris. See generally, Michael L Perlin and Heather Ellis Cucolo, Mental Disability Law: 
Civil and Criminal (LexisNexis 2013 Cum Sup) sections 5A-2.4, at 100–101.
149 See eg Perlin (n 4) 203–228. See also Perlin (n 95) 36 n 221.
150 See Atwood (n 8).
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This contribution maps the difficulties of recognising racial stereotypes as 
a human rights issue. Starting from the most serious human rights violations 
occurring in in conjunction with some form of physical violence, moving on to 
human rights violations in the absence of such violence, and finishing with the 
analysis of the practice of two specialised international human rights institutions 
fight against racism (CERD and ECRI), the argument is that so far insufficient 
explicit attention is paid to racial stereotyping in binding international law. 
A comparison with the different recognition of gender stereotypes under human 
rights law strengthens this argument and shows, at the same time, how fighting 
against racial stereotypes could and should become a broader human rights law 
issue.
This contribution argues that racial stereotypes and/or stereotyping 
are insufficiently taken into account under binding human rights law and 
international criminal law. The role played by such stereotypes in contributing 
to ongoing structural racial discrimination is either ignored or only implicitly/
indirectly addressed, and only very rarely explicitly recognised as a human 
rights violation. Instead, in non-binding recommendations their role is better 
highlighted but the limited impact of such recommendations – as welcome as 
they may be – warrants that more needs to be done.
Before entering into the substance of this article, it is important to explain 
some key terms and distinctions, mainly that between (racial) prejudices and 
(racial) stereotypes. So far, lawyers have not been heavily involved in untangling 
the differences between these terms and it is certainly not my aim to do so here. 
But the distinctions that have been elaborated mainly in the literature of social 
* Mathias Möschel is Associate Professor at the Central European University (Budapest). He 
can be reached at moschelm@ceu.edu. Earlier drafts of this contribution have been presented 
at the conferences ‘Stereotyping as a Human Rights Issue’ at Ghent University in December 
2013 and ‘Global Challenges and New Perspectives on Equality Law’ at Université Libre de 
Bruxelles in May 2014. The author has profited from the discussions and comments during 
these conferences and wishes to thank Alexandra Timmer and the anonymous reviewers for 
their comments on the drafts. Any errors and omissions are the author’s alone.
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psychology, show why speaking in terms of stereotypes is conceptually and 
also qualitatively somewhat different. While there is no unitary definition of 
stereotypes and/or prejudice, some social psychologists have defined the former 
as ‘beliefs about another group in such terms as personality traits, attributions, 
or behavioural descriptions’ and the latter as ‘negative attitudes toward another 
group that express negative affective or emotional reactions’.1 Others have added 
that prejudices serve to ‘create and maintain hierarchical status relations between 
groups’ and that stereotypes ‘shape how people think about and respond to the 
group’.2
According to these definitions, stereotypes are broader than prejudices. 
First, they can include both negative and positive (emotional) reactions. For 
instance, the fact that certain racial minorities are more industrious than others, 
that certain racial minorities are rich, or that certain groups of people (such as 
Filipinos) are more caring than others towards children or the elderly would not 
be necessarily considered a racial prejudice. But these certainly can be interpreted 
as racial stereotypes. Second, they are not limited to intentional negative attitudes 
but often extend also to unconscious understandings and orderings of our 
world. Third, there is a clearer normative dimension linked to stereotypes in the 
sense that they not only extend to certain characteristics but also to the roles 
that are or should be performed by certain groups, ie women should behave in 
a certain way; immigrants do not integrate/should integrate; Roma people are 
lazy and criminal and should rely less on social welfare, etc. Indeed, once the 
lens of (racial) stereotypes is applied, one can understand how these conscious or 
unconscious beliefs about groups can also imprison them in certain roles, destine 
them automatically towards certain professions and even serve as an argument for 
genocide, as was the case for Jews. For these reasons, speaking and researching in 
terms of stereotypes rather than of racial prejudice has the advantage of allowing 
a broader framework of analysis and critique of both domestic and international 
law.3 It allows going beyond the limited framework of intentional, negative 
behaviours that underpin racial prejudice towards the (often) unintentional 
beliefs, assignment of certain roles and hierarchical orderings that structure our 
societies along different lines, amongst which also racial and ethnic ones.
1 Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘Delegitimization: The Extreme Case of Stereotyping and Prejudice’ in Daniel 
Bar-Tal et al (eds), Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing perceptions (Springer 1989) 169 
(referring to other authors). See a very similar definition in Charles Stangor (ed), Stereotypes 
and Prejudice: Essential Readings (Taylor and Francis 2000) 1.
2 John F Dovidio et al, ‘Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical 
Overview’ in John F Dovidio et al (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and 
Discrimination (Sage 2010) 7 and 8.
3 See eg for analyses in terms of gender stereotypes in international law: Rebecca Cook and 
Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2010) and Alexandra Timmer, ‘Toward an Anti-Stereotyping Approach 
for the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 11 HRLR 707.
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This contribution will be subdivided into four sections. Section 1 will analyse 
racial stereotypes when they arise in conjunction with the exercise of violence 
and how limited attention is given to the role they play in the perpetration of 
violent acts against racial minorities. Section 2 will look at how racial stereotypes 
fare when they emerge in the absence of violence or the threat thereof and how in 
this area as well there is limited acknowledgement in binding case law of racial 
stereotyping as being problematic. Section 3 then looks at the practice of two 
human rights institutions, the United Nations’ Committee on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee) and the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). To conclude, section 4 will 
compare and contrast the combat against racial stereotypes with the fight against 
gender stereotypes which has recently made great steps forward in human rights 
law and literature. This comparison helps identifying the differences between 
gender and racial stereotypes in the domain of human rights law and also shows 
how such law may come into play in the future when fighting racial stereotypes.
1. RACIAL STEREOTYPES AND VIOLENCE
The first area to analyse is not necessarily linked to classical human rights 
categorisations (civil/political and socio-economic/cultural rights) but rather 
to the presence or absence of some form of violence. This is in part justified by 
the intuition that possibly in these gravest forms of human rights violations, 
the underlying racial stereotypes which allowed such violence to explode and 
to be exercised would be taken into account. Needless to say, there are different 
levels of violence ranging from the gravest form in terms of (a) genocide and 
state-sponsored extermination policies based on racial prejudice, to (b) racially 
motivated state actions that happen without necessarily requiring an official 
state policy, and finally to (c) private race-based violence. Starting from the 
most brutal and focused form of violence, namely genocide, to the less invasive 
but possibly more widespread and detailed exercise of violence through private 
individuals, we will see that in all these forms of violence racial prejudice and/or 
stereotyping underpin the behaviour of different actors but that racial stereotypes 
have only become limitedly explicitly relevant as a violation of human rights and 
international criminal law.
1.1. IN R ELATION TO STATE-ORGANISED 
VIOLENCE/ GENOCIDE
Genocide researchers agree that racial prejudices and stereotypes constitute one 
of the founding stones permitting extermination measures to be taken against 
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certain groups of people.4 Thus, the long existing stereotypes and prejudices 
against Jewish, Roma and/or Tutsi people, for example, revived and made 
broadly accessible through propaganda, prepared the terrain for their genocide 
to happen.5
What may be somewhat surprising is that there is seemingly no international 
case law on genocide explicitly linking racial stereotypes with the actual crime 
of genocide. One explanation could be that it is implicit that genocide takes 
place when racial stereotypes are acted upon and that by consequence they are 
automatically subsumed in the higher crime of genocide and therefore become 
invisible. Where the link instead becomes visible is in the distinction between 
incitement to commit genocide and ‘mere’ hate speech.
In fact, the Genocide Convention bans speech that constitutes direct incitement 
to commit genocide.6 A proposed Article III which would have also punished 
‘all forms of public propaganda tending by their systematic and hateful character 
to provoke genocide, or tending to make it appear as a necessary, legitimate or 
excusable act’ was not adopted.7 Interestingly the explanatory comments state 
that ‘[s]uch propaganda is even more dangerous than direct incitement to commit 
genocide’ and that ‘[g]enocide cannot take place unless a certain state of mind 
has previously been created’.8 However, the proposed article was eventually not 
retained.9 In a similar vein, more than fifty years later the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court specifies that individual criminal responsibility 
with regard to genocide applies only when someone directly and publicly incites 
others to commit genocide.10 It is exactly this distinction between ‘mere’ hate 
speech and propaganda and/or hate speech that incites to commit genocide 
which became relevant in a couple of cases involving genocide and incitement to 
genocide in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
In the Kordic Trial Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), an indictment against Dario Kordic for hate speech 
as a crime against humanity was rejected by the judges because hate speech in 
itself does not constitute a crime against humanity, because it is not enumerated 
4 Fine describes this as ‘religious traditions of contempt and collective defamation, stereotypes, 
and derogatory metaphor indicating the victim is inferior, sub-human … or super-human 
… and that if certain groups are “pre-defined as alien … subhuman or dehumanized or 
the enemy” they must “be eliminated on order that we may live”’. Helen Fine, Genocide: A 
Sociological Perspective (Sage 1993) 26 (emphasis added).
5 See eg Tonja Salomon, ‘Freedom of Speech v Hate Speech: The Jurisdiction of “Direct and 
Public Incitement to Commit Genocide”’ in Ralph Henman and Paul Behrens (eds), The 
Criminal Law of Genocide (Ashgate 2007), 141.
6 Article 3(c) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
7 Secretariat Draft, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, UN Doc E/447, 26 June 
1947, published in Hirad Abtahi and Philippa Webb, The Genocide Convention. The Travaux 
Préparatoires (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008) vol 1, 239–241.
8 Ibid 239.
9 For more details on the Genocide Convention’s drafting history, see: William A Schabas, ‘Hate 
speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide’ (2000) 46 McGill LJ 141.
10 Article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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as a crime elsewhere in the ICTY’s Statute, and because hate speech has not 
attained the status of customary international law.11 The Appeals Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), instead, reached a different 
conclusion in what became known as the Media case.12 The issue was whether 
some individuals in charge of certain radio stations and newspapers which had 
received government funding and support in Rwanda that had produced and 
diffused hate-filled messages based on stereotyped images of the Tutsi, were guilty 
of direct and public incitement to genocide as opposed to simple hate speech. On 
appeal, the international judges confirmed the Trial Judgment’s conviction for 
this crime, while reversing some other charges.13 Precisely the distinction between 
incitement to genocide and hate speech gave rise to a partly dissenting opinion 
by judge Meron who found the Appeals Chamber had gone too far in extending 
the application of international criminal law to mere hate speech.14 However, the 
important point to highlight here is that the propaganda brimming with negative 
stereotypes broadcast over radio coupled with the ensuing genocide of the Tutsi, 
were linked in this case and considered as sufficiently grave to convict even those 
who were not physically involved in the killings but who provided the ideological 
backdrop for the genocide.15
However, beyond these limited examples relating to hate speech and genocide, 
there is little evidence that the case law on genocide or state-organised violence 
goes into depths of analysis in terms of racial stereotypes.
1.2 . R ACIALLY MOTIVATED/BIASED VIOLENCE 
BY STATE OR PUBLIC ACTORS
This second category differs from the first one, in as much as the racial stereotypes 
do not give rise to an official, coordinated state policy, or toleration thereof, 
attaining the level of genocide but are nevertheless at the basis of some other form 
of violent state action. The way in which racial stereotypes come into play here is 
that they can be interpreted as indicia or as a prima facie case showing that the 
violence was racially motivated and therefore contrary to human rights standards 
and non-discrimination provisions. In fact, racial stereotypes and prejudices often 
11 ICTY, Prosecutor v Kordić & Cerkez, Case No IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 26 February 2001, 
para 209.
12 ICTR, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngezwe v Prosecutor, Case 
No ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, 28 November 2007.
13 Ibid paras 673–892.
14 Judge Meron, partly dissenting opinion, 375–381.
15 For more details on this decision as well as earlier decisions by the ICTR on direct incitement 
to commit genocide, see Tonja Salomon and Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Between Hate Speech and 
Mass Murder: How to Recognize Incitement to Genocide’ in Harmen van der Wilt et al (eds), 
The Genocide Convention. The Legacy of 60 Years (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 41–50.
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underpin racially discriminatory behaviour and are therefore reliable indicia for a 
certain state of mind/conscience.
Especially the case law by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or 
Court) on anti-Romani police violence demonstrates to what extent such actions 
are often based on racist bias and stereotypes without the Court recognising 
or acknowledging them as problematic. I have analysed and critiqued this line 
of cases more in detail elsewhere, especially with regard to the difficulty of the 
ECtHR to recognise Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) violations.16 
For the purposes of this contribution, it is interesting to analyse what counts as 
racially stereotyped expressions and what contexts lead the European judges to 
believe there was indeed discriminatory, racist violence at play to either trigger a 
procedural Article 14 violation because no investigation had been made into the 
potential racist motives behind the violence or a substantive Article 14 violation, 
meaning that the violence itself was triggered by racist stereotypes.
Before entering into the case description and analysis, it should be mentioned 
what the types of stereotypes and prejudice about Roma people consist of. 
Stereotypes and/or prejudices about Roma people include for instance that they 
are seen as having innate propensities to commit crimes, as being beggars and 
thieves, as being disproportionately reliant on welfare, as being uneducated, as 
not wanting to work or to integrate into society, as being nomadic and as being 
musicians/artists.17 Often these stereotypes and prejudices get concentrated in 
and expressed by the derogatory word ‘gypsy’ which, when used by media, elected 
officials, or police forces, demonstrates the understanding that Roma people 
are less worthy, less human, thereby encouraging and justifying violent actions 
against them.
For this reason, the case law in which the reference made to ‘gypsies’ is 
particularly indicative of the (pre-)existence of such stereotypes or prejudices. 
Nevertheless, the way the ECtHR uses such indicia is quite incoherent. In some 
cases the reference made to ‘gypsies’ by the aggressor police forces or by the official 
investigators looking into the affair, or in official statements has been found as 
not being indicative of racially motivated attacks or racially biased ineffective 
investigations, thus allowing the ECtHR to fully dismiss the non-discrimination 
claim.18 In other cases, such references or remarks were found at least to have 
triggered a procedural Article 14 violation, meaning that the State should at 
16 Mathias Möschel, ‘Is the European Court of Human Rights’ case law on anti-Roma violence 
“beyond reasonable doubt?”’ (2012) 12 HRLR 479.
17 For more details, see the report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe entitled ‘Human Rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe’, 
2012, especially 39–61 <www.coe.int/t/commissioner/source/prems/prems79611_GBR_Couv 
HumanRightsOfRoma_WEB.pdf>.
18 See eg Anguelova v Bulgaria (2002) 38 EHRR 659; Balogh v Hungary App no 47940/99 (ECtHR, 
20 July 2004); Osman v Bulgaria 47 EHRR 1067; Vasil Sashov Petrov v Bulgaria App no 
63106/00 (ECtHR, 10 June 2010); and Soare and Others v Romania App no 24329/02 (ECtHR, 
22 February 2011).
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least have investigated into the potential racial motives behind the violence. 
This was the case in Nachova v Bulgaria, one of the key anti-Romani violence 
cases, which involved two Romani army conscripts who were shot by a Bulgarian 
military officer who was overheard by a witness as saying, ‘You damn Gypsies’ 
while standing over the bodies of the dead.19 Similarly, the tendentious remarks 
made by a deputy police director in regard to the applicant’s Roma origin 
during an administrative investigation was held to be sufficient at least to trigger 
the obligation of investigating potential racial motives in the applicant’s ill-
treatment.20 Or again, in a case involving the beating of a Romani man by the 
police the reference to the victim as ‘Gypsy’ by the investigators and as ‘antisocial 
elements prone to violence and theft’ by the military prosecutor in charge of the 
case at the national level, induced the ECtHR to find a procedural violation of 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 (prohibition of torture, or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment).21
However, there is so far only one case in which such racially stereotyped 
remarks were found to lead to a substantive Article 14 violation and which 
like many of the cases described above involved the ill-treatment of a Romani 
individual by the police.22 Interestingly, this is also one of the few cases where the 
ECtHR refers explicitly to stereotypes when it ruled that the remarks in the police 
report that the villagers’ behaviour was ‘purely Gypsy’ and that, at the request of 
the deputy mayor so as to teach the Roma a lesson, the police officers asked the 
victim whether he was ‘Gypsy or Romanian’ before beating him up.23 In this 
case, the Court did find a link between the violence and the racial/racist context 
in which it took place and thus found a full Article 14 violation in conjunction 
with Article 3.
However, there is no clear line of reasoning to be drawn from the case law 
in terms of when the Court finds that certain stereotypes which are acted upon 
by the states’ authorities are relevant or not. In most cases mentioned above, 
the ECtHR did find Article 2 (right to life) or Article 3 violations. But the key 
point, namely that these violations most probably occurred precisely because 
of underlying racial stereotypes and prejudice against Roma individuals, was 
rejected or not explicitly acknowledged in most instances.
19 Nachova and Others v Bulgaria (2005) 42 EHRR 933.
20 Petropoulou-Tsakiris v Greece 48 EHRR 1109.
21 Cobzaru v Romania 47 EHRR 10.
22 Stoica v Romania 52 EHRR 918.
23 Ibid paras 7 and 122.
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1.3. R ACIALLY MOTIVATED/BIASED VIOLENCE 
BY PRIVATE ACTORS
Similar observations and/or conclusions could be made in a line of cases which 
is only marginally different from that observed immediately here above. The 
difference mainly resides in the legal relevance for human rights purposes (not 
in terms of the persecution and daily discrimination suffered by the Romani 
victims of such violence!) of whether the violence was exercised by the State or by 
private individuals. Here the existing stereotypes against racial minorities (and 
in the ECtHR’s case law it is mostly against Roma) as criminal, as parasitic, and 
by consequence as subhuman are acted upon by private individuals who attack, 
kill and destroy Roma individuals and settlements. In such human rights cases, 
the State ‘only’ intervenes at the investigation or trial level. As a consequence, its 
liability in terms of human rights violation can only be procedural, meaning that 
the investigation or judgment into the facts were racially biased or prejudiced.
Once this point has been clarified, we find the same difficulties which the 
ECtHR already demonstrated when fully-fledged state action and violence was 
at stake. Thus, in yet another case involving Bulgaria, the ECtHR held that the 
utterance of ‘you damn gypsies’ during a fatal attack on the eventual victim was 
not sufficient to have triggered an obligation by the State to investigate into the 
racial prejudice leading to the death.24 In another case, the Court did heed the 
racist slogans yelled during an attack and physical assault on Romani houses and 
individuals, but only to declare an Article 3 procedural violation instead of also 
engaging a separate analysis for a (procedural) Article 14 violation.25 So again, 
this case law demonstrates the ECtHR’s limited understanding of how stereotypes 
lead to racial discrimination and how the failure of state authorities to investigate 
such background may in itself be based on stereotypes.
This first part of my contribution has demonstrated the mitigated success in 
human rights law and humanitarian law of recognising racial stereotypes if not as 
a self-standing human rights violation in terms of genocide or race discrimination 
then at least as an accessory violation. There is some limited recognition that 
such stereotypes when leading to violence constitute a human rights problem. 
However, this is rather the exception than the rule.
The next section will explore whether the recognition of racial stereotypes by 
human rights law fares better when they emerge in the absence of violence.
24 Dimitrova and Others v Bulgaria App no 44862/04 (ECtHR, 27 January 2011).
25 Koky and Others v Slovakia App no 13624/03 (ECtHR, 12 June 2012).
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2. RACIAL STEREOTYPES IN THE ABSENCE 
OF VIOLENCE
If racial stereotypes were already limitedly recognised as constituting a problem 
for human rights purposes when arising in conjunction with violence, it should 
come as little surprise that the picture is as mitigated when no such violence is 
exercised. Here, three different domains in which racial stereotypes have come 
into play in international human rights law so far will be looked at: (a) the right to 
a fair trial, (b) racial profiling, and (c) racist speech not leading to violence.
2 .1. R ACIAL BIAS IN COURT DECISIONS
One of the few areas of human rights law in which one can certainly identify 
sensitivity to racial prejudices and/or stereotypes is when they emerge during 
trial and give rise to issues of a fair and unbiased judgment. For example, the 
ECtHR has dealt with a fact pattern involving physical and structural violence and 
discrimination against Roma, including a combination of arson against Romani 
houses and property, lynching by angry mobs with active police participation 
and the eventual impunity of the perpetrators. In the first Moldovan and Others 
judgment, Romania entered into a friendly settlement agreement, admitting that 
the events posed problems under various articles of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), including Article 3 and Article 14.26 However, not all the 
plaintiffs accepted the friendly settlement and this led to a second judgment.27 
In terms of stereotypes, the second Moldovan judgment is interesting because 
they arose during the criminal trial decision following the events. In fact, the 
Romanian judges described the Roma community as follows:
Due to their lifestyle and their rejection of the moral values accepted by the rest 
of the population, the Roma community has marginalised itself, shown aggressive 
behaviour and deliberately denied and violated the legal norms acknowledged 
by society. Most of the Roma have no occupation and earn their living by doing 
odd jobs, stealing and engaging in all kinds of illicit activities. As the old form 
of common property that gave them equal rights with the other members of the 
community was terminated, the Roma population were allocated plots of land. 
However, they did not work the land and continued to steal, to commit acts of 
violence and to carry out attacks, mainly against private property, which has 
generated even more rejection than before.28
26 Moldovan and Others v Romania (No 1) App nos 41138/98 and 64320/01 (ECtHR, fr. settl., 
5 July 2005).
27 Moldovan and Others v Romania (No 2) App nos 41138/98 and 64320/01 (ECtHR, 12 July 
2005).
28 Ibid para 44.
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Whereas the ECtHR considered the racial elements of the attacks as an 
aggravating factor under Article 3 and not as a separate Article 14 violation, it 
held that the judge’s remarks as well as others made during related proceedings 
had determined unfavourable outcomes for the victims and thus constituted, 
inter alia, a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6 (right to a fair 
trial).
In another case before the ECtHR,29 a Romani woman was denied probation 
in a fraud case against her because according to the national judges granting 
parole would have created a sense of impunity, especially for members belonging 
to ethnic minorities. This also led the ECtHR to find an Article 14 violation in 
conjunction with Article 6. In other words, when racial stereotypes determine 
the outcome of judicial decisions and distort the exercise of unbiased justice, this 
causes a human rights violation in terms of absence of a fair trial even in the 
absence of any violence.
2 .2 . R ACIAL PROFILING
Racial profiling is another area in which racial stereotypes play a certain role. 
Racial profiling has been on the increase since the ‘war on terrorism’ and related 
security issues but also in conjunction with immigration issues. The stereotypes 
here are mainly that all people of colour or those wearing certain (religious) 
clothing are identified as either being more probably a terrorist or an irregular 
migrant and therefore more prone to continuous border or police checks. 
However, the practice certainly goes further back in time and has to do with 
the notion that racial minorities, immigrants and/or Roma supposedly have a 
propensity towards crime and violence and thus constitute a threat for society.30
The UN Human Rights Committee was the first international human rights 
body to condemn such practices by declaring that police identity checks which 
are motivated by race or ethnicity violate the international human right to non-
discrimination.31 The case was brought by Ms Williams, an American naturalised 
Spanish citizen, who was the only person to be stopped and asked for her identity 
documents at a Spanish train station by a police officer. She claimed that she was 
targeted because she was a Black woman but lost her case at the national level. 
The Human Rights Committee, on the contrary, held that the identity check 
had taken place only on the basis of the petitioner’s racial characteristics which 
violates Article 26 (non-discrimination) of the International Covenant on Civil 
29 Todorova v Bulgaria App no 37193/07 (ECtHR, 25 March 2010).
30 See more broadly on racial profiling: Frederick Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities and Stereotypes 
(HUP 2003) 155–198 and Karen S Glover, Racial Profiling. Research, Racism, and Resistance, 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2009).
31 HRC, Rosalind Williams Lecraft v Spain, Communication No 1493/2006, 17 August 2009 
(CCPR/C/96/D/1493/2006).
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and Political Rights. However, it should be noted that there is little in the Human 
Rights Committee’s analysis explicitly linking the profiling to racial stereotyping.
Nevertheless, like the proverbial swallow that does not make a summer, 
this important decision does not yet constitute a strong, binding human rights 
jurisprudence against racial profiling.
2 .3. R ACIAL IMAGERY OR DEPICTIONS NOT LEADING 
TO VIOLENCE
A last ‘non-violent’ area in which the issue of racial stereotypes has emerged in 
human rights law is that of racial imagery or depictions and which, while not 
directly inciting to violence, is offensive, degrading and/or discriminatory. The 
question is whether and how far such imagery violates certain human rights which 
would mean that some of the racial imagery that we are used to seeing would need 
to be prohibited by the State or that States have an obligation to restrict access to 
them.32 Clearly here we enter into the additional issue of the limits of freedom 
of speech and the different levels of protection from racist speech and imagery 
existing around the world.
Probably for this reason, human rights law and national courts have been 
somewhat reluctant to recognise this issue as a violation. The ECtHR’s Grand 
Chamber decision Aksu v Turkey33 is a perfect example. At stake were two 
publications, a dictionary which was in part financed by the Turkish Ministry 
of Culture and a book written by an Associate Professor and published by the 
Turkish Ministry of Culture. Both publications represented the Roma as thieves 
and contained negative, discriminatory and prejudiced connotations. Mr Aksu, 
a Turkish Roma, complained that these publications offended him as a member 
of the Roma community and claimed an Article 8 violation (right to private life) 
in conjunction with an Article 14 violation. The ECtHR rejected the Article 14 
claim because the applicant has not succeeded in producing prima facie evidence 
that the impugned publications had a discriminatory intent or effect.34 As far as 
Article 8 is concerned, the Court framed the issues as one of positive obligations 
of the State and whether the Turkish State adequately protected the applicant’s 
private life from the authors/publishers of the books. Having to balance this right 
with the freedom of expression, the Court concluded that Turkey had offered 
sufficient protection thus also rejecting the Article 8 claim. Nevertheless, in terms 
32 In this sense, see: Gregor Maučec, ‘Does international law require the removal of racially 
offensive material from libraries and bookstores?’ (2013) 3 SACHA JHR 1.
33 Aksu v Turkey App nos 4149/04 and 41029/04 (ECtHR [GC], 15 March 2012). See the 
comment using a racial stereotypes analysis: Alexandra Timmer, ‘Stereotypes of Roma: 
Aksu v Turkey in the Grand Chamber’, Strasbourg Observers Blog, 20 March 2012 <http:// 
strasbourgobservers.com/2012/03/20/stereotypes-of-roma-aksu-v-turkey-in-the-grand-
chamber/> accessed 16 April 2015.
34 Aksu v Turkey, para 45.
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of racial stereotyping, the judges stated that ‘any negative stereotyping of a group, 
when it reaches a certain level, is capable of impacting on the group’s sense of 
identity and the feelings of self-worth and self-confidence of members of the 
group’.35 Hence, one can sense that some sort of sensitivity to the harms created by 
racial stereotypes is there, but it is so far just not sufficient to amount to the level 
of a human rights violation. In spite of acknowledging the potential damages to 
Roma, the European judges, in this case held that the racial stereotypes contained 
in these publications are not sufficiently serious to matter for human rights/
discrimination purposes.
Another example of non-violent racial imagery that has come to the attention 
of international human rights fora and which demonstrates the difficulties in 
acknowledging that racially stereotypical images constitute any sort of harm 
and (human) rights violation, is the case of Zwarte Piet (Black Pete) in the 
Netherlands, a Black figure who accompanies and helps St Nicholas (alias Santa 
Claus). Allegedly, his skin colour is black because he is a chimney sweeper. In spite 
of this origin, he is mostly represented as a Black person in racially stereotyped 
ways. Zwarte Piet has obtained global attention thanks to a letter by a number of 
UN experts and special rapporteurs sent to the Dutch government36 denouncing 
this practice and asking it to stop. A racial stereotyping approach which might 
attempt at contextualising such imagery and how it is offensive for Black Dutch 
or European citizens because it harks back to colonial times would certainly 
strengthen the human rights claims against this tradition and practice.
For that same issue, at the national level, human rights have also been 
invoked to challenge this tradition when a trial court held that Article 8 (and not 
Article 14!) of the ECHR had been violated due to the mayor of Amsterdam giving 
permission for the festive arrival of St. Nicholas together with Zwarte Piet without 
taking into account the discriminatory effect of the latter figure.37 However, that 
judgment was overruled on appeal by the Dutch Council of State which held that 
the mayor is not allowed to refuse permission for public manifestations because 
of their content. The claimants should have lodged a civil or criminal case against 
the organisers of the St Nicholas parade instead of acting against the mayor.38
As one can see, absent some form of violence, the recognition of racial 
stereotypes by binding human rights law is haphazard at best, quite limited, 
35 Ibid para 58.
36 Communication to the Government of the Netherlands signed by Verene Shepherd (Chair 
Rapporteur of the Working Group on people of African descent), Farida Shaheed (Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights), Rita Itsák (Independent Expert on minority 
issues) and Mutuma Ruteere (Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance) (17 January 2013) (AL Af Descent 2012 
Cultural rights (2009) Minorities (2005–4) G/SO 214 (78–15) NLD 1/2013) <https://spdb.
ohchr.org/hrdb/23rd/public_-_AL_Netherlands_17.01.13_(1.2013).pdf>.
37 Amsterdam District Court, 3 July 2014, case no 13/6350. The author wishes to thank the 
anonymous reviewer for this update.
38 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, 12 November 2014, case 
no 201406757/1/A3.
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and rarely explicit. At this point, it might be useful to look at the practices and 
decisions of two institutions whose main goal is to combat racism and how the 
issue of racial stereotypes is increasingly emerging here.
3. SPECIALISED HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES 
AGAINST RACISM
Over the years, two specialised bodies have been created to fight racism at the 
international human rights level. These are (a) the Committee which overviews 
the implementation of the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination and (b) the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance.
3.1. INTER NATIONAL CONVENTION 
ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FOR MS 
OF R ACIAL DISCRIMINATION (ICER D)
On 4 January 1969, the United Nations’ International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) entered into 
force. Under it, a committee of experts (CERD Committee) was created which 
supervises its application and issues general recommendations, state reports and 
also decides individual complaints of human rights violations. For the purposes 
of this contribution, two provisions come into play. On the one hand, Article 7, 
which deals with educational measures preventing race discrimination and on 
the other hand, Article 4 which deals with hate speech.
3.1.1. Article 7
Article 7 provides that:
States Parties undertake to adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly 
in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to 
combating prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promoting 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical 
groups … [emphasis added].
Even though the word ‘stereotype’ does not appear here, we are at an earlier stage 
than prejudices leading to violence. Indeed, at stake here are prejudices that lead 
to racial discrimination especially in the domains of education and the media. 
Note also that the language of this provision does not limit itself to the fields of 
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teaching, education, culture and information and could therefore also be applied 
to other domains.
So far, Article 7 has been the object of one General Recommendation, in 
which the CERD Committee regretted that few States Parties include information 
on the measures which they have adopted and which give effect to Article 7 of the 
Convention in their reports, and that moreover such information has often been 
general and perfunctory.39
The issue of racial prejudices in the media also arose in another General 
Recommendation No 27 in which the CERD Committee ‘encouraged awareness 
among professionals of all media of the particular responsibility to not disseminate 
prejudices and to avoid reporting incidents involving individual members of 
Roma communities in a way which blames such communities as a whole’.40 Last 
but not least, stereotyping is also mentioned in its General Recommendation 
No 30, where the Committee recommends that measures taken against terrorism 
do not lead to racial profiling or stereotyping and that resolute action be taken 
to counter tendencies to target stigmatise, stereotype or profile non-citizens on 
the basis of their race, colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin.41 However, 
there is nothing binding in this language, and the CERD Committee has 
neither interpreted Article 7 broadly, nor granted this provision such a central, 
‘mandatory’ position as the Committee supervising the application of the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) has done in relation to Article 5 of CEDAW of which more in 
detail further below.
An analysis of the CERD Committee’s individual decisions provides little 
more information on the practice relating to Article 7. In two cases, violations 
of Article 7 have been invoked in conjunction with other provisions of CERD. 
The first one was brought by a Dutch citizen of Surinamese origins who claimed 
to have been discharged from the Netherlands Police Academy (NPA) on racial 
grounds evidenced by statements such as that he was a bad learner, that his Dutch 
was insufficient and that he should pattern himself on the white male police 
officers; being registered each time he was late for classes which was not the case 
for white students; and upon not performing well enough at a physical exercises, 
being told by the sports teacher that: ‘[t]he muscles needed for performing this 
exercise well are poorly developed in apes’.42 After having unsuccessfully litigated 
his way through the national system, the petitioner held that these facts amounted 
to a violation of Articles 2, 5, 6 and 7 of CERD. The CERD Committee recognised 
that there were some racial connotations of a serious nature in the matter but that 
the claims at the national level mainly dealt with the dismissal which it agreed 
39 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No 5 (CERD/C/GC/5, 1977).
40 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No 27 (CERD/C/GC/27, 2000).
41 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No 30 (CERD/C/GC/30, 2004).
42 CERD Committee, EIF v the Netherlands, Communication No 15/1999, 21 March 2001 
(CERD/C/58/D/15/1999).
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seemed rather caused by the petitioner’s bad results at the Academy than by racial 
discrimination. Thus they found no violation.
The second case took place in Australia and dealt with a sporting ground 
named the ‘E.S. ‘Nigger’ Brown Stand’, in honour of a well-known sports 
personality, Mr E.S. Brown who, in spite of being White, had seemingly acquired 
the nickname ‘Nigger’ because he liked to use ‘Nigger Brown’ shoe polish.43 The 
sign with the name on the grandstand of the sporting ground offended Mr Hagan, 
an aboriginal Australian. After having his claims to remove the sign dismissed at 
the national level, he petitioned the CERD Committee for violation of Articles 2, 
4, 5, 6 and 7 of CERD. In particular, he contended that the term is among the 
most racially offensive words in English and that for this reason he and his family 
were unable to attend functions at this football venue. The Committee first noted 
that the offending term was not designed to demean or diminish Mr Brown who 
was neither Black or of aboriginal descent and that the sign had gone by without 
any objections for many years. Nevertheless, it added that meanings of terms 
can change and that the CERD is a living instrument which must be interpreted 
and take into account the circumstances of contemporary society. Moreover, it 
noted that there are other ways to honour a sportsperson than by maintaining 
and displaying a public sign considered to be racially offensive. Therefore it 
recommended that the State Party take the necessary measures to secure the 
removal of the offending term from the sign in question. This decision shows 
more sensitivity to the issue of racial imagery and words than the previous one. 
The mere fact that such an expression may have a negative impact on someone, 
regardless of discriminatory intent, and also in consideration of the changing 
meaning of the words was sufficient for the CERD Committee to find a violation. 
However, it never openly refers to racial stereotypes and the damages they may 
cause.
Instead, the CERD Committee refers explicitly to such stereotypes in its 
analysis of State reports. For example, in its recent concluding observations on 
the Italian state report the issue of racial stereotypes, especially with regard 
to the Roma, comes up at several points.44 To Austria it recommended taking 
‘resolute action to counter any tendency, especially from politicians, to target, 
stigmatize, stereotype or profile people on the basis of race, colour, descent 
and national or ethnic origin, or to use racist propaganda in politics’.45 In the 
concluding observations to the state reports by Chile and Ecuador it recommends 
that effective educational and awareness-raising measures are taken in order to 
43 CERD Committee, Hagan v Australia, Communication No 26/2000, 20 March 2003 
(CERD/C/62/D/26/2002).
44 CERD Committee, Concl Obs – Italy, 9 March 2012 (CERD/C/ITA/CO/16–18) paras 17, 19 and 
25.
45 CERD Committee, Concl Obs – Austria, 21 August 2008 (CERD/C/AUT/CO/17) para 16.
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counter any tendency to stereotype or stigmatise migrants.46 Thus, we can observe 
a concern by the ICERD Committee in combating racial stereotypes in a number 
of domains and there is a large margin in using Article 7 more broadly, especially 
as far as individual decisions are concerned.
3.1.2. Article 4
The second provision under which the issue of stereotypes has emerged especially 
in the CERD Committee’s individual decisions has to do with the issue of hate 
speech. Article 4 provides that:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based 
on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour 
or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and 
discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive 
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination.
We have already seen how the issue of hate speech and publications containing 
stereotypical images and language has been dealt with in international criminal 
law and also by the ECtHR. The CERD Committee has only addressed the 
problem of hate speech in a recent general recommendation.47 In this document, 
racial stereotypes are explicitly mentioned as an issue of concern,48 to be avoided 
in media representations of ethnic, indigenous and other groups,49 but also that 
freedom of expression assists vulnerable groups in the deconstruction of racial 
stereotypes.50 However, it is probably in its ‘case law’ interpreting Article 4 where 
a true stereotyping perspective emerges, thus going further than the CERD 
Committee’s Article 7 jurisprudence. Even though it does not explicitly use the 
word ‘stereotypes’ in those individual decisions, nevertheless this UN treaty body 
shows an understanding of how dangerous they can be, even in the absence of 
incitement to violence.
Thus, one recent case51 involved the publication of an interview of Thilo 
Sarrazin, a former politician from Berlin in which he made a number of 
denigrating, stereotypical statements about Turks and Arabs in Germany, their 
lack of integration, their welfare dependence, their unproductiveness, their lower 
class and higher birth-rate, their lower IQ compared to Eastern European Jews. 
46 CERD Committee, Concl Obs – Ecuador, 24 October 2012 (CERD/C/ECU/CO/20–22) para 15 
and CERD Committee, Concl Obs – Chile, 23 September 2013, CERD/C/CHL/CO/19–21, 
para 18.
47 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No 35 (CERD/C/GC/35, 2013).
48 Ibid para 6.
49 Ibid para 40.
50 Ibid para 29.
51 CERD Committee, TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v Germany, Communication 
No 48/2010, 4 April 2013 (CERD/C/82/D/48/2010).
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These stereotypes then served to propose a revamp of the social security system 
and also of restricting immigration only to highly qualified individuals. The 
criminal charges filed by a Turkish-German association against such statements 
at the domestic level failed on the grounds that those statements were part of 
a significant public intellectual debate. The Committee held that Mr Sarrazin’s 
statements ‘contain ideas of racial superiority, denying respect as human beings 
and depicting generalized negative characteristics of the Turkish population, as 
well as incitement to racial discrimination in order to deny them access to social 
welfare’.52 Balancing these statements against the issue of freedom of speech, it 
held that Germany had failed to effectively investigate the issue of incitement to 
racial hatred and recommended that Germany ‘review its policies and procedures 
concerning the prosecution in cases of alleged racial discrimination consisting 
of dissemination of ideas of superiority over other ethnic groups … and of 
incitement to discrimination on such grounds’.53
This case illustrates how the CERD Committee understands the risks 
underlying publications/statements brimming with racist stereotypes and their 
detrimental effects even when they do not directly lead to violence. Other cases 
by the same body seem to confirm this trend that racist speech will be given 
somehow less freedom than in other international bodies.54 However, even here 
the case law is far from unidirectional. In fact, on the one hand, clearly the issue 
of free speech and the risks of restriction loom everywhere as indicated by the 
dissenting opinion to this individual decision by the CERD Committee.55 On 
the other hand, in another case involving again Germany, the same committee 
did not find that statements against Roma and Sinti depicting them as criminals 
and as social welfare parasites published by a Bavarian police officer constituted 
a violation of Article 4.56 Here the same legal framework as above was not 
deemed to be insufficient, mainly because in the concrete case it did not find 
the authorities (re)actions arbitrary and because the policeman had received 
disciplinary measures.57
Ultimately, we see that in the work of this specialised body, the issue of 
racial stereotypes is acknowledged to some extent as constituting a human 
rights violation, especially with regard to Article 4 decisions. However, mostly 
the provisions adopted by the CERD Committee are non-binding and somehow 
remain between the lines.
52 Ibid para 12.6.
53 Ibid para 14.
54 See eg The Jewish Community of Oslo et al v Norway, Communication No 30/2003, 15 August 
2005 (CERD/C/67/D/30/2003) in particular para 10.5.
55 Ibid. Individual opinion by Committee member, Mr Carlos Manuel Vazquez (CERD/C/82/3).
56 CERD Committee, Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma et al v Germany, Communication 
No 38/2006, 3 March 2008 (CERD/C/72/D/38/2006).
57 Ibid para 7.7.
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3.2 . EUROPEAN COMMISSION AGAINST R ACISM 
AND INTOLER ANCE (ECRI)
Some developments going into the direction of recognising that racial stereotypes 
and prejudices can become relevant for human rights purposes even without 
violence can also be gleaned from the documents of another institution, this time 
at the level of the Council of Europe: the European Commission against Racism 
and Intolerance (ECRI).
Contrary to the CERD Committee, the ECRI cannot decide on individual 
cases but like the former institution it issues general policy recommendations 
and country reports. And indeed it invokes stereotyping explicitly in a number 
of its recommendations. Thus, the link between stereotypes and racial profiling 
is explicitly made by the ECRI in its General Policy Recommendation No 11 
where it states that ‘[r]acial profiling is mainly the result of stereotypes existing 
among the police, whereby certain groups of persons designated by grounds 
such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin 
are presumed to be more prone than others to commit offences or certain 
kinds of offences. However, the prohibition of racial profiling must also cover 
those situations where the link between stereotypes and racial profiling is more 
difficult to establish’.58 Also, in its General Policy Recommendation No 13, it 
recommends that governments of members states take measures for preventing 
and combating stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination experienced by Roma 
children in schools, by making parents of non-Roma children aware of it and 
by training teaching staff in particular for intercultural education;59 that school 
textbooks do not convey stereotypes on Roma;60 to combat prejudices and 
stereotypes concerning Roma and Travellers in respect of access to housing;61 and 
to provide training to health workers aimed at combating stereotypes, prejudice 
and discrimination against Roma.62
Some country reports also highlight the attention which ECRI pays to racial 
stereotypes and the necessity to fight them at various levels. Thus, in its latest 
report on Spain, it deplored manifestations of the stereotype that Jews have too 
much power and cartoons equating Jews or Israelis with Nazis and that those 
prejudices contribute to the feeling of vulnerability of Jews in Spain.63 The latest 
Italian report in turn deplored the many stereotypes and prejudices existing 
against Roma people in Italy.64
58 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation No 11, 29 June 2007 (CRI(2007)39) para 37.
59 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation No 13, 24 June 2011 (CRI(2011)37) para 4b.
60 Ibid para 4q.
61 Ibid para 6g.
62 Ibid para 7d.
63 ECRI, Report on Spain, 7 December 2010 (CRI (2011)4) para 142.
64 ECRI, Report on Italy, 6 December 2011 (CRI (2012)2) para 83.
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It could be said that possibly the ECRI is the most advanced institution in 
openly acknowledging and addressing the issue of racial stereotypes under human 
rights law. It understands stereotypes as being the basis of racial profiling and 
more generally of playing out both in the area of civil and political and social and 
economic rights, in the presence or in the absence of violence. Yet it may be that 
ECRI is so bold because its interpretations are non-binding recommendations, 
which may provide arguments for binding cases or persuasive authority but, for 
the time being, little more.
In conclusion to this third part, we see that racial stereotypes under ICERD 
and ECRI certainly are acknowledged. However, this acknowledgement comes 
mostly in form of recommendations and non-binding decisions. This opens the 
discussion on some of the potential developments which a fight against racial 
prejudice and stereotypes may mean at the human rights level.
4. FIGHTING RACIAL STEREOTYPES THROUGH 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE FUTURE?
Parts of this contribution already hinted at the way in which racial stereotypes 
could occupy a more central place in human rights analysis.
One way of conceiving how racial stereotypes may become more relevant 
in the future can be gleaned when comparing them with gender stereotypes 
in human rights law and especially with the use made by the fundamental 
provision of Article 5 of CEDAW. Without entering too much into the details 
that are explained much better and more in detail by others,65 this provision 
helps understanding how the fight against racial stereotyping is more limited 
than what occurs in terms of gender stereotyping in human rights law. In fact, 
what appears from this article is that State Parties need to take all appropriate 
measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct, prejudices and 
practices that are based on the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes as 
well as breaking down the gendered parental roles. In General Recommendation 
No 25 the CEDAW Committee has elevated Article 5 from a seemingly marginal 
provision to a corner stone in the CEDAW’s architecture by including the fight 
against gender stereotypes amongst the three main obligations State Parties have 
in their efforts to eliminate discrimination against women.66
Therefore, one of the first things that could be done is to draft a similar 
general recommendation by the CERD Committee which could elevate Article 7 
of ICERD to similar heights as Article 5 of CEDAW. While still being ‘soft 
international human rights law’, such a general recommendation would have 
65 Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Article 5’ in Marsha Freeman, Christine Chinkin and Beate Rudolf (eds), 
The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
A Commentary (OUP 2011) 141–167.
66 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 25 (2004) para 6.
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the advantage of explicitly addressing the role played transversally by racial 
stereotypes for the different rights recognised in the ICERD. It would also have 
the benefit of clarifying to what extent such stereotypes are problematic, how they 
relate to freedom of speech and which international obligations arise as a result of 
fighting and deconstructing such stereotypes.
It is precisely with regard to this last point of deconstructing such stereotypes 
that the comparison with what is happening at the level of gender stereotypes 
becomes relevant. Indeed what we see occurring in this domain is that what is 
seen as (increasingly) problematical are the social, cultural and economic roles 
based on ideas of inferiority or superiority attributed to women and men and that 
influence our societies and their ordering at the very basis of its existence. In a 
certain way one could say that the fight against gender stereotypes is increasingly 
about undoing the sexual contract which Carol Pateman identified so well67 or 
about eliminating some of its consequences.68
To keep the parallel and comparison with gender stereotypes in relation to 
the sexual contract and the ways in which fighting against such stereotypes may 
undo or deconstruct this contract, the situation looks quite different with regard 
to race. In his seminal book, political theorist Charles Mills has identified the 
racial contract as underlying modern Western societies.69 He posits that this 
contract was concluded amongst those that are identified on various and varying 
grounds as White, to categorise the remaining humans as non-White and of a 
different and inferior moral status. Moral and legal rules that normally regulate 
behaviour amongst whites do not apply in dealings with non-Whites or only 
apply with certain limitations.70 Ultimately, the racial contract is a contract to 
exploit people of colour to the economic, cultural and political benefit of White 
people. This contract was able to be sustained also because of existing prejudices 
and stereotypes about non-Whites: uncivilised, culturally backward, childlike, 
lazy, incapable of self-rule. These are just some of the characterisations that have 
served to justifying and maintaining the racial contract not only by force and 
violence but also ideologically. Thus by fighting stereotypes, the social, cultural 
and economic roles that are de facto attributed on the basis of some prior racial 
ordering or which are the result of the latter and that constitute the basis of racial 
states71 would be at least (legally) exposed. Not only would this again touch upon 
some racial imagery mentioned above and become relevant in the educational 
67 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (SUP 1988).
68 Similar observations can be made with regard to the national level, when the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht identifies gender stereotypes with the expression ‘überkommene 
Rollenverteilung’ (see eg: BVerfG, 24 January 1995, 1 BvL 18/93 and 5, 6, 7/94, 1 BvR 403, 
569/94, para 73; and BVerfG, 9 November 2011, 1 BvR 1853/11, para 18) and the US Supreme 
Court with ‘ancient canards about the proper role of women’ (Phillips v Martin Marietta Corp., 
400 US 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
69 C Mills, The Racial Contract (Cornell University Press 1997).
70 Ibid 11.
71 David Theo Goldberg, The Racial State (Blackwell Publishers 2002).
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domain, but it would equally touch upon the racially ordered division of labour 
or other patterns of social stereotyping related to racial minorities.
For instance, in many restaurants in big cities of Western Europe the menial 
kitchen work is mostly done by Black or immigrant workers whereas the waiters are 
often White. Similar observations could be made with regard to Black or Filipino 
domestic workers in economically developed countries. Again, the parallel with 
gender stereotypes may help to highlight the different legal relevance of the two 
situations: if the same labour division were gendered, in the sense that women 
were predominantly working in the kitchen and the men waiting on tables, gender 
stereotypes would or at least could be invoked. However, the racial contract is 
much harder to break down through (human rights) law. Hence, thinking about 
gender stereotypes and how they play out in the human rights domain may help 
to frame future claims or develop solutions that take into account how racial 
stereotypes compound certain outcomes and that go beyond the declaration or 
recommendation level.72
An example of how to configure a broader human rights approach which 
takes into account racial stereotypes comes from the recent ECtHR judgment, 
Biao v Denmark, involving a family reunification claim in Denmark.73 The legal 
issue at stake was whether it amounted to indirect discrimination to impose an 
attachment requirement or 28 years of life in Denmark to all Danish citizens in 
order to be allowed to apply for family reunion given that the impact for naturalised 
Danish citizens, who are often of a different race/ethnicity, would be that such 
reunion comes at a much later time in life. In this concrete case, the applicant of 
Togolese origins had applied for asylum, married and divorced a Danish woman, 
obtained a residence permit in Denmark, and finally obtained Danish citizenship 
between 1993 and 2002. In 2003, he married a Ghanaian woman and intended to 
have her come to Denmark but the request for family reunification was refused 
on the grounds of the requirements mentioned above. Had he been a Danish born 
citizen, this would not have been the case, thus negatively impacting persons who 
acquire Danish nationality later in life far more often and far more heavily than 
persons born with Danish nationality.
The Court held that there was no violation of the applicants’ Article 8 and/or 
Article 14 rights. Whereas it did find that there had been an indirect difference 
in treatment based on status it nevertheless found that there was an objective 
justification for the 28-year and attachment rules, namely to demonstrate strong 
ties to the country, and that the rule was proportional.74 However, for the 
72 See for instance an early example of awareness of the economical, educational and cultural 
elements of racism and race prejudice: UNESCO, Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, 
Paris, 27 November 1978.
73 Biao v Denmark App no 38590/10 (ECtHR, 25 March 2014). It should be noted that this case 
has been referred to the Grand Chamber, so more information on racial stereotypes might be 
forthcoming.
74 Ibid paras 79–107.
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purposes of this contribution the dissenting opinion is the most interesting part 
because it explicitly frames some issues of the case in terms of racial stereotypes 
and compares them to gender stereotypes. In fact, the dissenting judges state that:
[I]n this context, the paramount concern of a human rights court should be 
whether such criteria have the disparate adverse impact of a stereotype on a 
minority group, no less important than the actual individual impact, which in 
every case is absolutely necessary for victim status to obtain. The difference in 
the treatment of a group raises fundamental human rights concerns, especially 
if it reflects or reinforces existing patterns of social stereotyping related to one or 
other ‘natural feature’. It is impossible to think of Article 14 of the Convention as 
permitting second-class citizenship, especially within the ambit of Convention 
rights (such as those consolidated in Article 8). Indirect discrimination is 
unrelated to legislative intent, therefore in such cases there is no need to prove 
discriminatory intent. It exists, and it remains impermissible, even if it burdens 
disparately only a group that is differentiated on a specific ground. There is no way 
to justify discrimination, even if indirect, where it is to a ‘decisive extent’ based on 
a person’s ethnic or national origin (see paragraph 9 below).75
The first step was thus linking this case to the ECtHR’s indirect (race) 
discrimination case law76 and by demonstrating how the Danish rules have a 
disparate racial impact on foreigners who are more often than not of different 
racial or ethnic origin. The stereotype reasoning comes in at a second step, namely 
the justification provided for introducing such a different treatment. According to 
the dissenters, ‘[t]he concern was that, among the relevant population, there was 
“a widespread marriage pattern to marry a person from their countries of origin”, 
this being understood for all practical purposes as reflecting a lack of integration. 
The impugned differentiation reflects and reinforces, albeit indirectly, a negative 
stereotype’.77 However, the ECtHR had already held that general assumptions 
or prevailing social attitudes in a particular country provided insufficient 
justification for a difference in treatment on the ground of sex,78 the reason 
why, according to the dissenters, ‘similar concerns should apply to immigrant 
minorities’.79
What this dissenting opinion shows is how anti-stereotyping reasoning, 
combined with the concept of indirect discrimination, can offer new 
understandings and new grounds on deconstructing certain aspects of the racial 
contract through human rights law. On the one hand, this allows closing the 
existing gap between racial stereotypes and gender stereotypes and, on the other 
hand, of explicitly acknowledging the role they play in race discrimination.
75 Ibid (Sajó, Vučinič and Kūris dissenting) para 8 (italics added).
76 In particular DH and Others v Czech Republic (2007) 47 EHRR 59.
77 Biao v Denmark (Sajó, Vučinič and Kūris dissenting) para 16 (internal reference omitted).
78 Konstantin Markin v Russia (2012) 56 EHRR 8.
79 Biao v Denmark (Sajó, Vučinič and Kūris dissenting) para 16.
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In conclusion, this contribution has attempted to map the ways in which 
stereotypes are (or are not) relevant in international human rights law. So far, 
I argue that there is a limited, inconsistent and implicit recognition of the role 
they play in justifying and maintaining race discrimination. Only the specialised 
bodies fighting against such discrimination do address the issue explicitly, 
albeit mostly in non-binding recommendations. The comparison with gender 
stereotypes and recent case law by the ECtHR indicate some way forward in 
changing this picture.
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The Failure to Address Gender 
Stereotypes in the Legal Procedures 
around the Dutch SGP
Rikki Holtmaat*
The theme of this volume, eradicating harmful stereotypes with the help of law, 
goes to the heart of my academic work in the past two decades. The stubbornness 
and the detrimental effects of gender stereotypes inspired me to search for legal 
norms that are available and appropriate to tackle such stereotypes. I have written 
extensively on this issue, in particular in relation to Article 5(a) of the Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).1 
The first part of this provision entails the obligation of States Parties to effectively 
put an end to prejudices and all customs and practices which are based on the idea 
of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for 
men and women. In the second part, States Parties are encouraged to promote a 
different (than traditional) understanding of the parental roles of men and women. 
According to the Committee of experts that supervises the implementation of 
CEDAW, gender stereotypes and fixed parental gender roles are root causes of 
discrimination against women. The elimination of all forms of discrimination 
* I am most grateful to my assistant Paul Post who conducted a thorough review of the first draft 
of this chapter and to my honours class students Habiba Bellagia, Maria Klomp and Kim van 
Muiswinkel for assembling and analysing the vast amount of materials on the SGP cases. SGP 
is the abbreviation for Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (see text infra n 13).
1 See for example Rikki Holtmaat, Towards Different Law and Public Policy (Reed Business 
Information 2004); Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Preventing Violence Against Women. The Due 
Diligence Standard and Article 5(a) CEDAW’ in Carin Benninger-Budel (ed), Due Diligence 
and its Application to Protect Women from Violence (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008); 
Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Article 5’ in Marsha A Freeman, Christine Chinkin and Beate Rudolf, The UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: a Commentary 
(OUP 2012); and Rikki Holtmaat, ‘CEDAW: A Holistic Approach to Women’s Equality and 
Freedom’ in A Hellum and H  Sinding-Assen (eds), Women’s Human Rights: CEDAW in 
International, Regional and National Law (CUP 2013).
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against women is impossible without eradicating these causes.2 The Committee 
uses various terms to express this concern. For example, it states that stereotypes 
are ‘adverse cultural norms’,3 that they ‘constitute barriers’,4 and that they form 
‘the most serious obstacles’,5 or ‘are a root cause of the disadvantaged position of 
women’.6 Sometimes the Committee considers stereotypes to be discriminatory 
per se.7 In its Concluding Observations on Burundi in 2008, the Committee 
adopted both approaches in one comment.8
It is certainly positive that the CEDAW Committee has systematically 
stressed the discriminatory nature of gender stereotypes, and that this insight 
has also been accepted elsewhere in international law, as well as in case law of 
for example the Supreme Court of the United States.9 However, this does not 
mean that gender stereotypes are always recognised and revealed by the parties 
in legal procedures in which a violation of women’s human rights is at stake, or by 
the judges that adjudicate such cases.10 Recognition of stereotyping is often also 
lacking in legal procedures that revolve around women’s right to equality or non-
discrimination.11 Is it possible that the legal framing of ‘women’s human rights 
violations’ as ‘sex equality issues’ contributes to the invisibility of the underlying 
gender stereotypes, and that a claim for legal equality therefore is not the most 
suitable strategy to address and redress such stereotypes? ‘While feminist appeals 
2 Already in 1987 the Committee adopted a General Recommendation (No 3) on Article 5. It 
should be noted that the General Recommendations and the Concluding Observations of this 
Committee are not binding upon the States Parties. However, they may be considered as an 
authoritative source of interpretation of the Convention. See about the role of the Committee 
I Boerefijn, ‘Article 17’ in Freeman et al (eds) (n 1).
3 Concluding Observations Madagascar, CEDAW/C/MDG/CO/5 (2008) para 16.
4 Concluding Observations Cook Islands, CEDAW/C/COK/CO/1 (2007) para 28.
5 Concluding Observations Cyprus, CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/1–2 (1996) para 45.
6 Concluding Observation New Zealand, CEDAW/C/NZL/CO/6 (2007) para 22.
7 Concluding Observation Guinea, CEDAW/C/EST/GIN/CO/6 (2007) para 23.
8 Concluding Observation Burundi, CEDAW/C/BDI/CO/4 (2008) para 17. The Committee held 
that it ‘continues to be concerned about the persistence of patriarchal attitudes and deep-
rooted stereotypes regarding the role and responsibilities of men and women in society, which 
discriminate against women. The Committee is also concerned that the preservation of negative 
cultural practices and traditional attitudes serves to perpetuate women’s subordination 
in the family and society and constitutes a serious obstacle to women’s enjoyment of their 
fundamental rights.’
9 See eg CESCR, ‘General Comment 16’ (2005) UN Doc E/C.12/2005/4, para 14; and CESCR, 
‘General Comment 20’ (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20, para 20. A wording similar to Article 5(a) 
CEDAW can for example be found in the Convention of Belém do Para, Articles 7(e) and 8(b); 
the Protocol to the Banjul Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa, Articles 2(2), 4(d), 6 
and 13. The discriminatory nature of gender stereotypes has also been acknowledged in some 
important court cases, eg by the US Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 
228 (1989). See Rebecca Cook and Suzanne Cusack, Gender Stereotyping; Transnational Legal 
Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010).
10 As far as the case law of the ECtHR is concerned, this has been analysed in depth by Alexandra 
Timmer in her PhD research project at Ghent University; see in particular Alexandra Timmer, 
‘Towards an Anti-Stereotyping Approach for the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 11 
HRLR 707.
11 Timmer therefore argues in favour of improving the equality analysis of courts, specifically 
the ECtHR. See Timmer (n 10).
Intersentia 145
The Head of the Woman is the Man
to equality have been rhetorically useful … they have proved problematic in 
practice, and produced either limited or counterproductive results for women.’12 
Is framing women’s human rights as claims for legal (sex) equality by definition 
problematic, or is it possible to use that legal framework in order to put an end to 
gender stereotyping? And if not, is there a way of legally constructing controversies 
or conflicts in such a way that the equality framework is avoided?
In an attempt to further develop my thoughts on this topic,13 I will discuss 
the case of the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party, SGP), 
an orthodox protestant Calvinist political party in the Netherlands that up to 
2013 denied women their right to participate in political life on the basis of a 
traditionalist-fundamentalist reading of the Bible. This patriarchal standpoint of 
the SGP was legally contested by several persons and organisations as violating 
women’s right to equality, in particular their right to equality in respect to political 
participation. My finding in this chapter is that legally construing the SGP’s 
exclusion of women from political participation as an issue of unequal treatment 
of women, to a large extent stood in the way of effectively addressing the gender 
stereotypes at stake in these procedures. However, there is one exception to this 
finding, showing that, provided that judges are aware of the detrimental role of 
stereotypes, law can contribute to eradicating them.
This chapter consists of three main sections. Section 1 explains the position 
of the SGP and describes the (fourteen!) legal procedures that took place between 
1993 and 2012 around its founding principle that women should/could not have 
a right to participate in political life. Section 2 subsequently analyses the options 
that were theoretically available to legally construct the case and describes the 
consequences of the chosen construction of ‘unequal treatment of women’. This 
construction, it will be shown, has led to neglecting the fact that the SGP’s ideology 
was based on gender stereotypes in all but one of these fourteen legal procedures. 
Section 3 then discusses the metaphor of conflicting fundamental rights that 
played a pivotal role in the legal discourse surrounding these procedures and in 
the procedures themselves. In the framework of the legal test whether the SGP’s 
patriarchal policies and practices could be justified, lawyers used the language of 
conflicting, colliding, or clashing rights that should be weighed or balanced by 
the judge. In what way do these metaphors frame our way of thinking about the 
nature and possible outcome of cases such as the SGP case? Are other metaphors 
perhaps better suited to discuss the issue at hand? Finally, in the Conclusion, the 
question whether and how law or legal procedures could play a role in combating 
12 Rosemary Hunter, ‘Introduction: Feminism and Equality’ in Rosemary Hunter, Rethinking 
Equality Projects in Law. Feminist Challenges (Hart Publishing 2008) 8.
13 See earlier work arguing that other law needs to be developed, instead of claiming rights 
equal to those possessed by men. See Rikki Holtmaat, ‘The Power of Legal Concepts: the 
Development of a Feminist Theory of Law’ (1989) 5 Intl J Soc L 481; and Rikki Holtmaat, 
‘Van Gelijke Behandeling naar Ander Recht’ in Eva Brems and Liesbet Stevens (eds), Recht en 
Gender in België (Die Keure 2011).
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(gender) stereotypes is re-examined in the light of my findings about the SGP 
cases. The most simple and straightforward solution would be to firmly hold 
on to the idea that human rights are destined for all, ie are ‘universal’, and that 
therefore no inroads on this universality principle are possible, but this stance 
is not accepted in legal doctrine; in practice we need to work with the (formal) 
equality principle. Although still rare, there are some examples of how Courts 
can use that legal framework in order to address and redress gender stereotypes. 
In the last part of the Conclusion, it is suggested that the metaphors of conflicting, 
colliding, or clashing rights should be replaced by different metaphors that are 
more suited to imagine less damaging forms of conflict resolution.
1. THE SGP: ITS ORIGINS AND PRINCIPLES, 
AND THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL RESPONSES 
TO ITS DISCRIMINATORY POLICY
How could a political party continue openly denying women’s equal right to 
political participation for almost three quarters of the 20th century, before this 
practice was seriously contested as a violation of women’s human rights? And 
who contested the SGP’s right to follow, to the detriment of women, their religious 
beliefs in this respect, and which legal basis was chosen for this contestation? In 
this part of the chapter, first the historical background of the SGP is explained. 
Subsequently, the position of the Dutch government as regards the SGP’s stance 
on women’s rights is discussed.14 Finally, four types of legal procedures that 
revolved around the SGP are distinguished and briefly described.
1.1. THE SGP: ITS ORIGINS AND PRINCIPLES
The SGP was founded in 1918 after a political accord was reached by liberal and 
Christian political parties that were represented in the (then all-male) Dutch 
14 There is extensive Dutch-language literature on this party and the legal procedures concerning 
its denial of women’s right to political participation. See (in English) I Boerefijn, ‘The Right to 
Political Participation. The Case of the SGP’ in Rikki Holtmaat and I Boerefijn (eds), Women’s 
Human Rights and Culture/Religion/Tradition: International standards as guidelines for the 
discussion? Proceedings of the Colloquium in the Peace Palace, The Hague 12 May 2009 (SIM 
2010); Barbara Oomen, ‘Between Rights Talk and Bible Speak: The Implementation of Equal 
Treatment Legislation in Orthodox Reformed Communities in The Netherlands’ (2011) 33 
HRQ 175; and Barbara Oomen, J Guijt and M Ploeg, ‘CEDAW, the Bible and the State of the 
Netherlands: the struggle over orthodox women’s political participation and their responses’ 
(2010) 6 Utrecht LR 158. From the perspective of CEDAW, the case is discussed by S Wittkopp, 
‘Article 7’ in Freeman et al (eds) (n 1). The history of the SGP and some of the legal procedures 
concerning its policy are also described in the (inadmissible) case before the European Court 
of Human Rights, SGP v the Netherlands no. 58369/10 (ECtHR, 20 July 2012), published in 
NJ 2012/478 and AB 2012, 334.
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Parliament.15 The deal provided that, in return for the acceptance by Christian 
political parties of the introduction of universal suffrage for men and women, 
the Christian part of the population would gain a constitutionally guaranteed 
right to found schools and get State funding on a basis of equality with ‘neutral’ 
schools.16 Some orthodox Christians fiercely rejected this trade-off because of 
the introduction of female suffrage, and therefore decided to found their own 
political party, the SGP.
The SGP is a theocratic party, representing a considerable minority of around 
250,000 persons belonging to a particular strand of orthodox Calvinism.17 Most 
of these people live in rather secluded communities in the so-called Bible Belt 
(stretching from the south-west to the central east of the country), and adhere to 
very strict behavioural rules. These rules include a prohibition to engage in any 
activities on Sundays apart from going to church, as well as particular dress codes, 
especially for women. The SGP is described as a party believing ‘in the absolute 
authority of the Word of God over all areas of societal life. The SGP rejects the 
idea of absolute equality of human beings, which it sees as false teaching of the 
French Revolution. In essence, the SGP believes that, although all human beings 
are of equal value as God’s creatures, differences in nature, talents and place in 
society should be recognised.’18
From the very beginning, the party’s principles and political programme 
included the principle of women’s and men’s difference as regards their respective 
roles in life. According to the SGP, the Bible tells us that the man is the head of 
the woman and that a woman’s role is to be obedient to man. This idea is amongst 
others based on 1 Corinthians 11, verse 3: ‘But I would have you know, that the 
head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head 
of Christ is God.’ It is derived from this verse that women cannot hold any kind of 
public office. This is expressed in the party’s byelaws:
Article 7
The Word of God holds that, on the basis of the order of creation, man and woman 
have each been given their own and distinct mission and place. In this order the 
man is the head of the woman. … Every effort at emancipation that negates the 
God-given mission and place of men and women is considered revolutionary and 
has to be combated forcefully.
15 See M Braun, ‘Staatkundig gereformeerde gewetensnood: beginselvastheid door de eeuwen 
heen’ (1994) Nemesis 12.
16 Currently Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution.
17 Oomen et al, ‘CEDAW’ (n 14) 162–64; Oomen, ‘Between rights talk’ (n 14). SGP leadership 
does not describe the party as being theocratic; nevertheless, the byelaws of the Party contain 
the principle that the Party strives for a political and social order that is based on Biblical 
principles and the Party does not acknowledge any normative order above God’s Word.
18 SGP v the Netherlands no. 58369/10 (ECtHR, 20 July 2012), NJ 2012, 478; AB 2012, 334, para 8.
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Article 10
The notion of [the existence of] a right to vote for women which results from a 
revolutionary striving for emancipation is incompatible with woman’s calling. 
The latter equally holds true for the participation of women in both representative 
and administrative political organs. Women shall be led by their consciences as 
regards the question whether casting their vote is in accordance with their God-
given place.19
For the (male) SGP leadership it was a matter of principle that women could and 
should not participate in political life. However, after some time the SGP gave up 
its resistance to women casting their vote during elections and declared that this 
was an issue of women’s personal conscience. It may be assumed that this was 
allowed because without women’s votes the party would not be able to get enough 
support to be represented in Parliament. The founders of the SGP considered it so 
obvious that women could not become members that this was not included in the 
party’s byelaws.20 This altered in the beginning of the 1990s after some local SGP 
branches had accepted women as members, which was subsequently contested by 
a majority of other local branches. Female party membership became impossible 
after a change of the party’s internal rules in 1993, which were subsequently 
formalised in its byelaws in 1997. Women, from then on, could only apply for 
‘special membership’, which gave them a kind of observer status, having no right 
to vote about internal party affairs or internal rules and regulations or to be eligible 
for committees or the general board. Female members were also not eligible for 
a place on the SGP’s election lists. Only in 2007 did the SGP formally enable full 
female membership.21 However, the party leadership publicly declared that it 
would still be impossible for women to represent the party in any democratically 
elected forum or to hold any public office on its behalf. The SGP thus still denied 
women the right to stand for elections, and defended this position through almost 
two decades (between 1993 and 2012), during which the party was involved in as 
many as fourteen legal procedures.
19 The translation of these provisions has been derived from SGP v the Netherlands no. 58369/10 
(ECtHR 20 July 2012), NJ 2012, 478; AB 2012, 334, para 7–9.
20 Comparably, in the Dutch Constitution of 1882, it was not deemed necessary to explain that 
only male ‘Nederlanders’ (Dutch persons) could vote or be elected. After an attempt (in vain) 
of the Dutch feminist Aletta Jacobs to get elected to the Local Council of Amsterdam in 1883, 
the Constitution of 1887 explicitly reserved the right to vote or to be elected to men.
21 In response to the judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal 20 December 2007, ECLI: 
NL:GHSGR:2007:BC0619, NJ 2008, 133, in which it was decided that the SGP’s policy was 
discriminatory against women and that the Dutch State was therefore obliged to take action.
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1.2 . THE POSITION OF THE DUTCH GOVER NMENT 
AS R EGAR DS THE SGP
The Dutch government has been reluctant to address the exclusion of women by 
the SGP.22 Although the SGP’s policy is a clear case of sex discrimination based 
on patriarchal religious views, it nevertheless continued to exist in the context of a 
Dutch legal order that progressively recognised women’s legal equality.23 Until the 
end of the 1970s, although internally this issue was debated at regular intervals, 
there was hardly any public debate about the SGP’s continuing discrimination 
against women. Partly this may be due to the fact that the SGP never gained 
more than a few seats in Parliament.24 Neither the Dutch Constitution nor any 
formal act imposes any substantive requirements on the founding of a political 
party, or on the right to receive State subsidies for their political work. In fact, the 
only requirement under the law for party subsidies is that a party may not have 
been convicted by a court under the prohibition of discrimination in the Dutch 
Criminal Code.25
The question whether the SGP’s policy was acceptable from a human rights 
perspective was for the first time openly raised in the debates during the twelve 
years that it took the Dutch Parliament to ratify CEDAW (from 1979 to 1991). In 
these debates several Christian parties expressed their concern about the possible 
impact of the adoption of CEDAW on the SGP and asked the Government to make 
a reservation to Article 7. However, the Government assured these parties that 
the Convention left enough room for a restrictive implementation of the State’s 
obligations at this point ‘because the right to equality needs to be balanced against 
other freedom rights’.26 The Dutch Government, although on some occasions 
22 See on this issue I Boerefijn (n 14).
23 This process was slow after the right to passive (in 1917) and active (in 1919) political 
participation was gained. Only in 1956 women gained full legal civil rights. After that it took 
until the mid-1970s to gain the right to equal pay, the right to equal access to employment 
and the right not to be dismissed because of or during pregnancy. In 1983, the right to non-
discrimination on the ground of (inter alia) sex was for the first time explicitly included in the 
Dutch Constitution.
24 However, the SGP was rather influential and sometimes even dominant in some Provincial and 
Local Councils thereby being able to set their own ‘Biblical’ standards in these communities. 
For example, in many Bible Belt villages no swimming pools were available, men and women 
had to swim separately, or swimming was prohibited on Sundays. At the national level, the 
SGP became very influential in the years 2010–2012, when their votes were decisive to keep the 
minority government Rutte I in power.
25 This is different from many other countries in Europe where at least the requirement exists 
that a political party should fully abide by the Constitutional guarantees of human rights or 
the right to equality or non-discrimination.
26 See the reports that were exchanged between the Government and Parliament: Kamerstukken 
II 1986/87, 18 950, (R1281), 3, 8 and 11; Kamerstukken II 1986/87, 18 950, 6, 5–6, 16 and 30; 
Kamerstukken II 1986/87, 18 950, 9, 15. See also the minutes of the oral debates in Parliament: 
Handelingen II, 26 June 1990, 82-4614-4615 and Handelingen II, 3 July 1990, 85-4848. The 
debate was held again in the framework of the adoption of the General Equal Treatment Act; see 
Handelingen II, 10 February 1993, 47-3507 and 47-3523. See on this J Hes and C van Vleuten, 
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acknowledging that the SGP’s policy was indeed discriminatory,27 consequently 
refused to take effective action – maintaining that CEDAW allowed for a margin 
of discretion about how to implement the non-discrimination principle in the 
light of other fundamental rights at stake.28
After the Convention had been ratified in 1991,29 the ‘SGP issue’, as it had 
become known by then, was raised in the context of the Dutch reporting to the 
CEDAW Committee. The Government itself never mentioned the existence of 
this discriminatory political party in its reports. Women’s rights and human 
rights NGOs drew the attention of the Committee to this situation in a Shadow 
Report that was submitted on the basis of the Second and Third Dutch Country 
Report;30 these Country Reports were discussed by the Committee in 2001. In its 
Concluding Observations, the Committee pointed out that allowing the SGP’s 
discriminatory policy constituted a violation of the Convention.31 It repeated this 
stance in 2007.32 The Committee’s critical position drew some attention in the 
academic legal press,33 but it did not in any way alter the Government’s position in 
this regard.34 The Government maintained its argument that CEDAW allowed for 
a ‘balancing of rights’, in all legal procedures revolving around the SGP in which 
the Dutch State was directly or indirectly involved. It is now time to turn to these 
procedures and describe who instigated them and what their outcome was.
Het Vrouwenverdrag in de Nederlandse rechtsorde (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
1996) 89–90; L Groenman, C van Vleuten, R Holtmaat, T van Dijk and JHJ de Wildt, Het 
vrouwenverdrag in Nederland anno 1997 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 1997) 
81–85.
27 eg State Secretary of Social Affairs and Employment Ter Veld in the Parliamentary discussions 
about the ratification of CEDAW, Handelingen II, 3 July 1990, 85-4848.
28 See for an overview of the reaction of the Government on the CEDAW Committee’s Comments, 
I Boerefijn (n 14) 130. The Government’s estimation of the possibilities to justify unequal 
treatment of women under Article 7 was followed by all instances in the court proceedings, 
with the exception of the Regional Court of The Hague (see below), as was predicted by 
L Lijnzaad, ‘Het kussen van een kikker’ (1991) Nemesis 5, 13.
29 See the Kingdom Act of 3 July 1991 for the Ratification of the CEDAW-Convention (New York, 
18 December 1979), Staatsblad 1991, 355.
30 See Defective Acceleration; Shadow Report on the Second and Third Dutch Government’s 
Report to the CEDAW Committee, to be discussed at the 25th Session of the Committee 
(E-Quality 2000) <www.atria.nl/epublications/IAV_B00077823.pdf> accessed on 22 March 
2015.
31 Concluding Observations the Netherlands, CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/2–3 para 196.
32 Concluding Observations the Netherlands, CEDAW/C/NLD/CO/4 paras 25–26. The 
Committee, in para 25, expresses its concern about the fact that the State decided to launch 
an appeal against the 2005 District Court judgment in which it was ordered to withdraw the 
subsidy of the SG.
33 See eg C Flinterman and M Shuteriqi, ‘De Staatkunding Gerformeerde Partij, vrouwen en het 
recht’ (2002) 27 NJCM-Bulletin 336; M de Blois, ‘De Mannenpartij en het Vrouwenverdrag’ 
(2002) 18 Nemesis 173.
34 Letter dated 1 October 2001 from State Secretary of Social Affairs and Employment Verstand 
to the Second Chamber, Kamerstukken II 2001/02, SZW00-825.
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1.3. LEGAL PROCEDUR ES AGAINST THE SGP AND 
AGAINST THE DUTCH STATE SUPPORTING THE SGP
Between 1993 and 2012, as many as fourteen legal proceedings have been initiated 
by individual women, by feminist and human rights NGOs, and by the SGP itself, 
in all branches and at all levels of the Dutch legal system, finally resulting in a 
complaint by the SGP itself at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
Strasbourg. These procedures can be divided into four categories:
(1) 1993–2001:35 several proceedings against the SGP were initiated by individual 
women who wanted to gain full party membership and who stated that the 
SGP’s policy amounted to discrimination against women.
(2) 2004–2005: a coalition of NGOs brought a civil public interest lawsuit against 
the SGP in order to force the party leadership to change the party’s rules or 
byelaws and to accept female membership/female candidates on election lists.
(3) 2004–2010: the same coalition of NGOs brought civil public interest lawsuits 
against the Dutch State in order to force the State to take action to enforce 
women’s equal right to political participation.
(4) 2006–2012: the SGP itself instigated several court procedures in response 
to actions of the third type and the subsequent actions taken by the Dutch 
government on the basis of judgments in those procedures, culminating in 
the application to the ECtHR.36
The first type of legal action was fruitless. All individual women who started 
lawsuits against the SGP because of the discriminatory nature of the SGP’s policy 
and/or because they wanted to fully and equally participate in that political party 
(because this party best represented their world view), were either declared to be 
inadmissible, or lost their cases.37 In 1993, around twenty women made official 
complaints at a police station about discrimination by the SGP, but the public 
prosecutor dismissed these complaints because the exclusion of women from 
political participation was/is not a criminal offence under Dutch criminal law.38 
In an appeal to this decision of the prosecutor, the Appeal Court also reached the 
35 In 2010–2011 another individual tried to prevent the registration of the SGP for the national 
elections by making a formal complaint at the Electoral Council, which was declared 
inadmissible by the highest administrative court. See Administrative Jurisdiction Division of 
the Council of State (ABRvS) 27 January 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BP2851, AB 2011, 105. Since 
there is little information available about the identity of the individual and the substantive 
motivations in this procedure, I will not take it into consideration in my analysis.
36 The procedures of type 2, 3 and 4 and their outcomes are summarised in SGP v the Netherlands 
App no 58369/10 (ECtHR, 20 July 2012), NJ 2012, 478; AB 2012, 334, para 14–50.
37 See on these cases also Titia Loenen, ‘De SGP-discussie revisited’ (2010) Nederlands Juristen-
blad 2269.
38 A Mattijssen, ‘Wordt (niet) vervolgd?’ (1993) 9 Nemesis 172; and the press release of the Public 
Prosecution Service, ‘SGP wordt niet vervolgd’ (1995) 11 Nemesis 158.
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conclusion that the SGP’s exclusion of women did not amount to discrimination 
in the sense of the existing criminal law provisions.39
One woman instigated a civil lawsuit against the SGP to claim admission to 
the party, but also lost her case. It was found that she could not prove that she really 
desired membership of this political party, for she did not declare that she fully 
subscribed to the SGP’s reading of the Bible, in particular their reading as regards 
women’s role in life.40 Two complaints, furthermore, were issued at the Equal 
Treatment Commission, but this Commission concluded that the existing equal 
treatment legislation did not cover the area of political functions and political 
associations.41 One woman who was a member of the reformed protestant 
community, Ms Grabijn-Van Putten, very persistently tried to get access to party 
membership, but in the end gave up because she was threatened and harassed by 
members of her own community.42 Another woman, Ms Franssen, was also very 
persistent to get the SGP convicted for discrimination against women; she was 
involved in the criminal, the civil and the equal treatment route, all in vain.43 In 
short, for individual women who tried to change the SGP’s policy ‘from within’ 
no effective legal remedies were apparently available.44
The second type of legal action was also fruitless. In the early 2000s, a civil 
public interest lawsuit was brought against the SGP by a coalition of feminist 
and human rights NGOs. This coalition was deemed inadmissible by the court, 
mainly because it was unable to prove that it actually represented individual ‘SGP 
women’.45
The third type of legal action was eventually successful. In various procedures 
against the Dutch State, the same coalition of NGOs that brought a public interest 
39 The Hague Court of Appeal 30 November 1995, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:1995:AD2441, NJ 1996, 324.
40 District Court The Hague 1 November 1995, RN 1996, 539.
41 Equal Treatment Commission 30 December 1994, Decision 1994-16 and Decision 1994-17; 
Equal Treatment Commission 21 December 2001, Decision 2001-150. The Equal Treatment 
Commission is a pseudo-juridical, tribunal-type equality body that dealt with complaints 
under the (civil law) unequal treatment legislation. From 1 October 2012 onwards, the ETC 
has been replaced by the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR).
42 R Grabijn-van Putten wrote about her experiences in her booklet Ik wil het gewoon vertellen 
(Boekencentrum 1996). See also M van Amerongen, ‘Riet Grabijn-van Putten’ in De Groene 
Amsterdammer 10 July 1996, <www.groene.nl/1996/28/riet-grabijn-van-putten> accessed 
14 June 2015.
43 Mrs Franssen was involved in the procedures leading to the decision of the Regional Court 
The Hague not to instigate criminal proceedings against the SGP (District Court The Hague 
30 November 2006, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2006:AZ5393), in the first civil law (tort) case against the 
SGP (District Court The Hague 1 November 1995, RN 1996, 539); and in the first case before 
Equal Treatment Commission (Equal Treatment Commission 30 December 1994, Decision 
1994-16).
44 Against this background, the reproach, made by many commentators and even judges, that the 
coalition of NGOs had no business in interfering with the SGP’s internal affairs and that the 
women in the SGP should and could come forward themselves to claim their rights, is rather 
peculiar. See for this stance for example Oomen, ‘Between Rights Talk’ (n 14).
45 District Court The Hague 7 September 2005, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2005:AU2091, NJ 2005, 474. 
The coalition did lodge an appeal against this judgment, but did not actively continue this 
lawsuit against the SGP, after which the Appeal Court struck the case out of its list.
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lawsuit against the SGP was admitted as acting in the name of the general interest. 
The general interest in these cases was that Dutch society should be free from 
discrimination against women. It was therefore proposed that the State could not 
financially support a party that openly discriminated.
In 2005, the District Court of The Hague ordered the Dutch State to cease 
its subsidies for the SGP’s party organisation.46 The State and the SGP both 
appealed against this decision. The Court of Appeal in The Hague (in 2007)47 
and the Supreme Court (in 2010)48 both agreed with the District Court’s finding 
that Article 7 CEDAW has direct effect in the Dutch legal order and that the SGP 
was discriminating women (as is prohibited in inter alia Article 7(c) CEDAW). 
The State was ordered to take appropriate and effective measures to address this 
discrimination of women.49 The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court did not 
rule on the kind of action that should be taken. In terms of the separation of 
powers in a democratic State, it was deemed not the task for the judiciary to tell 
the State which measures it should take; thus the State had a discretionary power 
to decide what would be the most appropriate action to put an end to the SGP’s 
discriminatory policy.50 This meant that after six years of legal proceedings, in 
2010 the coalition of NGOs had finally won its case insofar that the Dutch State 
was held accountable for allowing the SGP to breach Article 7(c) of CEDAW.
The fourth type of legal action consisted of legal procedures brought by the 
SGP itself against the Dutch State. The State’s decision not to subsidise the SGP 
after the 2005 District Court judgment, was in the end successfully appealed 
by the SGP in an administrative law procedure. After the SGP lost its lawsuit 
against the State in first instance,51 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of 
the Council of State by contrast held that the Law on Party Subsidies did not offer 
sufficient grounds to refuse the SGP financial support.52 The withdrawal of the 
subsidy, from that perspective, was illegal.53
46 District Court The Hague 7 September 2005, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2005:AU2088, NJ 2005, 473.
47 The Hague Court of Appeal 20 December 2007, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2007:BC0619, NJ 2008, 133.
48 Supreme Court of the Netherlands 9 April 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010BK4547, NJ 2010, 388; AB 
2010, 190.
49 The Supreme Court’s judgment was heavily debated in the press as well as in the legal academic 
literature. See eg S van Bijsterveld, ‘Het passief kiesrecht, de staat en de SGP’ (2010) 1 TRRB 
81; Loenen (n 37); and R Schutgens and J Sillen, ‘De SGP, het rechterlijk bevel en het kiesrecht’ 
(2010) NJB 1114. Annotations on this judgment appeared in inter alia NJ 2010, 388 (Alkema); 
AB 2010, 189 (Van Ommeren); and Gemeentestem 2010, 63 (Broeksteeg).
50 In fact, the Dutch State, after the 2010 Supreme Court judgment, merely declared to wait and 
see whether the SGP would bring an application to the ECtHR. See C Flintermann and I Lintel, 
‘Vrouwen verkiesbaar bij de SGP: een kwestie van tijd en politiek?’ (2011) NJB 2029.
51 District Court The Hague 30 November 2006, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2006:AZ5393.
52 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (ABRvS) 5 December 2007, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2007, AB 2008, 35.
53 The Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State also gave several other 
arguments for its decision, which was made under the guise of a ‘weighing of interests and 
rights’ by this Court.
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Furthermore, the SGP submitted a complaint to the ECtHR after the 2010 
Supreme Court’s judgment that ordered the Dutch State to take appropriate 
and effective measures to address the discrimination of women by the SGP. 
According to the SGP, this judgment violated the right to freedom of religion, 
freedom of expression and freedom of association. The ECtHR held (simply put) 
that there was nothing wrong with the Dutch Supreme Court judgment and, in an 
inadmissibility decision, declared the SGP’s complaint manifestly ill-founded.54
The judgment of the Supreme Court and the decision of the ECtHR were 
considered a victory for the feminist and human rights NGOs, who thought 
that the Dutch government now finally had to take effective action against this 
political party. However, it was still not in hurry to do so.55 It was only after a ‘good 
conversation’ with the government that, in 2013, the SGP’s General Assembly 
voted in favour of allowing women to be eligible for being a candidate on the 
Party’s election lists.56 In March 2014, for the very first time in its history, a woman 
stood candidate for the SGP, winning a seat in the Local Council of Vlissingen. 
Finally, after almost twenty years of various types of court procedures, change 
had been achieved.57
2. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL 
PROBLEM AS AN ISSUE OF UNEQUAL 
TREATMENT OF WOMEN
This section analyses the legal construction of the procedures that were 
described above. What would, at least in theory, have been the options to 
legally construct or ‘frame’ the cases against the SGP and/or against the State? 
It appears that the legal norm of equal treatment of men and women was the 
focal point of all legal procedures and of the academic and political discourses 
surrounding the SGP’s exclusion of women. As a consequence of the focus on 
unequal treatment of women, three issues became important: comparability, 
disadvantage, and justifications for the unequal treatment. In the latter context, 
54 SGP v the Netherlands no 58369/10 (ECtHR, 20 July 2012), NJ 2012, 478; AB 2012, 334. The 
ECtHR also considered that in fact the SGP was not a victim of any violation of the ECHR 
because the State had as yet not taken any action against the party.
55 Letter dated 12 October 2012 of the Minister of Interior to the Second Chamber, Kamerstukken 
II 2012–13, 28 481, no 19.
56 See an article in Dutch daily NRC Handelsblad <www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/03/16/politiek-
ongeschikt-maar-vooruit-vrouwen-mogen-van-de-sgp-op-de-kieslijst/> accessed 15 June 
2015. After this development, the Minister of Interior announced that no further action on 
the basis of the Supreme Court’s judgment was necessary. See Kamerstukken 2012–13, 28 481, 
no 20.
57 It is debated whether the court procedures in fact hastened or slowed down this process. 
Oomen argued that the Court proceedings by the coalition of NGOs against the SGP only led 
to a strengthening of the belief of the SGP constituency that their position was ‘right’. See in 
particular Oomen et al, ‘CEDAW’ (n 14).
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the main point of dispute became one of ‘clashing fundamental rights’ and of a 
weighing or balancing of women’s right to equality against other fundamental 
rights. However, the fact that the SGP’s ideology is an example par excellence of 
gender stereotyping, apparently did not put any weight in the scales. Only the 
inadmissibility decision of the ECtHR forms an exception to this rule. In the last 
part of this section I will therefore analyse how this Court, within the framework 
of application of the formal equality principle, did effectively address the gender 
stereotypes that underlie the SGP’s patriarchal ideology.
2 .1. FOUR DIFFER ENT POSSIBILITIES TO LEGALLY 
ADDR ESS THE SGP’S POLICY TO EXCLUDE WOMEN 
FROM POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
The issue of the exclusion by the SGP of women from membership and on their 
election lists can be constructed as a legal issue in at least four different ways.58
(1) The beliefs and practices concerning the exclusion of women of the SGP 
(the SGP policy) amount to a denial of the fundamental right to political 
participation of women. Under international human rights law all human 
beings have the right to active and passive political participation. These human 
rights documents further specify that these rights exist without distinction.59 
States Parties to these Treaties have a negative duty not to interfere with these 
rights; and, most importantly, a positive duty to ensure that these rights can 
be enjoyed effectively by all who are formally eligible (eg on the basis of their 
nationality, citizenship or age).60 In the Netherlands, the right to active and 
passive political participation is laid down in Article 4 of the Constitution, 
58 See about the fact that any ‘story’ allows to be transformed into a particular ‘legal issue’ in 
many different ways S Baer, ‘A Closer Look at Law: Human Rights as Multi-level Sites of 
Struggles over Multi-dimensional Equality’ (2010) 6 Utrecht LR 56. Baer, at 63, calls this the 
tendency to fetishise the law. She contends, at 63: ‘Then, discussions of conflicts in human 
rights focus on court decisions which react to insular claims, again reduced to an abstract 
narrative of “key” facts and “the” law applicable thereto. … Then it is “cases” which are 
discussed, rather than “experience”, and “cases” seem to be clear, while experience is personal, 
ambivalent, shifting, contextual, where details matter.’ She concludes, at 74: ‘Finally there is 
this tendency to fetishise the law, to frame complex problems as binary clashes, to disregard 
multilevel regulation and the richness of norms which may inform a solution to a problem.’
59 See inter alia Articles 1 jo 55 UN Charter; Article 2 ICCPR; Article 2(2) ICESCR; and Article 
14 ECHR. The latter right is explicitly accessory (it guarantees that the rights under the 
Convention can be enjoyed without discrimination), but nevertheless got a free-standing 
meaning; as a consequence the ECtHR ‘balances’ this right against other Convention Rights. 
See A Stuart, ‘Without distinction – a defining principle?’ in E Brems (ed), Conflicts between 
Fundamental Rights (Intersentia 2008) 111ff.
60 The positive duty to ensure that fundamental human rights are ensured ‘without distinction’ 
can also be derived from the more specific non-discrimination treaties, such as CERD, 
CEDAW and CRPD.
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which stipulates expressly that these rights belong to all Dutch nationals on a 
basis of equality.
(2) The policy of the SGP amounts to unequal treatment of women as compared 
to men; women do not have the right to be a full party member and/or to 
represent the community in elected political bodies and in public offices while 
men do have these rights. In legal terms: the SGP’s policy is violating several 
international legal norms/human rights provisions in which women’s right 
to equal treatment has been laid down, most notably Article 7(c) CEDAW.61 
In terms of national law: the SGP’s policy amounts to a violation of the 
prohibition of discrimination as enshrined in the Dutch Constitution.62 
The equal treatment or non-discrimination norm has also been laid down in 
criminal law and in equal treatment laws;63 however, these laws do not cover 
the area of political participation.
(3) Women belonging to traditional SGP communities and/or women in the 
wider orthodox Protestant communities from which the SGP derives its 
support, have the right to take part in all aspects of the formation and practising 
of their (religious) beliefs, customs and practices and to act as spokespersons for 
these communities. In the words of Article 13(c) CEDAW, women have the 
right to ‘participate in … all aspect of cultural life’ on the ‘basis of equality 
between men and women’. For this international right, no equivalent exists 
under Dutch law. However, since the Netherlands has a monist system, such 
a transposition in Dutch law is not necessary, provided that the international 
norm is clear and precise enough to be applied directly in the Dutch legal 
order; which in this case is debatable.
(4) The policy of the SGP amounts to gender stereotyping because it reflects a 
deeply rooted, religiously inspired ideology about the different roles of men 
and women in life. In legal terms, the SGP’s policy as regards women amounts 
to – in the words of Article 5(a) of CEDAW – ‘prejudices and customary 
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the 
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women’. 
Although the SGP, as well as the reformed protestant community in which 
it is based, has the freedom to adhere to such an ideology,64 the Dutch State 
is under an international legal obligation to put an end to the practice. For 
61 Invoking CEDAW in procedures against the SGP is problematic because the SGP is not a 
party to these human rights treaties and is therefore not directly bound by the norms that 
they entail. Therefore, this provision in fact only played a role in the third type of legal actions 
against the SGP’s policy, ie holding the Dutch State accountable for allowing this violation of 
women’s right to equality by means of subsidising the SGP.
62 Although it is recognised that this constitutional provision can have horizontal effect, it was 
not successfully invoked in the procedures of types 1 and 2.
63 In particular Article 137f of the Criminal Code and the General Equal Treatment Act of 1994.
64 This freedom of conscience or political conviction is guaranteed under international law, but 
always under the restriction that the rights and interests of others are nor disproportionately 
affected.
Intersentia 157
The Head of the Woman is the Man
this international right, there is also no equivalent under Dutch law. Again, 
transposition is not a condition for applicability of this norm, provided that 
it is considered to be clear and precise enough; which in this case is also 
debatable.
The difference between the first and second conceptualisation of the issue 
may appear to be a matter of nuance or may even seem trivial, but in fact is 
crucial. When the human right to vote and to be elected are put central in the 
construction of a legal issue that is put before the court, the question of whether 
there is equality when granting these rights becomes an essential normative 
feature of that right as such. The right to political participation exists as a human 
right for all; denying that right to a particular group of people is by definition 
unacceptable. Equality, in that perspective, is a crucial feature of the right that is 
invoked; without equality this right does not even exist. In the words of Stuart: ‘It 
is contended that the non-discrimination norm was designed to shape the content 
of each human right internally so as to guarantee that human rights were ensured 
without distinction. The norm [of non-distinction] cannot therefore be used in an 
external balancing process. It is part, and foundation, of each human right.’65 She 
continues to remark that ‘[t]he duty on the state to ensure human rights without 
distinction is a stark and simple one. In none of the multiple references to it is 
there any mention of an allowable limitation to that right.’66 This is very different 
in the free standing human right to non-discrimination: this ‘right to equality’ is 
open to bring forward ‘objective justifications’.
The construction of a legal case against the SGP and/or the Dutch State, as a 
violation of the norms laid down in inter alia Article 5 and Article 13 of CEDAW, 
is problematic as long as these norms are deemed to be of a too general and 
programmatic nature to be invoked in a concrete legal dispute and as long as no 
transposition in Dutch law has taken place.67 However, Article 5 CEDAW could 
and should be invoked as interpretative tool for any of the other rights at stake (in 
our case: the right to political participation).68 In its General Recommendation 
No 28 the Committee made it clear that, on the basis of Article 2(c), ‘States parties 
must ensure that courts are bound to apply the principle of equality as embodied 
in the Convention and to interpret the law, to the maximum extent possible, in 
65 Stuart (n 59) 102.
66 Ibid 106.
67 The norms in CEDAW, for a very long time, were seen as ‘programmatic’ by Dutch courts. In 
that sense, it was a victory of the coalition of NGOs that at least the civil courts, including the 
Supreme Court, accepted that Article 7 did have direct effect in the Dutch legal order.
68 Article 5 is placed in the part of the Convention that contains the general obligations of the 
States Parties. This means that it should play a role in the interpretation and implementation 
of all substantive Convention rights. See Christine Chinkin and Marsha A Freeman, 
‘Introduction’ in Freeman et al (eds) (n 1) 8.
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line with the obligations of States parties under the Convention.’69 As regards the 
right to political participation, it is of crucial importance that the Committee, 
in General Recommendation No 23, made explicit reference to the detrimental 
effects of gender stereotypes for women’s realisation of their political rights:
In all nations, the most significant factors inhibiting women’s ability to participate 
in public life have been the cultural framework of values and religious beliefs, the 
lack of services and men’s failure to share the tasks associated with the organisation 
of the household and with the care and raising of children. In all nations, cultural 
traditions and religious beliefs have played a part in confining women to the 
private spheres of activity and excluding them from active participation in public 
life.70
Although at some points the Dutch courts did show awareness of the existence of 
this General Recommendation,71 its content, in particular in relation to gender 
stereotyping, did not make any difference in the way they evaluated and weighed 
the various rights that were invoked in the case.
In addition to the use of Article 5 in the construction of the legal issue, 
Article 13 could and should have been used to argue that women belonging to 
traditional SGP communities and/or women in the wider orthodox Protestant 
communities from which the SGP derives its support, have the right to take part 
in all aspects of the formation and practising of their (religious) beliefs, customs 
and practices and to act as spokespersons for these communities.72 On the basis 
of Article 13 the stance of the male leadership of the SGP, ie that only they were 
capable of speaking on behalf of this religious community, could and should 
have been contested. According to Shaheed, giving women a voice about how 
they interpret their belief and how they experience particular traditional or 
religious practices is a prerequisite for the correct implementation of the human 
right to culture.73 Another possible consequence of including this right into the 
construction of the case is the avoidance of granting fundamental rights, such as 
the right to freedom of political association, to the SGP as a group, instead of to 
69 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties 
under Article 2, para 33.
70 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 23 on Political and Public Life, para 10.
71 See in particular District Court The Hague 7 September 2005, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2005:AU2088, 
NJ 2005, 473, in the case of the coalition against the Dutch State, para 3.21, quoting from 
CEDAW, General Recommendation 23, paras 32–34.
72 This seems to be an argument of Loenen in her comment on the Supreme Court judgment of 
2010, although she does not mention this provision of CEDAW. See Loenen (n 37). See on the 
content and scope of women’s right to cultural participation the report on gender and cultural 
rights by UN Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights, F Shaheed, Report to the UN General 
Assembly 10 August 2012, UN A/67/287.
73 Shaheed (n 72).
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individual believers and citizens.74 As for cultural and religious rights, frequently 
the claim is made that these rights belong to the cultural or religious group as 
such, thus – in the words of Baer – often amounting to ‘groupism’:
Whenever a ‘culture’ or a ‘religion’ claims recognition, we have the problem of 
reification, in that this suggests that the culture or religion is homogenous. We 
also usually have the problem of elitism, since and when such collective claims are 
not defined by all members of the relevant entity.75
In the legal cases revolving around the SGP, the fact that no individual woman 
from that community was actually represented by the coalition of NGOs and 
the fact that (some) SGP women had openly declared that they did not want 
to support legal procedures against this party was deemed to be problematic. 
The civil public interest lawsuit brought against the SGP by the coalition was 
therefore deemed inadmissible by the court.76 In this case, it was presented as a 
fact that SGP women preferred to discuss the issue internally.77 However, none of 
the courts, nor any of the academics writing on the topic, directly contested the 
ability and authority of the SGP all male leadership to represent ‘their’ women 
in these court procedures. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Cultural 
Rights, ‘whenever “gender-biased social arrangements are defended in the name 
of culture, the purported cultural norms need to be challenged”, by asking, inter 
alia … whether these norms are representative of the community, or are simply 
a generalization of the narrow interests of a few; and whose power is preserved 
through the use of the purported cultural norms?’78 Clearly, that did not happen 
in the cases revolving around the SGP.
2 .2 . THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SGP’S POLICY AS 
A CASE OF UNEQUAL TR EATMENT OF WOMEN
As regards the choice between the first and second possible way of constructing 
an issue of equality in relation to a human rights violation, Stuart notes that 
human rights treaty bodies and other judicial bodies have ‘rather than treating 
74 On the topic of cultural rights as individual human rights, see Y Donders, Towards a Right to 
Cultural Identity? (Antwerp 2002); and Y Donders, ‘The Legal Framework of the Right to Take 
Part in Cultural Life’ in Y Donders and V Volodin (eds), Human Rights in Education, Science 
and Culture (Unesco 2007).
75 Baer (n 58) 59. In this quote she refers to R Brubacker, Ethnicity without Groups (HUP 2006). 
Baer, at 60, warns against legal recognition of group rights, since ‘a collective freedom tends to 
trump individual rights.’
76 District Court The Hague 7 September 2005, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2005:AU2091, NJ 2005, 474.
77 Ibid para 3.9. See Oomen et al, ‘CEDAW’ (n 14), who describe this preference of the SGP 
women for internal discussion.
78 UN Special Rapporteur on Cultural Rights (n 72), para 68 (reference omitted).
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the non-discrimination norm as integral to, and part of, each human right, [have] 
separated the duty not to discriminate in the fulfilment of each human right, from 
the development of the scope of the duty to ensure them without distinction, and 
treated the non-discrimination norm as a substantive human right to be balanced 
alongside any other human right.’79 This tendency is clearly visible in the SGP 
cases.80 In practice, in all four types of legal proceedings revolving around the 
SGP’s policy of exclusion of women, the second construction or ‘legal framing’ 
of this situation prevailed to the exclusion of the other three possibilities, ie the 
central argument of the claimants was that the unequal treatment of women 
(as compared to men) by the SGP was prohibited under (international and/or 
national) law and/ or that the State should put an end to that unequal treatment 
or at least not support it any longer.81
The SGP’s stance on the role of women was seen as a violation of women’s 
human right to have access to all aspects of political participation ‘on a basis of 
equality with men’ as laid down in (inter alia) Article 7(c) CEDAW. This means, 
that the ‘separate equality norm’ became applicable, the consequences of which 
will be discussed below. Another feature of this construction of the legal issue 
was that Article 7 was invoked without putting that provision in the context of 
Articles 5(a) and 13(c) CEDAW, or in the context of the general object and purpose 
of the Convention as such.82 As a result, the principle of equality as included in 
CEDAW was read in a rather formalistic way, not taking into account the fact that 
the Convention (for example in Articles 3 and 4) also appeals to States Parties to 
actively contribute to enhancing women’s de facto equality and to see equality as 
a transformative principle.83
What is striking when analysing the extensive case law and academic 
literature that resulted from the legal procedures around the SGP, is that neither 
the claimants in the procedures (particularly the coalition of NGOs), nor the 
judges, nor any of the academic commentators on this case law in any way 
directly addressed the underlying patriarchal ideology of this party as being 
79 Stuart (n 59) 101.
80 See on this general tendency to rephrase almost every anti-oppression or anti-exclusion claim 
made by feminists into an equality claim, Holtmaat, ‘Van Gelijke Behandeling’ (n 13). See for 
a critique of the ‘equality paradigm’ in law also Hunter (ed) (n 12).
81 I made this latter argument myself in my only (published) contribution in all these years to the 
legal debate surrounding the SGP’s policy. See Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Wèl het opgeheven vingertje, 
maar niet de hand in eigen boezem’ (2001) NJB 2001 1800. There, I argued that the most 
appropriate action against the SGP would be to (try to) get a court order in which the State 
would be compelled to stop subsidising this political party.
82 See Holtmaat, ‘CEDAW’ (n 1). On this omission, I wrote an article together with Alexandra 
Timmer: ‘De SGP-zaak anders bekeken. Maar een holistische uitleg van artikel 7 
VN-Vrouwenverdrag’ (2011) 36 NTM/NJCM-bulletin, 445.
83 On the transformative potential of CEDAW, see S Fredman, ‘Beyond the dichotomy of formal 
and substantive equality. Towards new definitions of equal rights’ in I Boerefijn et al (eds), 
Temporary special measures. Accelerating de facto equality of women under article 4(1) UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (Intersentia 
2003).
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discriminatory against women in itself.84 The primordial claim was that the actual 
practices of the SGP (the refusal to admit women as members and the refusal 
to put women on the election lists) based on this patriarchal belief amounted 
to unequal treatment of women as compared to men; women did not have the 
right to full party membership and/or to represent their religious community in 
elected political bodies and in public offices, while men did have these rights. 
In legal terms: the SGP’s policy was violating several international legal norms/
human rights provisions in which women’s right to equal treatment has been laid 
down, most notably Article 7(c) CEDAW. The legal framing of an issue as a matter 
of unequal treatment (in this case on the ground of sex) has serious implications 
for the way a Court will analyse or test whether indeed the legal norm of equal 
treatment or non-discrimination has been violated.85 In particular, issues of 
comparability, disadvantage and justification have proven to be important 
‘hurdles’ in this test, as is also visible in the SGP cases.
The requirements of comparability and the existence of a disadvantage and 
the possibility to bring forward objective justifications.
The first result of framing something as an issue of unequal treatment on the 
ground of sex is that it immediately raises questions about the comparability of 
men and women: are women in this regard (in this case: political participation) 
indeed comparable, ie ‘equal’ to men?86 This opens the door to bring forward 
(presumed or ‘real’) differences between men and women, like biological, 
reproductive differences. Or, as in the case of the SGP, the fact that the Bible 
ascribes very different characteristics and roles to men and women, which roles 
are seen as ‘God-given’ and therefore unchangeable.87 The SGP consistently 
84 With the exception of the ECtHR in the very last stage of the proceedings. See the last part 
of this section. A reason for not openly addressing/redressing the SGP’s patriarchal ideology 
could be that in discrimination law there is a general tendency to only prohibit concrete acts/
deeds, not the ideas or ideologies that inspire these deeds, at least not when they are not openly 
provoking violence against protected groups (hate speech and incitement to discriminatory 
violence as prohibited forms of discrimination). This may be due to the very strong protection 
that the freedom of thought and the freedom of expression have gained in international 
human rights law; in particular when this ‘expression’ is related to religion. An example of this 
hesitance to prohibit speech acts is the fact that in Dutch criminal law sexist speech acts (eg 
in commercial advertising) are not prohibited. See on this division between ‘acts’ and ‘speech 
acts’, Judith Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution; An Essay in Phenomenology 
and Feminist Theory’ (1988) 40 Theatre Journal 519.
85 There is extensive literature on the construction of this test. See in particular Janneke Gerards, 
Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005).
86 Although formally being two different issues, the question whether there is comparability 
in many cases gets easily mixed up with the question whether there is a justification. See 
Gerards (n 85). See also S Moreau, ‘Equality Rights and the Relevance of Comparator Groups’ 
(2006) 5 JL&Equality 81. One of the main problems with comparability in a formal equal 
treatment claim is that this requirement tends to reinforce gender stereotypes: the claimant 
has to compare her position with the position of the defendant, who can state to be relevantly 
different on the basis of existing gender roles or stereotypes.
87 Often descriptive and prescriptive stereotypes about the differences between men and women 
are interwoven. See on this topic Cook and Cusack (n 9).
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argued that although men and women are of equal worth and dignity, they are 
not equal or similar and therefore equal treatment is not called for. Although this 
argument was not accepted by the courts, it was also not contested or rejected as 
not viable (or ‘void’) in the light of the principles expressed in the international 
treaties that guarantee human rights for all.
The second result of this way of framing the issue is that it implies that some 
or all women in the Netherlands have been done injustice to because they have 
experienced the disadvantage of having been denied benefits or having been 
subjected to particular burdens that are unfavourable for them as compared to the 
treatment given to men. Often this requirement is an obstacle for women since the 
existence of an actual disadvantage is difficult to prove.88 In the SGP cases, due to 
this requirement an individual reformed protestant woman lost her civil law case, 
for she had not proven that she actually fully subscribed to the SGP’s founding 
principles and because she was free to become a member of another party or to 
found her own party. Therefore, she was not supposed to be disadvantaged by the 
SGP’s exclusion of women. In the coalition’s cases against the SGP and the State, 
the same argument was made by the SGP and the Dutch State: women in the 
Netherlands were, supposedly, not in any way disadvantaged by the SGP’s policy 
because they were free to either become members of other political parties or to 
found their own new party.89 In particular women belonging to Dutch reformed 
protestant communities were supposedly not disadvantaged because it was 
assumed that they themselves also adhered to the same interpretation of the Bible 
as not allowing women to ‘govern over men’. And even if they would not adhere 
to this belief any longer, it was possible for them to found a new political party on 
the basis of their own interpretation of the Bible.90
Here, the difference with the first possible construction of the legal issue, as 
described above, becomes very visible. From the perspective of the fundamental 
human right to participate in the democratic process, women and men are equal. 
This right is enshrined in the Dutch Constitution and in many international 
human rights treaties. Comparability or actually being ‘similarly situated’ and 
88 For that reason, some scholars argue that not causing disadvantage but causing harm 
should be the standard. For example, sexual harassment does not cause a disadvantage for 
women as compared to men, but is harmful in the sense of violating women’s dignity. This 
is visible in the different definition of direct and indirect discrimination as compared to the 
definition of (sexual) harassment in the EU (Recast) Sex Equality Directive. See Article 2 
of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5  July 2006 on 
the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L204/23.
89 This argument was not accepted by the judges in the civil law cases of the coalition of NGOs 
against the Dutch State, but it did play a role in the way the Administrative Jurisdiction 
Division of the Council of State balanced the interests involved in the administrative law case 
of the SGP against the State when its subsidy was withdrawn.
90 This argument was very important in the judgment of the highest administrative court, the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (ABRvS) 5 December 2007, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2007, AB 2008, 35.
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/ or having experienced a disadvantage as compared to men is not at all an issue 
when the legal issue is framed as a human rights violation. The right to equality is 
part and parcel of the right to political participation and cannot and should not 
be separated from it. In the words of Stuart, ‘the non-distinction norm delineates 
the content of each human right’.91
Alternative ways of constructing a disadvantage were absent in this equality 
framing. Is the disadvantage, injustice or harm that Dutch women, or more 
specifically Dutch reformed protestant women, experienced as a consequence of 
the policy of the SGP, really that men possessed something that women did not 
possess? Or is perhaps the harm done to the women who are member of that 
Protestant community that, apparently, they do not have the freedom to decide 
what is the proper role for a woman, and are denied the possibility to define 
what it means (for them) to be a woman? And could the harm done to them not 
also be that they apparently (according to the SGP Party’s byelaws) are not in a 
position to co-decide what exactly the Bible entails in this regards? (Article 13(c) 
of CEDAW) Although they are a member of the reformed protestant community 
and want to stay a member of that community, they may want to bring forward 
and effectuate a different understanding of the Bible, one that does not exclude 
women from active political work as a party representative in elected organs of 
the democratic society.92 And is it not harmful more generally (to Dutch women 
and men) that the Dutch State allows for the existence and even subsidises a 
party that stereotypes women according to patriarchal norms? Should the legal 
question not have been whether, or to what extent, the State has an obligation 
under Article 2(f) in conjunction with Article 5(a) CEDAW to put an end to this 
policy of the SGP, or at least not to support it any longer by means of granting 
subsidies to this political party?
The third, and in my view most important consequence of framing an issue 
as ‘unequal treatment on the ground of sex’, is that this construction opens the 
door for the defendant(s) to bring objective justifications.93 In the case of the 
SGP, the rights to religious freedom and/or freedom of political association were 
brought forward (both by the SGP and the Dutch State) as justifications for the 
SGP’s policy as regards women and for the State’s support to this political party. 
In particular in the legal proceedings of the coalition of NGOs and the SGP itself 
91 Stuart (n 59) 121.
92 There is some evidence that quite a few women who belong to the SGP’s traditional constituency 
had different opinions, but preferred to have that discussion internally, instead of by means of 
a legal procedure that was instigated by feminist outsiders. See Oomen et al, ‘CEDAW’ (n 14). 
There is also evidence that at least one woman did, in vain, try to change the party from within, 
then opted for legal procedures, but in the end had to give up because of serious intimidations 
from the side of other members of her community. See Grabbijn van Putten (n 42).
93 This is because, at least at the level of international human rights law (eg Art 14 ECHR) and 
Dutch constitutional law, the (separate) prohibition of unequal treatment is not absolute, but 
may be ‘objectively justified’ when there is a legitimate aim and the means to achieve that aim 
(ie the unequal treatment) are proportional, ie appropriate and necessary.
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against the Dutch State,94 the debates focussed on the question to what extent the 
State could or should limit fundamental freedoms of the SGP in order to uphold 
the principle of sex equality.
In this regard, there is again a crucial difference between the first and the 
second possible legal construction of the issue. The argument that the rights to 
religious freedom and/or to freedom of (political) association would be violated 
if the SGP were to be compelled to accept women as members of the party, is 
not valid (or even irrelevant) from the perspective that the fundamental right 
to political participation belongs to all human beings, without any exception. 
Weighing or balancing the right to equality against other ‘conflicting’ rights that 
are brought forward by way of justification for the unequal treatment is therefore 
not appropriate, according to Stuart: ‘As the non-distinction norm delineates the 
content of each human right, it is misleading to talk about there being a clash 
between the non-distinction norm and a substantive human right as if they were 
human rights of equal weight.’95
In the context of the SGP cases there was a lot of critique about whether the 
right to equality was by definition an ‘absolute’ right, which was (implicitly) the 
stance of the coalition in their pleas.96 In fact, the stance taken by Stuart was not 
accepted by any of the participants in the legal and political discourse surrounding 
the SGP court cases. The issue was constructed from the very beginning not as a 
matter of the right to political participation per se, which right belongs to all, but 
as a matter of unequal treatment of women in respect to this right. The possibility 
to bring forward justifications for the unequal treatment by the SGP, in the form 
of an appeal to other rights or interests on the side of the SGP, was deemed in 
principle possible by almost all judges and academic commentators, because ‘the 
right to equality cannot automatically prevail over other fundamental rights.’97 
The only exception was the District Court of The Hague in the civil law suit of 
the coalition of NGOs against the Dutch State, which decided that the drafters 
of CEDAW had already made the assessment which right should prevail and that 
therefore there was no room for any balancing or weighing of other rights or 
interests, at least not in case a political party was involved in the conflict. This was 
the most far-reaching decision in this regard, which left no room for justifications 
in this particular equality case. On the basis of an examination of the travaux 
préparatoires of Article 7, the District Court concluded that the drafters of 
CEDAW did not intend to make the right to equality in general superior to the 
94 The cases described under types 3 and 4 in section 1 of this chapter. In cases of types 1 and 2 
the balancing act did not take place because these cases were deemed inadmissible or were lost 
for other reasons.
95 Stuart (n 59) 121.
96 The coalition did not phrase it as such, but stated that the principle of sex-equality should 
outweigh other possible rights or interests (based on papers submitted to the Courts by the 
coalition; on file with the author).
97 This was a recurring statement, both in the judgments and in the annotations and academic 
articles that were published in reaction to them.
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right to freedom of association; this was different, however, in the situation where 
political parties were involved. Besides, the Dutch State had made no reservation 
to this article; therefore the right to equality should prevail.98 This judgment, 
however, was fiercely criticised by several commentators,99 and was subsequently 
reversed as regards that particular part of its reasoning in the judgments of the 
Appeal Court and the Supreme Court.
Although the coalition of NGOs in the end won the case against the State, the 
question whether the State somehow was under a duty under Article 5(a) CEDAW 
to modify/eliminate the patriarchal views and practices of this political party, or 
were under a duty under Article 13(c) CEDAW to effectively guarantee protestant 
women to co-determine the content of their own religious ‘culture’, was never 
raised. In that sense, the legal arguments that were put in the judges’ scales to be 
weighed or balanced against the fundamental rights of the SGP were definitely 
incomplete.100
2 .3. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF JUSTIFYING 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN WITH 
AN APPEAL TO TR ADITIONAL GENDER ROLES
Only one court explicitly addressed this political party’s patriarchal ideology and 
declared that it is not legally possible to justify the exclusion of women from the 
enjoyment of a (human) right solely with a call upon such an ideology. After the 
Dutch State had lost its Supreme Court case against the coalition of NGOs, the 
SGP complained in Strasbourg that the State (by means of this judgment alone) 
had violated its rights under the Convention. Although the case was declared 
inadmissible, the principles expressed by the ECtHR in this document are very 
important.
Firstly, the ECtHR has some notable things to say about the relationship 
between the right to political participation for all and the concept of democracy.101 
Secondly, the issue of the patriarchal values underlying the SGP’s policy was finally 
98 See also Boerefijn (n 14) 126–27.
99 District Court The Hague 7 September 2005, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2005:AU2088, NJ 2005, 473. 
Annotations appeared in AB 2005, 398 (Kanne and Nehmelman), NJCM-Bulletin 2005, 8 (De 
Blois and Loenen). See also H Dölle, ‘De SGP onder vuur’ in Jaarboek Documentatiecentrum 
Nederlandse Politieke Partijen 2005 (DNPP 2006); M Busstra, ‘De afweging afgewogen’ (2008) 6 
Themis 235; G Leenknegt, ‘Het gelijkheidsbeginsel en de scheppingsorde: een staatsrechtelijke 
botsproef ’, (2005) 54 AA 659.
100 In section 3 I will return to the metaphors that are predominantly used in this ‘balancing’ or 
‘weighing’ discourse.
101 See paras 69–71 of this judgment. In particular, the Court reiterates (in para 71) ‘that a 
political party may, under the Convention, pursue its political aims on two conditions: firstly, 
the means used to those ends must be legal and democratic; secondly, the changes proposed 
must themselves be compatible with fundamental democratic principles (see Refah Partisi and 
Others, cited above, § 98).’
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addressed by this human rights Court, although only in one brief and rather 
cryptic paragraph. After having confirmed (in para 72) that ‘the advancement of 
the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council 
of Europe’ and that ‘very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a 
difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with 
the Convention’, the Court, in para 73 continues:
Moreover, the Court has held that nowadays the advancement of the equality of 
the sexes in the member States of the Council of Europe prevents the State from 
lending its support to views of the man’s role as primordial and the woman’s as 
secondary.
The ECtHR at this point inter alia refers to the Grand Chamber judgment in 
Konstantin Markin .102 In order to understand how the Court applies the principle 
of formal equality here, it is useful to have a brief look at that judgment. In 
Konstantin Markin, the ECtHR makes it clear that, as far as justifications for 
unequal treatment are concerned:
[I]n particular, references to traditions, general assumptions or prevailing social 
attitudes in a particular country are insufficient justification for a difference in 
treatment on grounds of sex. For example, States are prevented from imposing 
traditions that derive from the man’s primordial role and the woman’s secondary 
role in the family.103
Assessing the case of the applicant Markin, a military serviceman who had no 
statutory right to three years’ parental leave while servicewomen were entitled to 
such leave, the Court concludes (para 143):
that the reference to the traditional distribution of gender roles in society cannot 
justify the exclusion of men, including servicemen, from the entitlement to parental 
leave. The Court agrees with the Chamber that gender stereotypes, such as the 
perception of women as primary child-carers and men as primary breadwinners, 
cannot, by themselves, be considered to amount to sufficient justification for a 
difference in treatment, any more than similar stereotypes based on race, origin, 
colour or sexual orientation.
The ECtHR, contrary to the Dutch courts in the SGP cases, is sensitive to the 
underlying gender stereotypes of certain (different or unequal) rights granted to 
102 Konstantin Markin v Russia App no 30078/06 (ECtHR [GC], 22 March 2012). See on this 
case in relation to the issue of gender stereotyping, Alexandra Timmer, ‘From inclusion to 
transformation: rewriting Konstantin Markin v. Russia’ in Eva Brems (ed), Diversity and 
European Human Rights. Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR (CUP 2013).
103 Konstantin Markin v Russia App no 30078/06 (ECtHR [GC], 22 March 2012) para 127.
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men and women, and uses this knowledge to clearly point out that such ideologies 
or traditional values cannot justify any unequal treatment between the sexes. 
Without explicitly mentioning it, the ECtHR applies a norm that was already 
broadly accepted in international human rights law long before this judgment.104
3. THE METAPHORS USED IN THE JUSTIFICATION 
TEST IN SEX-EQUALITY CASES
This section briefly addresses the detrimental effects of using the language of 
‘conflicting rights’. This language is predominant in any situation where it is 
argued that women have a right to equal treatment, but where the other party 
– due to the fact that it is possible to bring forward objective justifications – 
appeals to one or more other fundamental rights that in this party’s view are at 
stake. The first part of this section will explain that the language of ‘conflicting 
rights’ should not be taken literally, but that the words used in that context are 
metaphors – metaphors, in fact, with disastrous effects. The second part of this 
section considers the possibility of replacing these metaphors with less damaging, 
alternatives.
3.1. THE DISASTROUS LANGUAGE OF CONFLICTING 
RIGHTS
Application of the objective justification test in discrimination cases implies 
that other interests may be brought forward that (in the view of the defendant) 
legitimise the inequality of treatment. In this way a dualistic/oppositional 
scheme of women’s human rights or of women’s right to equality versus other 
fundamental rights, like the freedom of expression, the freedom of religion, or 
the freedom of association is constructed. This ‘conflict of fundamental rights’105 
becomes most poignant when an opposition between on the one hand women’s 
right to equality and on the other hand the freedom of religion or freedom of 
conscience is constructed, as was the situation in the SGP cases.106 This means 
104 See for various sources confirming this ‘principle’ R Holtmaat and J Naber, Women’s Human 
Rights and Culture; From Deadlock to Dialogue (Intersentia 2011) 47–49.
105 See on the topic of conflicting human rights S Smet, Resolving Conflicts Between Human Rights; 
A Legal Theoretical Analysis in the Context of the ECHR, PhD Dissertation University Ghent, 
2013–2014. In any situation where inroads on the full enjoyment of the human right by an 
individual may be justified (ie where limitations of the rights are deemed possible), this issue 
may arise. Smet’s research shows that such conflicts in particular arise between the right to 
family life or privacy and the right to freedom of expression, and between the right to equality 
and the right to freedom of religion. See about the conflicts between the last two rights also 
A McGolgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Hart Publishing 2014), Chapter 5.
106 See T Loenen, W van Rossum and Jet Tigchelaar, ‘Human Rights Law as a site for struggle 
over multicultural conflicts’ (2010) 6 Utrecht Law Review 10, who note that often these rights 
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that, as a consequence of constructing the legal issues surrounding the SGP’s 
exclusion of women as an issue of in principle justifiable unequal treatment of 
women, the controversy from the very beginning was also framed as an issue 
of ‘opposed’, ‘competing’, ‘incommensurable’, ‘conflicting’, ‘colliding’ or even 
‘clashing’ fundamental rights.107 Subsequently, the debate resulted in a firm 
deadlock between these fundamental rights.108
A link appears to exist between usage of the frame of a right to equal treatment 
and the language of conflicting rights: as soon as something is framed as an issue 
of (un)equal rights between men and women, it also becomes possible, and often 
unavoidable, to frame that same issue in terms of conflicting etc. rights, between 
which in the end the judiciary needs to make a choice. Which right should carry 
most weight: women’s right to equal treatment or the SGP’s right to religious 
freedom or freedom of (political party) association? This image of weighing or 
balancing of interests or rights is very familiar to lawyers.109 It has an appearance 
of neutrality and objectivity that in fact hides the hidden normative assumptions 
behind each of these rights. Baer points out that any such ‘clashing rights’ 
discourse is based on the belief that legal rights do have a fixed and determined 
meaning, and are not sites for struggle over meaning: ‘Any given law and any 
given set of rights, including human rights, are contested and, if taken seriously 
as sites of diverse interpretations, are not useful to mark clear collisions, ie of 
religious freedom and equality.’110
Baer, in this last quote, although being critical of this framework, still seems 
to accept that a collision between rights is possible at all. In my view, the critique 
of this particular legal discourse should be taken a little further. It is necessary 
also to criticise the metaphors that are constantly used in this discourse, up to a 
point that they are ‘paradigmatic’, ie determine our way of being able to conceive 
of a particular issue. Often, metaphors are used to say something general or 
abstract by means of making an implicit comparison with something concrete 
or tangible. Metaphors thus have the power to inspire people’s imagination and 
contribute to their knowledge and understanding of the world that surrounds 
are invoked in such legal conflicts, because they offer more strongholds than the vague and 
under determined ‘cultural rights’ or ‘right to cultural diversity’. According to these authors 
the framing of multicultural issues as conflicting and opposing fundamental human rights 
leads to a particular construction of ‘clashing’ of cultural identity rights or religious rights, as 
opposed to women’s (equal) rights.
107 The various metaphors used in this regard are slightly different from each other, but all of them 
somehow presuppose that the rights involved are ‘hard’ and have a stable and fixed meaning. 
They all invoke the image of the legal procedure as a conflict or contest with only one possible 
‘winner’.
108 Holtmaat and Naber (n 104).
109 It is also much criticized. In relation to the SGP cases, M Busstra argued that the fact that 
this balancing takes place in the framework of a justification test makes it already an ‘uneven’ 
exercise because the claimed right is ‘equal treatment’ and the defendant is therefore in a 
disadvantaged position to have to bring forward arguments why the equal treatment norm 
should not apply. Busstra (n 99). However, Busstra does not question the balancing act as such.
110 Baer (n 58) 64.
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them.111 The choice of an appropriately ‘functioning’ metaphor is crucial. In the 
context of a fictional story metaphors can put people’s minds on the right or on 
the wrong track as regards their understanding of what the story is about and how 
it will possibly evolve and come to a conclusion. This also applies to any other 
kind of story; like stories that lead to legal disputes or stories about how these 
legal disputes can or should be resolved. The role of metaphors in imagining a 
solution in legal procedures therefore deserves ‘strict scrutiny’.112 To return to the 
image of a track: metaphors may lead us to the right conclusion, or they may put 
us on a carrier that is heading in the wrong direction, or even leading us into a 
crash with major obstacles on that track.
In legal procedures where more than one fundamental right is invoked, 
the metaphorical words predominantly used by practicing lawyers and legal 
academics to describe what is going on are ‘balancing’, ‘weighing’ and ‘conflicting 
rights’. My thesis is that the usage of these metaphors about judges’ activities 
and about the character of the issue that needs to be decided by the court, is not 
an innocent method of helping us to understand the process of legal decision 
making, but that it structures the way in which this legal process functions, and 
that it thereby co-determines its outcomes.
In particular the language used to indicate that there is a ‘conflict’ between 
rights is very problematic in my view. The term ‘conflicting rights’ is further 
specified in this legal discourse by words like ‘outweighing’, ‘colliding’, ‘competing’, 
‘clashing’, ‘incommensurability’, and ‘incompatibility’. Like the metaphor of 
putting rights in scales and weighing or balancing them,113 these words suggest 
that fundamental rights have a definite, uncontested and concrete substance or 
content that can ‘conflict’ with the substance or content of other rights. The more 
specific words, however, most strongly suggest that fundamental rights are ‘hard’. 
This is certainly the case when words like collision or clash are used. Imagine what 
111 See G Lakoff and M Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (University of Chicago Press 2003 [1980]).
112 Metaphors play a role in respect to law in at least four different ways. Firstly, the phenomenon 
of (the) law as such is often pictured as something else that is more comprehensible or concrete 
for most people. For example, law is seen as a body of institutions and rules that functions 
organically. Secondly, law itself uses metaphors when defining the content of a rather abstract 
or general norm. For example, the ‘open’ norm that everyone has the obligation to look after 
someone else’s property ‘like a good housefather’. Thirdly, metaphors are used to describe what 
exactly is being done by actors in the legal field, in particular what judges do. Most often used 
nowadays is the expression that judges are ‘balancing’ or ‘weighing’ the interests that are at 
stake in a particular case. A fourth metaphor in law concerns the nature of the relationship 
between the norms or rights that are involved in a legal case, like is the case with the metaphor 
of ‘conflicting rights’.
113 This image of the scales of justice is in fact presupposing that judges know exactly what the 
weight of each right involved is. Of course they do not actually use scales in which they put 
interests to be weighed; they ‘weigh’ or ‘balance’ only in a manner of speaking. Interests, in 
fact are abstract social constructions and cannot be equated with or treated as natural objects, 
likes stones or cherries. The same goes for rights: they do not have a particular ‘weight’ and 
their content is contested instead of clear and fixed forever. See Baer (n 58), where I quote her 
objections to the language of conflicting rights.
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happens when a collision or clash between actual objects takes place; any such 
‘encounter’ will lead to serious damage of the least ‘hard’ one of the two objects 
involved in it. Clashes or collisions cause fractures or even a ‘total loss’.
The word conflict seems less disastrous in this regard. Using that word in 
the context of adversarial court procedures seems logical: why would people 
bring something before a court of justice when they do not have a conflict (over 
something) with each other? However, the phrase ‘conflicting fundamental 
rights’ is not referring to a conflict between the parties in the procedure, but to a 
conflict between the rights that are invoked by these parties. Because rights cannot 
argue with each other, the word conflict in this context is a metaphor. The same 
applies to all the other words describing the ‘encounter’ of the various rights 
involved in this kind of legal procedures. It is important to realise how metaphors 
help human beings understand something abstract with the help of something 
concrete: the image of fractures or a total loss resulting from a ‘clash’ between 
objects in real life is used to imagine the outcome of the legal procedure in which 
these words are being used. One of the rights involved (in the SGP cases in some 
instances women’s equal right to political participation, in other instances the 
right to political association or religious freedom) has to give way to another right 
that ‘wins’ the case; the right that loses the case is ‘damaged’ (worth less) by the 
outcome of this procedure.114
3.2 . TOWAR DS USING A DIFFER ENT METAPHOR
In order to avoid this rather disastrous image of what is at stake in such legal 
procedures, it is necessary to free ourselves from these dominant (probably 
even paradigmatic) metaphors about the nature of legal procedures and the 
role of judges in solving them, and to develop alternative ways of imagining the 
resolution of the issue that is brought before the court of justice. Perhaps, lawyers 
and judges should attend creative writing workshops in which they are stimulated 
to employ other, more constructive and productive, metaphors when a situation 
arises where more than one fundamental right is invoked by the parties in a legal 
procedure. One suggestion for such alternative language could be that we imagine 
the legal procedure as the staging of a play; or, perhaps even more adequate, as a 
composition (and at the same time the performance) of a piece of music in which 
various instruments play a part or have a voice. The instrument of the judge, in 
that situation, would no longer be the two balancing scales, but a synthesiser 
that would be used to produce a symphony that does not suppress any of the 
instruments or voices in the play, and that is harmonic and a pleasure to listen to 
114 The metaphor of competing rights narrowly mirrors this idea of the legal procedure as a 
competition that can be won or lost by either of the parties.
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for all involved in the case.115 The resulting work of musical art (ie the judgment) 
would allow for women’s voices, in particular about the harms done by gender 
stereotypes, also to be expressed and to be heard.
4. CONCLUSION
The analysis of the history of the SGP cases has revealed that two topics deserve 
further investigation, also with a view to more effectively using law for the 
purpose of combating gender stereotypes. The first concerns the tendency 
to construct violations of women’s (human) rights as legal issues of unequal 
treatment of women and the consequences thereof. The second concerns the 
usage of the dominant and negative metaphor of conflicting rights in the context 
of the justification test that is applied in many of these unequal treatment cases.
As was shown in this chapter, issues of violations of women’s human rights 
can be constructed in various ways. Stuart’s suggestion to simply insist that 
human rights exist for all, and that therefore no justification of unequal treatment 
as regards the enjoyment of these rights is ever possible, is most often not followed 
in the legal construction of violations of women’s human rights.116 On the 
contrary, most lawyers vehemently emphasise that the right to equality can never 
be absolute or cannot automatically trump other invoked human rights. The 
warnings of feminist lawyers about the way legal (sex) equality operates, and their 
complaints about the very limited or even detrimental effects of using the equal 
treatment norm to advance women’s rights, are manifold, but still this norm is 
constantly invoked when violations of women’s human rights are contested in 
court.117 Issues of comparability and disadvantage are major obstacles to make 
such claims successful, as is also demonstrated in the analysis of the SGP cases 
in this chapter. Moreover, the doctrinal framework of the equal treatment norm 
opens the door to the objective justification test, which brings a conundrum of 
conflicting rights into play – a situation named as one of ‘conflicting’ or even 
‘clashing’ fundamental rights.
The analysis shows that constructing women’s rights violations as issues of 
equal treatment (as compared to men) leads to a particular kind of reasoning in 
which these ‘juridical exercises’ automatically come up. From a radical feminist 
perspective, it would therefore be recommendable to think beyond the equality 
framework, or maybe even to think beyond the ‘rights’ framework, in particular 
115 I am most grateful to Westerman, professor of legal philosophy at the University of Groningen, 
who in an inspiring discussion about this topic suggested this metaphor to me.
116 Stuart (n 59).
117 Critical assessments on the very limited or adverse instrumental value of liberal and formal 
equality law are abundant. See eg S Fredman, Discrimination Law (OUP 2011), in particular 
8ff. More and more it is acknowledged that replacing the notion of formal equality with that of 
substantive equality will also ‘not deliver the goods’. See eg Hunter (ed) (n 12) 8.
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when the aim is to combat the gender stereotypes that lie behind (and cause) these 
human rights violations. But that recommendation, most probably, would lead 
out of the realm of the rights discourse and of law, as it is currently constructed. 
Following that route would lead to abandoning the strategy of developing a 
constructive and effective feminist legal jurisprudence and practice. Maybe it is 
indeed true, as Brown stated, that equal rights are something that ‘we cannot not 
want to have’?118
In the context of the Dutch case law on the SGP’s exclusion of women, 
the framing of this exclusion as an issue of women’s equal rights to political 
participation indeed left the underlying patriarchal ideology and the gender 
stereotypes involved in this ideology undisputed and uncontested. Although 
the SGP cases thus confirmed my pessimistic feelings about using the right to 
equality as a basis for legal proceedings in order to enhance women’s human 
rights and to combat gender stereotypes, the decision of the ECtHR shows that 
there is some light shining in that darkness: when a Court is determined to do 
so, it can indeed effectively address and redress beliefs, customs, practices or 
laws that are based on gender stereotypes. This observation is shared by some 
scholars who point out that in particular the principle of formal equality can be 
used in a constructive way to combat gender stereotypes. There is, gradually, a 
re-appreciation of the possibilities of using the firmly rooted concept of formal 
equality not only to tackle overt forms of unequal treatment between women and 
men, but also to combat the underlying assumptions about the different roles of 
men and women that have justified that difference in treatment for a long time.119 
In these contributions to feminist legal theory, it is shown that – provided that 
the gender-biased nature of legal and social constructs is unveiled and openly 
contested – formal equality can deliver some positive results.
Such a re-appraisal of the principle of formal equality, in my view, deserves 
our full attention in the light of improving the usefulness of law in enhancing 
women’s human rights. Greater awareness among practicing lawyers and judges 
of the stubbornness and detrimental effects of gender stereotypes is a crucial 
condition for such a progressive use of formal equality. Revealing the existence 
of stereotypes, and bringing them explicitly into the legal discussion about what 
exactly constitutes equality, is a necessary step in the process of achieving a true 
118 In relation to claiming rights in the framework of liberal Western legal systems, Brown argues 
that – although being a mixed blessing and leading to many paradoxes we cannot not want to 
have rights. W Brown, ‘Suffering Rights as Paradoxes’ (2000) 7 Constellations 230, 231.
119 See for example contributions to the ongoing discussion about the pros and cons of formal 
equality by N and R Siegel and by Franklin, who discuss the positive and transformative effects 
– in terms of combating gender stereotypes – of a strict adherence to the principle of formal 
equality by US Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg. N Siegel and R Siegel, ‘Struck 
by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsberg on pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination’ 
(2010) 59 Duke LJ 771; C Franklin, ‘The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law’ (2010) 85 NYLR 101.
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transformation of society.120 In addition to that, legal scholars – probably in close 
cooperation with ‘literary’ scholars – should develop a critical approach towards 
the metaphorical language that is used to denote and frame legal issues, such 
as the issue of ‘conflicting fundamental rights’. Let us use our human creativity 
and our power of imagination to propose other concrete images that represent 
the abstract and almost unconceivable complex issues that are at stake when 
women (and men) legally contest the existing, gendered state of affairs, in order to 
guarantee women the full enjoyment of their human rights. Let us work together 
to produce a new legal symphony, one that does not silence women’s voices and 
clearly expresses the discriminatory nature of gender stereotypes.
120 See in particular the work of Cook and Cusack (n 9), and Timmer (n 10 and n 102).
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IN THE MILITARY
Insights From Court Cases
Rebecca Cook and Cornelia Weiss*
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines how courts in different regions of the world have determined 
whether stereotyping of women and men in the military contributes to violations 
of their constitutional and human rights. The term ‘stereotype’ derives from the 
Greek words ‘stereo’, meaning solid, and ‘type’, meaning mould that imprints a 
picture. A gender stereotype is ‘a generalized view or preconception of attributes 
or characteristics possessed by, or the roles that are or should be performed’1 by, 
women and men. Gender stereotypes are concerned with the social and cultural 
constructions of women and men due to their physical, biological, sexual, 
cognitive and social attributes.2 Stereotyping is the ‘process of ascribing to an 
individual specific attributes, characteristics, or roles by reason only of her or his 
membership in a particular group.’3
Understanding how women and men are stereotyped illuminates the hidden 
nature of gender prejudice. The pernicious effects of gender prejudice are often 
* Rebecca Cook is professor emerita, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Cornelia Weiss is 
a lawyer and a colonel in the US Air Force Reserve. The opinions and views expressed are the 
authors’ personal views and are not intended to represent in whole or in part the opinions 
of the US government or any of its components. We are grateful to: Michelle Hayman for 
her excellent research assistance, Christopher Dandeker for his timely insights on UK 
developments, Ariella Migdal for helpful discussions on pending US litigation, Tania Sordo 
Ruz for alerting us to the Colombian court decision, and Mumbi Gathoni for her assistance 
on Kenyan developments. We thank Simone Cusack and Ralph Earle for their perceptive 
insights and discussions on an earlier draft of this chapter, and anonymous reviewers for their 
helpful comments. We are indebted to the 2014 Women’s Rights in International Law course 
of the Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, American University Washington 
College of Law for thoughtful discussions on gender stereotyping in the military.
1 Rebecca J Cook and Susanne Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2010) 9, 20–31.
2 Ibid 20.
3 Ibid 12.
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invisible because their ordinariness blinds societies to such effects, like the 
proverbial fish that is blind to the water in which it swims.4 Stereotyping is one 
of the quickest ways ‘that prejudice can spread and thrive’:5 it is a ‘technology 
of prejudice.’6 Stereotypes ‘gain storage extra easily in the human mind and are 
extra easy to retrieve’.7
Gender stereotyping happens in all sectors of society, but it plays a particular 
role in the military. It has been explained that militaries are gendered institutions. 
They make use of, rely on and perpetuate the assumptions that women and men 
not only can but must occupy different roles, and that the place which is right 
and proper for men to occupy is privileged above that of women. This notion of 
a hierarchy or a privileging of (what is construed as) the masculine over (what 
is construed as) the feminine is very important because it helps explain why 
militaries need to preserve their status as distinctively masculine institutions.8
The chapter focuses on court decisions addressing women in the military 
but not exclusively, because the constraining power of male stereotypes impacts 
women and the similar power of female stereotypes impacts men. It has been 
explained that ‘[n]otions of masculinity and femininity are created and reinforced 
by states, societies and militaries in a wide variety of subtle and reciprocal ways. 
Accepting the ideas that militaries are distinctively male entities which have 
nothing to do with women and that it is natural for men to become soldiers makes 
it easier to accept the privileging of masculinity and men over femininity and 
women in society at large.’9
The term ‘sex’ in this chapter is used to refer to individuals’ biological sex, 
and the term ‘gender’ is used to refer to how individuals are socially constructed. 
Understandings of gender are fluid and can vary according to different contexts. 
Women can be considered to be ‘masculine’ or to have masculine attributes, 
and men can be considered to be ‘effeminate’ or to have feminine qualities. 
What constitute masculine and feminine attributes often depends on fixed 
notions or stereotypes that are dominant or hegemonic. It has been explained 
that ‘hegemonic masculinity is the ideal form and is considered to be the most 
respected, desired, and dominant within society’.10 Military institutions have 
contributed significantly, and sometimes exclusively, to the formulation of 
hegemonic masculinities.
4 Laurie A Rudman, ‘Rejection of Women? Beyond Prejudice as Antipathy’ in John F Dovidio, 
Peter Glick and Laurie A Rudman (eds), On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years after Allport 
(Wiley-Blackwell 2005) 107, 117.
5 Anita Bernstein, ‘What’s Wrong with Stereotyping’ (2013) 55 Arizona LR 665, 678.
6 Ibid 680.
7 Ibid 678.
8 Jennifer G Mathers, ‘Women and State Military Forces’ in Carol Cohn (ed), Women & Wars 
(Polity 2013) 126.
9 Ibid 145.
10 Tyson Smith and Michael Kimmel, ‘The Hidden Discourse of Masculinity in Gender 
Discrimination Law’ (2005) 30(31) Signs 1827, 1831.
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This chapter explains how courts have served and are serving an important 
role in naming detrimental gender stereotypes in the armed forces, exposing their 
harms and in determining how they infringe constitutional and human rights. 
It has purposely analysed decisions from different national and regional courts 
because ‘decisions from around the world may provide a much-needed external 
perspective on the myths and stereotypes that may continue to permeate the values 
and laws of our own communities and cultures.’11 The chapter argues that the 
ways in which national and international courts are determining constitutional 
and human rights violations can blunt the spread of stereotyping harms, and 
contribute to the eradication of gender prejudices in military institutions. This 
chapter will analyse national and international court decisions and pending cases 
around the following interconnected themes:
(a) Exclusion, such as exclusion from the draft: Rostker v Goldberg12 (Rostker), 
Alexander Dory v Federal Republic of Germany13 (Dory), from full integration 
including combat: Gauthier v Canada (Canadian Armed Forces)14 (Gauthier), 
Angela Sirdar v The Army Board and Secretary for Defence15 (Sirdar), Tanja 
Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland16 (Kreil), Hegar et al v Hagel17 (Hegar), 
and from military training: Alice Miller v Minister of Defence18 (Miller), 
United States v Virginia19 (Virginia);
(b) Unequal treatment, including discharge for pregnancy: Struck v Secretary of 
Defense20 (Struck), Crawford v Cushman21 (Crawford), unequal dependency 
benefits: Frontiero v Richardson22 (Frontiero), and unequal parental leave: 
Konstantin Markin v Russia23 (Markin);
(c) Sexual assault, including rape, sexual assault and sexual harassment by 
military personnel of their comrades: Mary Gallagher et al v United States of 
11 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, ‘Beyond Myths: Equality, Impartiality and Justice’ (2001) 10 Journal 
of Social Distress and the Homeless 87, 101.
12 453 US 57 (1981) (US Supreme Court).
13 Case C-186/01 [2003] ECR I-2508.
14 [1989] CHRD No 3, [1989] DCDP No 3 (Canadian Human Rights Tribunal).
15 Case C-273/97 [1999] ECR I-07403.
16 C-285/98 [2000] ECR I-00069.
17 C12-06005 (First amended complaint filed 31 October 2013 pending in the US District Court 
for the Northern District of California) <https://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/hegar-et-
al-v-hagel-amended-complaint> accessed 8 January 2015; originally filed as Hegar et al v 
Panetta (27 November 2012) <https://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/hegar-et-al-v-hagel> 
accessed 8  January 2015. See <www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/
Article/632578/> (3 Dec 2016) accessed 18 February 2016.
18 [1995] HCJ 4541/94, IsrSC 49(4) 94, IsrLR 178 (Israel Supreme Court).
19 518 US 515 (1996) (US Supreme Court).
20 460 F2d 1372 (1971) (US Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit).
21 531 F2d 1114 (1976) (US Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit).
22 411 US 677 (1973) (US Supreme Court).
23 (2012) ECHR 514.
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America and the U.S. Department of Defense24 (Gallagher), and of the civilian 
population: Rodríguez Bustamente et al v National Army/National Ministry 
of Defense25 (Rodríguez Bustamente), Ines Fernández Ortega et al v Mexico26 
(Fernández Ortega).
2. ANALYSIS OF CASES
This section analyses how select domestic and international courts have addressed 
whether the social practices of gender in militaries are in compliance with their 
obligations under constitutional and human rights law. The term ‘select’ is used 
because this analysis does not intend to be comprehensive, but rather only an 
introductory overview. Other decisions are referenced where they impact issues 
concerning exclusion, unequal treatment or sexual assault.
Discussion of each area of case law, exclusion, unequal treatment, and sexual 
assault, will conclude by exploring what has been learned about how courts:
– name the degrading stereotypes prevailing in the military;
– discuss their individual and group harms; and
– determine how those harms contribute to violations of human and 
constitutional rights.
Particular attention will be given to how courts analyse the facts about women’s 
actual military performance in order to better understand how courts’ analyses 
contribute to dismantling stereotypes.
2 .1. EXCLUSION CASES
Court cases have challenged a range of restrictions on women’s military 
recruitment, including exclusion from the draft (Rostker, Dory), from full 
integration in the military including combat (Gauthier, Sirdar, Kreil, Hegar), and 
from military training (Miller, Virginia).
24 Petition filed by the Cornell International Human Rights Clinic in the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, 23 January 2014 <www.lawschool.cornell.edu/academics/
clinicalprogram/int-human-rights/Military-Sexual-Assault-Petition-to-IACHR.cfm> 
accessed 8 February 2015. See also Carla Butcher et al v United States of America and the US 
Department of Defense (Petition filed by the Cornell Global Gender Justice Clinic in the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, 18 January 2015) <www.lawschool.cornell.edu/
Clinical-Programs/global-gender-justice/Sexual-Assault-Continues-to-Violate-the-Human-
Rights-of-US-Service-Members.cfm> accessed 8 February 2015.
25 Consejo de Estado de Colombia (Council of State of Colombia) No 29033 of 9 November 2014, 
per Ramiro Guerrero Pazos.
26 IACtHR, Judgment of 30 August 2010, Series C No 215.
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In Rostker, the US Supreme Court held that the Military Selective Service 
Act’s authorisation of male-only registration did not violate the constitutional 
due process guarantee.27 The Court explained that:
[s]ince women are excluded from combat, Congress concluded that they would 
not be needed in the event of a draft, and therefore decided not to register them 
… Men and women, because of the combat restrictions on women, are simply 
not similarly situated for the purposes of a draft or registration for a draft [and 
therefore the male only draft registration did not] violate the Due Process Clause.28
The dissent disagreed: ‘The Court today places its imprimatur on one of the 
most potent remaining public expressions of “ancient canards about the proper 
role of women”’.29 The dissent explained that the male-only draft registration 
‘categorically excludes women from a fundamental civic obligation – inconsistent 
with the Constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection’,30 and continued:
Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of 
gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing sexual stereotypes about the ‘proper 
place’ of women and their need for special protection … Where, as here, the 
[Government’s] … purposes are as well served by gender-neutral classification 
as one that gender classifies, and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual 
stereotypes, the [Government] cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex.31
In line with the Rostker result, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in Dory 
that member states could restrict the draft to men.32 Because of the compulsory 
nature of conscription as opposed to the voluntary nature of the professional 
service, the ECJ considered that conscription fell outside the scope of European 
Community law on sex discrimination, especially the Equal Employment 
Directive.33 In focusing on the scope of European Community law, the ECJ 
regrettably avoided any discussion on the discriminatory aspects of an all-male 
27 Rostker (n 12) 83.
28 Ibid 77, 78–79.
29 Ibid 86 (Marshall J).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid 94–95, citing Orr v Orr, 440 US 268 (1979) (US Supreme Court) 283.
32 Dory (n 13) para 111.
33 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40.
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draft.34 In contrast to the US and Germany, Norway in 2015 started conscripting 
both men and women.35
The cases addressing exclusion from full integration in the military include 
Gauthier, Sirdar, Kreil and Hegar. In Gauthier, the Canadian Human Rights 
Tribunal addressed whether operational effectiveness of the Canadian Armed 
Forces (CAF) constitutes ‘a bona fide occupational requirement of such a nature 
that the exclusion of women from combat-related occupations is justified, even 
though it is, on its face, a discriminatory practice.’36 The three female plaintiffs 
argued that the categorical employment of men to the exclusion of women was 
not a bona fide occupational requirement for operational effectiveness. As a 
result, the female plaintiffs contended that the policy of excluding women from 
combat training and positions was unjustifiable sex discrimination under the 
Human Rights Act.37 The male plaintiff, a retired military pilot, argued that the 
exclusion of women from the risks assumed by men of flying fighter aircraft and 
fulfilling combat duties was sex discrimination under the same Act.38 The CAF 
did not deny that its policy of excluding women constituted sex discrimination, 
but argued that it was justifiable under the Human Rights Act as a bona fide 
occupational requirement to ensure operational effectiveness.39
The Tribunal recognised that the ‘principle of operational effectiveness in 
time of war or national emergency is the fundamental criterion against which the 
CAF has developed and continually assesses its personnel policies. Operational 
effectiveness, or combat readiness and preparedness, determines personnel 
policy, and that policy by logical extension must seek to minimize the risk or 
hazards to life and limb that combat readiness might, or usually, entails.’40 The 
issue is ‘whether the occupational requirement is justifiable only if it increases 
safety by a substantial amount and whether the evidence is sufficient to show that 
the risk is real and not based on mere speculation.’41 To guard against the risk of 
speculation about women’s capacities, the Tribunal meticulously considered the 
factual record. This record included evidence from the SWINTER (Servicewomen 
in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles) trials which CAF had initiated in 
34 Karen Rabile, ‘Compulsory Military Service and Equal Treatment of Men and Women’ (2003) 
4 German Law Journal 299; Martin Trybus, ‘Sisters in Arms: European Community Law 
and Sex Equality in the Armed Forces’ (2003) 9 European Law Journal 631, 656–657; Beate 
Rudolf, ‘European Union: Compulsory Military Service’ (2005) 3 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 673.
35 Military Service Act and Home Guard Act (universal military service for women) (Endringer i 
vernepliktsloven og heimevernloven [allmenn verneplikt – verneplikt for kvinner]) 2013 Prop 
122 L (NW) <https://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumenter/Prop-122-L-20132014/id762771/? 
docId=PRP201320140122000DDDEPIS&ch=1&q> accessed 6 January 2015.
36 Gauthier (n 14) 5.
37 Ibid 2–4.
38 Ibid 2.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid 23.
41 Ibid 27.
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1980 to determine the physical, psychological and social problems that might 
arise ‘if all military occupations were opened to women without restriction of 
any kind.’42 The factors that the Tribunal deemed essential for operational 
effectiveness included physical capability, environmental conditions, social 
relationships, cohesion, and motivation.
With respect to physical capacities, the Tribunal explained that ‘until the 
recent past, it was widely assumed that women as a class lacked the physical 
capability for certain jobs which demanded strength or stamina. This stereotype 
assumption has been set aside in favour of a gender-neutral occupational physical 
standard in which individuals are, without respect to gender, tested for the specific 
job demands’.43 Based on the evidence from many tests in Canada and beyond, 
the Tribunal concluded that ‘there is no risk based on physical capability to the 
inclusion of qualified women in presently all-male units and occupations.’44 
The Tribunal also concluded that ‘pregnancy was not an issue in the definition 
of risk to operational effectiveness but simply a matter of temporary “disability” 
or medical condition for which leave was appropriate. The birth of a child to a 
servicewoman is not a cause for dismissal from the Forces.’45
Regarding environmental conditions, the Tribunal concluded that ‘the 
environmental factor in operational effectiveness of mixed units was less 
significant and less problematic than it had once been, largely because first, it 
could be ‘managed’ by minimal structural arrangements in existing facilities, 
and second, unisex environments and facilities for mixed-gender use are now 
common in civilian life.’46 The Tribunal did limit one occupational field, finding 
that ‘privacy constitutes a significant factor in operational effectiveness and the 
exclusion of women from occupations which serve in submarines exclusively is a 
bona fide occupational requirement’.47 When the privacy concerns were resolved, 
women started serving in submarines.48
On social relationships, the Tribunal addressed CAF’s allegation that ‘gender 
adds a complicating element to the performance of individuals and of the group 
when women are added to an all-male unit’.49 The Tribunal explained that ‘social 
factors do not themselves compromise operational effectiveness, where the 
gender relationships are built on shared commitment to a set of work standards 
42 Ibid 12.
43 Ibid 29.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid 29–30.
47 Ibid 30.
48 Lynn Bradley and Debbie Pestell, ‘Experience with Mixed Gender Submarines’ in Stéphanie 
AH Bélanger and Karen D Davis (eds), Transforming Traditions: Women, Leadership and the 
Canadian Navy, 1942–2010 (Canadian Defence Academy Press 2010) 198–199. See also Owens 
v Brown 455 F Supp 291 (DDC 1978) (lifting statutory ban on women serving in US Navy 
ships).
49 Gauthier (n 14) 30.
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and performance levels, and on shared training’.50 The Tribunal elaborated that 
‘education, work experience, leadership, all play a part in removing or modifying 
stereotypes held by one gender of another, and in this case, particularly held by 
males in the service about women’.51
The Tribunal addressed cohesion as ‘an essential ingredient of the drive 
to reach a goal, to perform well and to die for one another, if necessary’.52 The 
Tribunal found that ‘Having considered the evidence at length, we concluded that 
there was no, or not sufficient evidence of an indisputable kind, to suggest that a 
mixed gender unit could not develop that cohesion necessary to put in a better 
than adequate performance. There have been no studies of units during real 
combat and perhaps never can be. Nevertheless the SWINTER trials … suggested 
that the first step to cohesion, social tolerance or acceptance can be managed 
by good leadership and indeed would develop normally as unit members shared 
common occupational concerns, experience and training.’53
Regarding motivation, the Tribunal took the view that ‘a variety of 
motivational elements can be made subject to a management process or will grow 
out of common service training and experience. No one suggested that women 
resist discipline any less or more than men, or that those who are determined to 
succeed have no will.’54
The Tribunal discussed the historical record of women in all-female or mixed 
gender units in both regular and partisan forces from various countries, especially 
during World War II, and concluded that ‘the record of women in all female or 
mixed gender units in both regular and partisan forces … is reasonably clear. 
Women fought beside men in combat and combat support units, were armed, 
suffered both loss of life and limb, inflicted death and injury on others. In short, 
women were indistinguishable from men in terms of performance.’55
The Tribunal concluded overall that ‘there is no risk of failure of performance 
of combat duties by women sufficient to justify a general exclusionary policy. Such 
policy cannot, therefore, constitute a bona fide occupational requirement under 
the Canadian Human Rights Act.’56 Since 1989, with the exception of excluding 
women from submarines, which exclusion was subsequently rescinded,57 CAF 
excludes neither women nor men from any CAF positions, including combat.
About a decade after Gauthier, Canada’s Commonwealth cousin, the UK, 
argued in Sirdar that it could deny employment to women in the Royal Marines ‘by 
reason of the ‘interoperability’ rule established for the purpose of ensuring combat 
50 Ibid 31.
51 Ibid 30.
52 Ibid 31.
53 Ibid 32.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid 9–11.
56 Ibid 34.
57 Bradley and Pestell (n 48) 198–199.
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effectiveness’.58 The policy of the Royal Marines excluded women on the ground 
that ‘their presence is incompatible with the requirement of ‘interoperability’, 
that is to say, the need for every Marine, irrespective of his specialization, to be 
capable of fighting in a commando unit’.59 The European Community’s Equal 
Treatment Directive requires equal access for women and men to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions.60 Upon being made 
redundant as a female chef in the Royal Artillery, the plaintiff received the offer 
to join the Royal Marines, subject to the condition of passing the commando 
training course. The UK rescinded the offer when it realised that the plaintiff was 
female. The ECJ held that ‘the specific conditions for deployment of the assault 
units of which the Royal Marines are composed, and in particular the rule of 
interoperability to which they are subject, justified their composition remaining 
exclusively male’.61
Unlike the Gauthier Tribunal, the ECJ did not examine whether the 
categorical exclusion of women from the Royal Marines was ‘necessary and 
appropriate’ to ensure combat effectiveness.62 In deferring to the government’s 
determination that exclusion was necessary and appropriate, the ECJ assumed, 
without questioning, that the male sex is the essential criterion for ensuring 
combat effectiveness. Had it followed the reasoning in Gautier, it might have 
required the government, through its military, to establish ‘objective standards 
of competence … as the universal and ubiquitous reference point for all service 
personnel, whatever their race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexuality.’63 In the 
following years, the antipodean Commonwealth cousins, New Zealand64 and 
Australia,65 have followed Canada’s lead in revoking their respective combat 
exclusion policies, by establishing objective standards of competence irrespective 
of sex. The UK exclusion policy is currently under review.66
In Kreil, the ECJ interpreted the European Community’s Equal Treatment 
Directive to preclude ‘the application of national provisions, such as those of 
German law, which impose a general exclusion of women from military posts 
involving the use of arms and which allows them access only to medical and 
58 Sirdar (n 15) para 29.
59 Ibid para 7.
60 Directive 76/207/EEC.
61 Sirdar (n 15) para 31.
62 Ibid para 28; Trybus (n 34) 646–647.
63 Anthony C King, ‘Women in Battle: The Female Solider’ (2013) 43(2) Parameters 13, 25.
64 Human Rights (Women in Armed Forces) Amendment Act 2007 (NZ); Ministry of 
Defence, ‘Maximizing Opportunity for Military Women in the New Zealand Defence 
Force’ (February 2014) <www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2014/maximising- 
opportunities-military-women-nzdf.pdf> accessed 12 January 2015.
65 Australian Department of Defence, ‘Removal of Gender Restrictions from ADF Combat Roles’ 
(August 2013) <www.defence.gov.au/women/ImplementationPlan.asp> accessed 27 January 
2015.
66 Joanne Mackowski, ‘Women in Combat: British Band of Brothers May Soon be History’ 
(Royal United Services Institute 9 May 2014) <https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/
ref:C536CEF1517EE8/#.U-jSC7GTKA0> accessed 7 February 2015.
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military-music services’.67 The ECJ explained that ‘were the contrary view to 
be adopted, women would continue to be marginalized by being confined to 
certain sections of the Bundeswehr only – with the risk that the old stereotypical 
division between the sexes would be perpetuated.’68 The ECJ ruled that the 
Equal Treatment Directive does not allow women to be precluded from such 
employment ‘on the ground that public opinion demands that women be given 
greater protection than men against risks which affect men and women in the 
same way’.69
The ECJ explained that ‘the exclusion of women from the Bundeswehr is not 
restricted to specific units but covers, without distinction, all sections other than 
the medical and military-music services.’70 The German government tried to 
justify its exclusion because all combat units have to be capable of ‘interoperable 
deployment without any distinction between front-line duties (which present a 
greater risk) and duties behind the lines (which present a lesser risk).’71 The ECJ 
did not accept this justification because the interoperability rule applied to all 
sections, not just, as in Sirdar, to the Royal Marines. Moreover, the Court said that 
the German authorities, unlike the UK authorities, failed to prove that this rule 
is actually enforced in all combat units outside the medical and military-music 
services.72 The reaction to Kreil was swift. The German parliament amended its 
Basic Law to read: ‘The [women] may on no account be forced to render services 
involving the use of arms.’73
Similar to the Kreil Court’s reliance on the facts as a way of addressing gender 
bias, the European Court of Human Rights held that the discharge of individuals 
on grounds of their homosexuality from the armed forces was an unjustifiable 
violation of their right to privacy.74 The Court noted that there was a lack of 
concrete evidence to substantiate the alleged damage to morale and fighting 
power that any repeal of the ban on homosexuals in the military would entail.75 
The Court elaborated:
To the extent that they represent a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual 
majority against a homosexual minority, these negative attitudes cannot, of 
themselves, be considered by the Court to amount to sufficient justification for 
the interferences with the applicants’ rights [of privacy], any more than similar 
negative attitudes towards those of a different race, origin or colour.76
67 Kreil (n 16) R1 Order.
68 Ibid para A24.
69 Ibid paras A13, A23.
70 Ibid para A27.
71 Ibid para A27. See also ibid para A14.
72 Ibid paras A27-A28.
73 Trybus (n 34) 653.
74 Lustig-Prean and Beckett v the United Kingdom (1999) ECHR 71; Smith and Grady v the United 
Kingdom (1999) ECHR 72.
75 Lustig-Prean (n 74) paras 33, 92.
76 Ibid para 90.
Intersentia 185
Gender Stereotyping in the Military. Insights From Court Cases
The Court explained that ‘even if it can be assumed that the integration of 
homosexuals would give rise to problems not encountered with the integration 
of women or racial minorities, the Court is not satisfied that the codes and rules 
[of conduct] which have been found to be effective in the latter case would not 
equally prove effective in the former.’77
The Hegar case, currently pending in a US federal district court, alleges 
that the combat exclusion policy of the US Department of Defense (DoD) 
violates the constitutional equal protection guarantee.78 The plaintiffs, two of 
whom ‘were awarded the Purple Heart after being wounded while serving in 
combat,’79 ask the Court to ‘require the [DoD] to allow women to apply for all 
combat related positions and schools and to be considered on their individual 
merit’.80 They explain that ‘women – as a class and solely because of their gender 
– are currently barred from nearly 20 percent of jobs across the active duty 
force, including all or nearly all positions in the infantry units, armour units, 
artillery units, reconnaissance units, Special Forces Units and all other units 
below the battalion level that have direct ground combat as a primary mission. 
Women are also categorically excluded from combat arms schools, courses, and 
training programs, such as Ranger School and Special Forces.’81 Shortly before 
the DoD’s answer to the complaint was due in court, the combat exclusion policy 
was revoked.82 The case is still pending because the Services have yet to actually 
integrate women into combat units and positions.83
The Amended Complaint contends that the ‘categorical exclusion of women 
from combat units, occupational specialties and schools is based on outdated 
stereotypes of women and ignores the realities of the modern military and 
battlefield conditions’.84 The Complaint explains how the exclusionary policy and 
practice harm servicewomen in significant ways:
In addition to explicitly prohibiting women from serving in certain positions 
and career specialties, the DoD’s current exclusionary policies put servicewomen 
at a disadvantage in the promotion process, even within career specialties that 
are open to women. Formal assignment to combat arms units and positions is 
an important factor in promotion to leadership positions in the officer corps and 
among enlisted personnel, particularly in the Army and the Marine Corps. For 
example, more than 80 percent of the general officers in the Army came from the 
77 Ibid para 94.
78 Hegar (n 17) paras 1–8. See also Martha E McSally, ‘Defending America in Mixed Company: 
Gender in the US Armed Forces’ (Summer 2011) 140 Daedalus 148, 149.
79 Hegar (n 17) paras 13, 17, 22.
80 Ibid para 8, ibid ‘Prayer for Relief ’ 27, para 2.
81 Ibid para 52.
82 Ibid para 2.
83 Greg Jacob, ‘The ‘Brass Ceiling’ is Still Alive and Well in the US Military’ (Defense One 
12  November 2014) <www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/11/brass-ceiling-still-alive-and-well-
us-military/98837/?oref=d-river> accessed 7 January 2015. Defense (n 17)
84 Hegar (n 17) para 4.
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combat arms, from which women are largely excluded. Chances for promotion 
to senior enlisted positions are likewise enhanced for those who have served in 
combat arms positions and career specialties. Further, even in open specialties, 
servicewomen are prevented from being assigned to as many units as their 
male counterparts, and these restrictions can limit their ability to gain career-
broadening assignments and attend leadership and other schools. The DoD 
combat exclusion policy and practice thus serve as a structural barrier to the 
advancement of women with the Armed Forces.85
The Complaint explains that the exclusionary policy and practice imply that 
women are not capable of serving in the same manner as men, thus relegating 
them ‘literally and figuratively, to a “supporting role” in our Armed Forces based 
on stereotypes about women and assumptions about battlefield conditions that 
do not reflect the reality that women, including the individual Plaintiffs, are 
already serving in combat situations, and doing so with distinction’.86 In short, 
the military should use its basic training period to evaluate potential recruits, 
and include or exclude them based on their individual performance, not on the 
premise that all women cannot adequately perform.87
The Israeli Supreme Court in Miller and the US Supreme Court in Virginia 
have addressed exclusion of women from certain kinds of military training. The 
Israeli Supreme Court held that the Ministry of Defence general exemption of 
women from aviation courses could not be justified by planning considerations.88 
A perceptive concurring opinion explained that the harm of deprecating 
stereotypes is degradation: ‘closing a profession or a position to a person because 
of his sex, race or the like sends a message that the group to which he belongs 
is inferior, and this creates a perception of inferiority of the men and women in 
the group. This creates a vicious cycle that perpetuates the discrimination. The 
perception of inferiority, which is based on the biological … difference, causes 
discrimination, and the discrimination strengthens the deprecating stereotypes 
of the inferiority of the victim of discrimination. Therefore the main element of 
discrimination because of sex … is the degradation of the victim.’89
This same concurring opinion explained that equality ‘permits, and even 
necessitates, different treatment when the “difference” is relevant, but it does not 
contain criteria for determining that relevance. In the absence of such criteria, 
there is a danger … that the criteria applied in each case will reflect the degrading 
stereotypes which the prohibition of discrimination was originally intended to 
85 Ibid para 59.
86 Ibid para 63. See also Helen Thorpe, Soldier Girls – The Battle of Three Women at Home and at 
War (Scribner 2014).
87 Maia Goodell, ‘Exclusion of Women from Military Combat Positions’ (2010) 34 Seattle 
University Law Review 17, 33–36.
88 Daphne Barak-Erez, ‘The Feminist Battle for Citizenship: Between Combat Duties and 
Conscientious Objection’ (2007) 13 Cardozo J L & Gender 531, 541–547.
89 Miller para 4 (Dorner J).
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prevent. In our case, the prohibition against the discrimination of women is likely 
to be rendered meaningless by a determination – based on accepted degrading 
stereotypes – that the difference between women and men justifies, and even 
necessitates, different treatment of women.’90
A year after the Miller decision, the US Supreme Court in Virginia overturned 
a law preventing women from attending an all-male military institute because 
Virginia had relied on unsubstantiated generalisations about the talents, 
capacities, or preferences of women that have impeded women’s progress toward 
‘full citizenship stature’.91 The Court explained that ‘generalizations about “the 
way women are,” estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer 
justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them 
outside the average description.’92 Similar to the concurrence in Miller, Virginia 
emphasised the degrading nature of generalisations about women as a class: sex 
‘classifications may not be used, as they once were … to create or perpetuate the 
legal, social and economic inferiority of women.’93
With the exception of the Rostker and Dory decisions on the exclusion of 
women from the draft and the Sirdar interoperability decision, the exclusion 
decisions stand for the proposition that women can no longer be categorically 
excluded from the military, its particular operations or its training. Women 
must be given the opportunity to prove they can meet objective standards of 
military performance. Gauthier meticulously analysed the facts about women’s 
capabilities to find generalisations about women’s physical, emotional and 
cognitive inabilities to serve in combat roles to be unsubstantiated. In so finding, 
the decision contributed to the dismantling of prejudices of women as incapable 
of being combatants or successfully completing military institutes or training 
programmes.
The exclusion decisions did not elaborate on the sex role stereotypes and 
gender prejudices. The sex role stereotype of men is that they are and should be 
warriors and military leaders. The prejudice about women is that they do not have 
the capacities to be warriors and military leaders and as a result should be limited 
to support roles. The hesitancy to analyse the stereotypes and prejudices might be 
due to a lack of awareness of the gender dimensions of the military. It has been 
explained that ‘military organizations and war itself [are] inherently gendered 
and “naturally” masculine, so that women are seen as fundamentally not suited 
to soldiering and warfare.’94 Militaries ‘construct, rely on, and perpetuate beliefs 
90 Ibid para 6 (Dorner J).
91 Virginia (n 19) 533 (Ginsburg J).
92 Ibid 550.
93 Ibid 534.
94 Mathers (n 8) 124. See also Valorie K Vodjik, ‘Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection 
Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion of Women from Combat’ (2005) 57 Alabama LR 303, 
341–349.
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about gender, and they depend on women and men to accept, internalise, and act 
on those beliefs’.95
The exclusion cases discussed the individual and group harms to include 
marginalisation and degradation of women, disadvantaging them in their 
military careers, and denying them their full citizenship. Miller, Virginia, Kreil 
and the dissent in Rostker all pointed to individual and group harms of gender 
classifications. Virginia specified that gender classifications ‘may not be used, 
as they once were … to create or perpetuate the legal, social and economic 
inferiority of women.’ Miller explained that the harm of deprecating stereotypes 
is ‘degradation’.
The Hegar complaint perceptively addressed the effects of the combat exclusion 
policy on women’s inability to rise to the top levels of military leadership.96 The 
complaint explained that currently ‘more than 80 percent of the general officers 
in the Army came from the combat arms’. The dissent in Rostker and the majority 
in Virginia specified the harm of exclusion policies limiting women’s chances of 
becoming civilian leaders.97 The Virginia majority eloquently explained that the 
Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion policies impeded women’s progress toward 
‘full citizenship stature’, challenging the assumption that men’s ‘military service 
defines citizenship.’98
2 .2 . UNEQUAL TR EATMENT CASES
Equal treatment of men and women is essential for gender-integration to be 
effective in the military. Court decisions that address stereotypes embedded in 
unequal treatment by the military include those on the discharge of pregnant 
military personnel (Struck, Crawford), the unequal treatment of dependents of 
female military personnel (Frontiero), and denying military men parental leave 
on an equal basis with military women (Markin).
In Struck, a US Court of Appeals held that the Air Force regulation providing 
for the discharge of pregnant officers did not deny liberty or property without 
due process, equal protection or right to privacy. Captain Struck appealed this 
decision to the US Supreme Court, but because the Air Force thought its chances 
of success were slim, it agreed to waive her discharge and abandon its policy of 
automatically discharging its pregnant personnel.99
95 Mathers (n 8) 124.
96 Emerald M Archer, ‘The Power of Gendered Stereotypes in the US Marine Corps’ (2012) 39 
Armed Forces and Society 359.
97 Nancy Levit, ‘Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and Construction of Maleness’ (1995–1996) 
43 UCLA Law Rev 1037, 1059; Ellen Symons, ‘Under Fire: Canadian Women in Combat’ 
(1990–1991) 4 Canadian Journal of Women and Law 477, 507.
98 Catherine A MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist theory of State (HUP 1989) 224.
99 Neil S Siegel and Reva B Siegel, ‘Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination’ (2009–2010) 59 Duke L J 771, 778.
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Consistently with Gauthier’s treatment of pregnancy as a temporary 
disability,100 a US Court of Appeals in Crawford found that a US Marine Corps 
regulation that mandated the discharge of female Marines for pregnancy was 
unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the distinction between pregnant 
personnel and other personnel with other temporary disabilities was irrational. 
The Court determined that the ‘regulation as a tool for insuring mobility and 
readiness is applied in a manifestly underinclusive fashion. As the District Court 
found, at the time of appellant’s discharge, pregnancy was the lone disability 
subjected to the rather drastic treatment. The Marine Corps left all other 
temporary disabilities, which undeniably undermined the ability of all personnel 
to respond like quicksilver to duty’s call, free from the mandatory discharge 
“solution”’.101 The Court stated that: ‘In short, we can regard the regulation 
here only as one based on unsubstantiated generalizations about the sexes, in 
the class of those ‘archaic and overbroad’ premises which have been rejected 
as unconstitutional’. The Court continued: ‘Not the least of these outmoded 
generalizations are the taboos inherent in connection with pregnancy, whether as 
a result of Victorian embarrassment at its physical capacity or as a presumption 
of physical incapacity.’102
Both Struck and Crawford challenged the presumption embedded in 
military regulations that pregnant women as a group, and without regard to 
their individual capacities for service during pregnancy, are unfit for service. 
This presumption subordinated pregnant women as a group because they were 
assessed as a class of pregnant women, rather than on the basis on their individual 
fitness to serve. Moreover, women in the military were supposed to fit into ‘the 
stereotypical vision … of the “correct” female response to pregnancy.’103 These 
pregnancy regulations ‘prohibited the employment of officers who became 
mothers, while allowing the employment of officers who became fathers,’104 thus 
constraining women’s family life while privileging men’s. As a result, ‘mandatory 
pregnancy discharge reinforces societal pressure to relinquish career aspirations 
for a hearth-centered existence.’105
The Frontiero and Markin decisions dismantled the sex role stereotypes of 
men as breadwinners and women as dependent homemakers in the military 
sector. Frontiero concerned a female military member’s right to create automatic 
entitlements (such as increased housing allowances and medical and dental 
benefits) for her husband that a military husband already could provide for his 
wife. The US Supreme Court found that a federal law allowing wives of male 
military members automatically to become dependents, while husbands of 
100 Gauthier (n 14) 45.
101 Crawford (n 21), para 24.
102 Ibid para 30.
103 Siegel and Siegel (n 99) 780, quoting from the Ginsburg brief in Struck (n 20).
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
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female military members were not considered dependents unless they relied on 
their wives for over one-half of their income support, violated the due process 
guaranty. In so finding, the Court enabled women to be providers in the military 
sector.
Frontiero explained that laws that restrict women’s rights have historically 
been rationalised as benign protections of women, in that wives were afforded 
protection of their husbands’ support that wives could not afford their husbands. 
The Court elaborated that the nation’s ‘long and unfortunate history of sex 
discrimination’ was ‘traditionally … rationalized by an attitude of “romantic 
paternalism” which in practical effect, put women not on a pedestal, but in a 
cage.’106 Due to notions of benign paternalism, the Court explained, ‘our statute 
books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the 
sexes’.107 The Court continued:
what differentiates sex from such non-suspect classes as intelligence or physical 
disability, and aligns it with the recognised suspect criteria, is that the sex 
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to 
society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect 
of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without 
regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.108
In Markin, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR-GC) held that the exclusion of servicemen from entitlement to parental 
leave, while servicewomen are so entitled, amounted to sex discrimination in 
family life. The ECtHR-GC addressed the decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Russia holding that the Military Service Act granting female military members 
three years of parental leave, while granting their male military colleagues 
only three months special leave to arrange for childcare, was constitutionally 
compliant.109 In rejecting the request for parental leave, the Constitutional Court 
did not envision a need to accord men a better way to balance the demands of 
family life and military work. The Constitutional Court said: the ‘purpose of such 
a leave is to give the serviceman a reasonable opportunity to arrange for the care 
of his child and, depending upon the outcome, to decide whether he wishes to 
continue the military service. If the serviceman decides to take care of his child 
himself, he is entitled to early termination of his service for family reasons’.110 The 
Constitutional Court explained that the legislature took account of the limited 
106 Frontiero (n 22) 684 (Brennan J).
107 Ibid 685.
108 Ibid 686–687.
109 Markin (n 23), para 34.
110 Ibid (citing para 2.2 of the Russian Constitutional Court decision of 15 January 2009).
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participation of women in the military and the special role of women associated 
with motherhood.111 The applicant responded:
Far from mitigating any historic disadvantage suffered by women, a policy whereby 
only women were entitled to take parental leave perpetuated gender stereotypes, 
inequality and hardship arising out of women’s traditional role of caring for the 
family in the home rather than earning money in the workplace. As a result, that 
policy discriminated both against men (in family life) and against women (in the 
workplace).112
In finding a breach of the right to non-discrimination on grounds of sex in 
relation to family life, the ECtHR-GC concluded that: ‘traditional distribution of 
gender roles in society cannot justify the exclusion of men, including servicemen, 
from entitlement to parental leave.’113 It explained:
gender stereotypes, such as the perception of women as primary child-carers and 
men as primary breadwinners, cannot, by themselves, be considered to amount 
to sufficient justification for a difference in treatment, any more than similar 
stereotypes based on race, origin, colour or sexual orientation.114
In enabling military men to take parental leave (as opposed to ‘special leave’), the 
Court dismantled the myth of men as inadequate parents and began to build a 
norm of men as nurturers.115
A concurring opinion would have also found discrimination on the ground 
of military status, because servicemen were treated less favourably than civilian 
men, since the latter were entitled to parental leave. The concurrence explained 
that no factual evidence was presented of any risk to operational effectiveness of 
the armed forces due to the possible parental leave taken by servicemen.116
The unequal treatment decisions explicate the prejudicial nature of military 
regulations with regard to pregnancy and parental leave and dependency benefits. 
They name the stereotypes, discuss their individual and group harms and explain 
why generalisations violate military women’s rights. Markin’s naming of the sex 
role stereotypes of men as breadwinners and women as homemakers shows how 
such stereotypes unjustifiably denied Mr Markin, and other similarly situated 
men, parental leave and thus infringing their family life in the military sector. 
Frontiero explains the harms of the stereotypes of military women as a group: 
‘invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without 
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid para 104.
113 Ibid para 143.
114 Ibid.
115 Nancy E Dowd, The Man Question-Male Subordination and Privilege (NYU Press 2010) 8.
116 Markin (n 23) 62–63 (Pinto de Albuquerque J).
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regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.’ Crawford determined 
that the generalisations about pregnant women were ‘unsubstantiated’ and 
‘underinclusive’ because pregnancy was the only temporary disability subject to 
discharge. The courts showed how sex role stereotypes deny military men the 
equal benefits of family life and how generalisations about military women are 
under-inclusive, thus obstructing their military careers. In so doing, the courts 
have enabled military personnel, irrespective of gender, to enjoy family life 
consistently with their military duties.
2 .3. SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
This section addresses pending and decided cases on sexual harassment, assault 
and rape by male military personnel of their military comrades (Gallagher), and 
by male military personnel of civilian women (Rodríguez Bustamente, Fernández 
Ortega).
The Gallagher case against the US is pending before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights on behalf of 20 military personnel (17 women 
and 3 men) who had been subjected to sexual violence, in most cases rape, by 
their military comrades. In ignoring petitioners’ subjection to sexual assaults and 
in overlooking the retaliation against them for reporting the assaults, the case 
alleges that the US violated petitioners’ rights under the American Declaration of 
Human Rights to life and security of the person, to be free of inhumane treatment, 
to privacy and protection of honour and reputation, to special protection, and to 
inviolability of the home. The case further claims that the US failure to investigate 
petitioners’ complaints and provide them with appropriate remedies violated 
their rights under the American Declaration to equal protection before the law 
on the basis of military status, gender and sexual orientation, and their rights to 
truth, to resort to the courts, and to petition the government and receive a prompt 
decision.117
The claim alleges violations of the right to work for all the petitioners who 
experienced sexual harassment in the workplace and for those petitioners who 
had to leave the military because of, for example, physical injuries, military sexual 
trauma-related post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and being discharged 
under the ‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’ policy on sexual orientation.118
Consistently with the Commission’s previous decision that military justice 
systems, including investigations and trials, are considered ineffective remedies 
to address human rights violations,119 the petition requests that:
117 Gallagher (n 24) 47–65, 69–77.
118 Ibid 10, 18, 20, 22, 66–69.
119 IACtHR, Márcio Lapoente da Silveira v Brazil, Case 4524-02 Report No 74/08, OEA/Ser L/V/
II 130 Doc 22, rev 1 (2008), para 64.
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– the decision whether to investigate, prosecute, and punish alleged perpetrators 
be removed from the military Chain of Command;
– an independent reporting procedure is established to encourage victims to 
come forward without fear of reprisal from their Chain of Command; and
– victims have access to US federal courts so they may sue for civil relief when 
the US Military violates their human and United States constitutional rights, 
which they are currently unable to do under US law.120
The petition requests that the US Uniform Code of Military Justice be amended 
to include provisions that prevent retaliation, prohibit prosecuting perpetrators 
of sexual violence with adultery instead of the more appropriate charge of rape, 
and prohibit punishing perpetrators of sexual violence under lesser provisions on 
non-judicial punishment, such as docking the perpetrators’ pay. Ultimately, the 
petitioners seek an Advisory Opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights regarding the nature and scope of the US obligations under the American 
Declaration in light of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, 
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.121
The complaint explains how the petitioners in basic training were described 
as: ‘weak or incompetent,’122 ‘bitch, pussy, fag or a cunt’,123 or how the petitioners 
who reported rape were labelled as ‘trouble makers’,124 ‘difficult’,125 ‘liars’,126 
‘whores’,127 or ‘sluts’.128 Such hostile labelling often takes place when an out-group 
joins an in-group.129 When left unchecked, such degradation contributes to a 
culture of impunity that encourages sexism and misogyny,130 and ‘condones a 
culture that allowed sexual harassment, sexual assault and rape.’131
The complaint explains that the consequences of military sexual trauma are 
multiple, including PTSD. The complaint elaborates that:
According to Department of Veterans Affairs … statistics, in 2012, 85,000 veterans 
sought treatment for military sexual trauma. One study of female veterans found 
that those with military sexual trauma had higher rates of PTSD than those 
120 Gallagher (n 24) 4–6, 78–79.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid 8.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid 15, 19.
125 Ibid 11.
126 Ibid 11, 13.
127 Ibid 11, 15.
128 Ibid 17. See also Anthony C King, ‘Women Warriors: Female Accession to Ground Combat’ 
(May 2014) Armed Forces & Society 1, 2–4.
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who had experienced other forms of trauma. Sixty percent of those who had 
experienced military sexual trauma suffered from PTSD.132
Yet despite these higher rates, disability claims for military sexual trauma-related 
PTSD for both women and men are granted at significantly lower rates than other 
PTSD claims.133 Litigation regarding this unequal treatment is pending.134
Sexual violence and rape by male military personnel extend to the civilian 
population, for example rapes of Somali women and girls by the African Union 
military force.135 Much of it happens with impunity, as was the case in Kenya where 
British male military personnel sexually violated Kenyan women. Despite calls by 
Amnesty International136 and by the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission137 for investigation, neither the British nor the Kenyan governments 
have established commissions of inquiry, suggesting that women’s sexual bodies 
are expendable and crimes against women are lesser crimes that do not warrant 
state investigation.138 In contrast, the Colombia Council of State in Rodríguez 
Bustamente held its military accountable for sexual violations of civilian women. 
Where national courts have not held militaries responsible for sexual violence by 
military personnel against civilian women, international tribunals, such as the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Fernández Ortega decision, have 
done so.
132 Ibid 37.
133 American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut, Service 
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In Rodríguez Bustamente, the Colombian Council of State ordered the 
National Ministry of Defence to pay moral damages to the young victim, Mónica 
Marisol Rodríguez Bustamente, her mother and three siblings, damages to Ms 
Mónica for harm to her life plan, payment for her psychotherapeutic treatment, 
and damages to compensate her for loss of profits and other material harms. 
Finally, in order to achieve full reparation and non-repetition, the Council 
ordered non-pecuniary measures, such as dissemination of its decision to 
relevant governmental bodies for adoption of preventative and corrective 
measures, training programmes in women’s rights, including of women affected 
by internal armed conflict, for the national army in the area where this violation 
took place, and the development of guidelines for the military for the prevention, 
investigation and punishment of violence against women.139 The Council of State 
called for the prevention of gender prejudice and stereotyping, such as in the 
treatment of women as the sexual property of men, and the biased treatment of 
women in investigations and prosecutions.140
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Fernández Ortega held 
Mexico responsible for the rape of an indigenous woman, Mrs Fernández Ortega, 
by military personnel. The Court found that this rape entailed a violation of her 
right to personal integrity constituting an act of torture,141 her rights to personal 
integrity and dignity, and to private life,142 and an abusive interference with 
her family residence.143 Because the state did not act with due diligence in the 
investigation of the rape, the Court found a violation of her rights to judicial 
guarantees and to judicial protection.144 Moreover, because of Mrs Fernández 
Ortega’s inability to file a claim in her own language, the Court found unequal 
treatment in her access to justice.145 It also held that the rape and the facts related 
to the pursuit of justice, and the perpetrator’s impunity, involved a violation of the 
right to personal integrity of her husband and children.146 While the Court did 
not expose the operative stereotypes, its decision helped to overcome the prejudice 
against indigenous people as lesser citizens by finding a violation of the right to 
equal access to justice of Mrs Fernández Ortega and her immediate family.
Consistently with its previous rulings,147 the Court held that the military justice 
system does not have jurisdiction to determine whether its military personnel 
violated the human rights of civilians, because of the lack of independence and 
impartiality within the system.148 It ordered appropriate changes in the Mexican 
139 Rodriguez Bustamente (n 25) paras 67–73.
140 Ibid paras 65–66.
141 Fernández Ortega (n 26) para 128.
142 Ibid paras 129, 131, 138.
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Code of Military Justice,149 and establishment of procedures to contest the 
inappropriate intervention of the military justice system.150
In ordering pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, the Court emphasised 
the need to continue with the federal and state training programmes on the 
diligent investigation of sexual violence against women, applying a gender and 
ethnicity perspective by governmental officials who are the first responders to 
female victims of violence.151 The Court further asked the state to implement a 
training programme on human rights for all members of the Mexican Armed 
Forces.152 Research is needed to determine whether these training programmes 
have been undertaken and whether they are effective in dismantling patriarchal 
structures, such as the socio-cultural practices of gender including hostile gender 
stereotyping, in order to achieve women’s equality.153
Militaries are realising that they have to be far more effective in preventing 
and remedying sexual assault.154 Failure to do so will spur further litigation 
against them, exacerbating reputational and budgetary costs and compromise 
operational effectiveness. Explanations about the prevalence and persistence of 
sexual violence in the military abound, including lack of military leadership,155 
tolerance of an unprofessional work environment, hypermasculinity,156 power 
dynamics,157 rigid sex roles and hostility toward women who transgress gender 
boundaries.158 Elaboration of these and other explanations is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, except to say that more research is needed on how military policies 
and practices spawn prejudices and degrading stereotyping that can facilitate 
sexual violence.
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Lessons from these cases are preliminary because one case is pending and 
only two decided cases are discussed. The explication of the degrading labelling, 
whether it concerns professional competence, sexuality, or truthfulness in 
the Gallagher brief and the naming of women as the ‘sexual property of men’ 
in Rodríguez Bustamente, illuminate the prejudices about women. The hostile 
labelling suggests that women are less than human, justifying their sexual assaults. 
Moreover, in failing to adequately address such assaults, the military is sending a 
message that it is permissible to ignore women’s individual values. In delivering 
justice for Mrs Fernández Ortega and her family, the Inter-American Court 
overcame prejudices against indigenous people as lesser citizens. In so doing, the 
Court ensured that individuals, regardless of their sex and, for example, their 
indigenous status, ‘should be able to rely on a [legal] system free of myths and 
stereotypes, and judiciary whose impartiality is not compromised by … biased 
assumptions.’159
3. CONCLUSION
Where women take on warrior and leadership roles that have traditionally 
belonged to men, hostile stereotyping emerges to keep women out of, invisible 
in, or relegated to support roles in, the military rather than embraced by it. This 
phenomenon is not unique to the military. When women joined other professions, 
such as law,160 medicine,161 and religious ministries,162 hostile stereotyping 
emerged, and with the help of courts, has been or begun to be addressed.163 As 
female participation in defence forces grows (approximating 9% in the UK, 12% 
in the US, 13% in Australia, and 17% in Canada)164 militaries will have to address 
hostile gender stereotyping to ensure that professional competence, irrespective 
of gender, is given priority.165
The lessons learned from this analysis of select court cases on women’s 
exclusion from the military, the unequal treatment of women and men, and 
sexual assault, are multiple. Courts’ deference to presumptions constituting 
military expertise, evident in Rostker, Dory and Sirdar, is being replaced by 
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fact-based assessments, as was meticulously done in Gauthier. The fact that 
the US Department of Defense did not appeal the Hegar case suggests that 
the Department understood that it would not have been able to substantiate 
the generalisations about women’s inability to meet combat standards in part 
because, as the complaint explains, women have successfully served in combat as 
acknowledged by combat decorations awarded by the military to women.
As to the debate about whether claims involving the human and constitutional 
rights and obligations of military personnel should be litigated in the military or 
the civilian justice system, all the cases analysed in this chapter were brought in 
the civilian system. The Gallagher complaint, pending before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, exhausted all remedies before both the US 
military and civilian systems to no avail, as did the complaint in Fernández Ortega 
in the Mexican systems. To better overcome gender prejudice and to eliminate 
detrimental gender stereotypes, further research is necessary of military laws and 
policies and court judgments about equal treatment of men and women in the 
military, similar to analyses of civilian law.166
In the unequal treatment and the sexual assault cases, the naming of the hostile 
stereotypes was well done in part because consciousness had already been raised 
about the prejudices in those issue areas outside the military. In the exclusion 
decisions, stereotypes were less well articulated in part because consciousness 
had not been raised. Moreover, ‘[w]hen one sex is disproportionately represented, 
there is a danger of seeing this as some naturally occurring pattern, rather than 
questioning the socially constructed norm. Asking why there is disproportion is 
critical, as well as how that informs the structure and goals of the system.’167
The judicial exposition of harms of stereotyping, as was pointedly done in 
Miller, is essential: ‘The presence of unacknowledged harms means a silencing 
that harms individuals and their relationships, and their communities.’168 The 
individual and group harms of stereotypic generalisations varied according 
to kinds of decisions discussed in this chapter. Exclusion cases addressed 
unsubstantiated generalisations, while the unequal treatment decisions focused 
on under-inclusive generalisations. Sexual harassment cases exposed false 
stereotyping. How well courts articulate the individual and group harms, 
and explain how they violate human and constitutional rights, matters. Legal 
language shapes and reinforces social meaning. Courts are playing a critical role 
by articulating how the substitution of individual assessment for inappropriate 
stereotypes denies the military and civil society, more generally, particular 
capacities of both men and women.
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